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I 
IDEAS AND THEMES 
We all know, we all agree, that the imagination, as a creative 
and expressive force, holds supreme importance. The problem is 
to say exactly what this importance consists in. 
If we want an explication of the status of the imagination -
how it makes a difference - we shall have to seek after its highest 
expression. And so we should not rest content with a characteriza-
tion that covers all proper instances of the imagination fairly and 
equally. For it is plain that treating all the phenomena on a par 
impedes an investigation of what the imagination is capable of 
achieving. Rather the strategy here adopted is to focus on the most 
prominent exemplifications and let them suggest how the associated 
phenomena are to be organized and described. The stance is not the 
stance of one confronting an array of sorted phenomena in order to 
discern the meaning of the whole as constituted from the bits, but of 
one magnifying the bit that appears as the nucleus. After that is 
sketched, the view may be extended to include more by reducing the 
power of enlargement . That is to say, surveying the range of the 
imagination begins with the microscope. 
But before this task can be started on , competing theories have 
to be cleared away . Two pictures of the , imagination, the first lasting 
over two thousand years, the second for less than a hundred, have 
defined the thought of its nature . An attempt will be made to explain 
why the first endured so long and why the second arose . An adequate 
lJt.llVc .. , rY \ 
LIBRARY 
(;AMJR.ll•GE 
1 
account of the history of an idea, especially one so central to 
European philosophy as the idea of imagination, would of course 
involve a detailed study of all the leading contributions, showing the 
role the imagination has in each and how its conception changes and 
develops with time. But all that is necessary for my purposes is a 
rough description of the widely-held assumptions . Indeed such 
generalizing is possible because the views have remained so uniform . 
It should be readily acknowledged , upon reflection, that the 
imagination, for one reason or another, strikes us as more perplexing 
than perception . It is as though the familiarity and unavoidability 
of perception makes us oblivious to its inexplicableness. (For instance, 
remember how quite recently Wittgenstein admonished the philo-
sophically trained agains t surrendering to the natural tendency: 'We 
find certain things about seeing puzzling , because we do not find the 
whole business of seeing puzzling enough .') In fact to experience 
perception as a real problem requires extreme effort and concentration , 
while we naturally and easily find mental images strange , other-
worldly ~ Images and dreams are normally felt as most curious pheno-
mena , and we are not satisfied until we have come across some 
explanation , no matter , it seems frequently, how outlandish . This 
strong tendency of taking images as more' problematic has been re-
sponsible for approaching the analysis of perception in a particular 
way, which is to derive the definition of perception from the definition 
of imagination. The methodological priority of the imagination is 
however not made explicit because the conclusion of many of the 
various inquiries into the nature of experience, namely that internal 
images are not magical conveyors of unordinary truths, that their 
strangeness is only apparent, has perverted the exposition of the 
argument . One does not attribute the source of one's thinking to 
what one hopes to discredit. 
Due to a philosophical refinement and agreement that precludes 
investigation, the actual motivation for accepting the traditional 
picture has been buried. But it can be exhumed by examining an 
ancient version. In the first century B. C. Lucretius, relating the 
doctrines of Epicurus , who propounded them two hundred years earlier, 
writes, when first considering the nature of experience, about mental 
images. 
Now I will embark on an explanation of a highly 
relevant fact , the existence of what~ ca-11 'images' 
of things, a sort of outer skin perpetually peeled off 
the surface of objects and flying about this way and 
that through the air. It is these whose impact scares 
our minds, whether waking or sleeping, on those 
occasions when we catch a glimpse of strange shapes 
and phantoms of the dead. Often , when we are sunk 
in slumber, they startle us with the notion that spirits 
may get loose from Hades and ghosts hover about among 
the living, and that some part of us may survive after 
death when body and mind alike have been disintegrated 
and dissolved into their component atoms. (On the Nature 
of the Universe, p. 131) 
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The prose translation, needless to say, does not preserve the 
'sweet honey of the Muses' but this passage does show that the 
starting-point of the inquiry is the imagination and that the immediate 
concern is to allay fears evoked by its more frightening products . 
Now an obvious technique for explaining away the bizarre is to show 
that the bizarre is at bottom a function of the commonplace. Accord-
ingly, in this context, the imagination becomes, as it were, an inferior 
kind of perception. It must be inferior for, as Lucretius states, truth 
originates in the senses (p . 145). Once the imagination has been so 
defined, the argument about the nature of perception comes without 
trouble. Towards the end of the discussion the position is reviewed . 
. . . as a vision beheld by the mind closely resembles 
one beheld by the eye, the two must have been created 
in a similar fashion. Now , I have shown that I see a 
lion, for example , through the impact of films on the 
eyes. It follows that something similar accounts for 
the motion of the mind, which also, no less than the 
eyes, beholds a lion or whatever it may be by means of 
films . The only difference is that the objects of its 
vision are flimsier. (pp. 153-4) 
It stands to reason that mental images have to be flimsier in order 
to penetrate the body and to activate the substance of the mind 
. without stimulating the sense - organs . But notice how the progres-
sion of the argument has been reversed in the summing-up . What 
inspired the definition of perception was in fact, as we have seen , 
the characterization of images as very thin films; that character-
ization is the assumption that initiates the theory . In the course 
. . 
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of the poem the senses are presented as incomparably trustworthy, 
and all error is attributed to reason and the mind. This view there-
fore necessitates a correction . If it is claimed that perception is 
primary and the foundation of truth, the derivation of its definition 
from the definition of imagination would be an embarrassment. Thus 
the actual procedure of the inquiry is disavowed, and its contrary 
(i.e. the one advancing the thesis that the analysis of perception 
as the apprehension of films entails how mental images are to be 
explained) is declared. 
Later, because this doctrine of experience as the apprehension 
of representations had become so deeply ingrained in the philosophical 
tradition, the dubious need for a pretence to conceal the actual pro-
cedure fell away. That there was a consensus among philosophers 
obviated making explicit the reasons for adopting certain assumptions. 
And we may suppose that the doctrine remained unquestioned because 
it was an extremely simple and comprehensive account of complex 
and very varied phenomena . 'Internal images are discrete, insub-
stantial items which come and go according to no canons of coherence. 
They must be engendered by perception, for whatever the image dis-
plays - t he whole or each part - resembles sensory experience. 
Therefore perception itself must consist in the apprehension of fleeting 
representations , for no intimate relation '?an exist between essentially 
divergent things . ' This doctrine was taken for granted despite the 
fact that , although images appear markedly to have the properties 
attributed to them , there is no experiential basis for analysing per-
ception along similar lines . It is clear that perception could not 
possibly consis t i n the reception of discrete representations ; the 
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merest attention to one's perceptual experience demonstrates this 
fact. 
Hobbes, writing seventeen hundred years after Lucretius, 
corrects the classical materialist theory but leaves the core intact. 
He denies that sense or perception involves the reception of repre-
sentations emanating from objects without, and argues that sense 
consists in representations produced by the action of external objects 
on the sense-organs, the stimulations of which are ultimately just 
the motions of matter. Sensations and images inhere not in external 
objects but are internal bodily effects; and so images are what 
survive after the objects of perception no longer impinge on sensibility. 
For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, 
we still retain an image of the thing seen, though 
more obscure than when we see it • .. IMAGINATION 
therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found 
in men, and many other living Creatures, as well 
sleeping, as waking. (Leviathan, Pt. I, Ch. 2) 
Hobbes quickly explains that the waning of the image is due not to 
its natur~l disintegration, for unimpeded motion is eternal, but to the 
successive overlaying of sensory impressions, which obscures past 
experiences . 
As there is no point in explaining the currently obvious , Hobbes 
begins with the definition of sense without attempting more than a 
mere statement of it, and goes on to claim that the imagination is 
wholly dependent upon perception . What is experientially prior is 
6 
- --. -
accorded, fittingly, methodological priority. This ordering has to 
be right since, if the properties of images flow from the properties 
of sense, then the former may be discerned only after the latter 
have been determined. However, contrary to what one might naively 
expect, the substance of images turns out to be identical with the 
substance of sense : both sensation and imagination are, as Hobbes 
states, 'Fancy'. The phrase 'decaying sense ' purports to define 
the inferiority as well as the dependence of imagination. But, by 
Hobbes' implicit admission, there are no intrinsic features estab-
lishing the subordinate status of the imagination. The image is 
equal in all respects to the sensation . But in the waking man images 
disappear and diminish in force because obscured by more recent 
impressions and images; in sleep, they appear, without interference 
from sense, at full strength (the absurdity of dreams · is caused by 
"the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body'" (Pt. I, Ch. 2)).. 
Now Hobbes says both that images peter out through the continual 
imposition of present sensations , and that the images in dreams are 
indistinguishable from sensations . This ambiguity indicates that 
Hobbes intends to demonstrate the subordinate experiential (and so 
epistemological) status of the imagination but does not succeed in 
locating integral properties of images to prove their inferiority. He 
attacks, like Lucretius, the notion that images emanate from super-
sensible forces - he spends time discussing dreams and fantasy 
which can interfere with 'civill Obedience' - and maintains that 
knowledge begins with the action of external objects on the senses , 
. . ~ ........ 
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the remnants of which are images in the mind . If that is so , then it 
should be easy enough to separate the real source of knowledge from its 
vestiges by virtue of its primacy . But Hobbes finds it necessary to ad-
duce the peripheral : we know the difference, he says, between Sense and 
Dreaming because , among other things , we observe the absurdities of 
dreaming while awake but never dream of waking Thoughts as absurdities . 
Such considerations do not impress, for, in keeping with the status 
of sense , we look for an acknowledgement of the enveloping texture of 
perception and the stability and inexhaustible richness of experience 
that constantly challenge judgment and reason . Now to find an expla-
nation why neither Hobbes nor many others took the facts of perception 
into consideration , let alone recognized them , we do not have to seek 
very far. It cannot escape notice that the theory of perception for Hobbes 
and for others , comes from an almost exclusive preoccupation with the 
phenomenal properties of mental images . The theory of perception is 
modelled on the theory of imagination . Perception , they contend , in-
volves the apprehension of d i screte , immaterial appearances just like 
imagination . This evidently implies that t he relation between the self 
a nd the percept ion is exactly s imilar to the relation between the self 
and the image . But if perce iving is i n part inferr ing from patches of 
colour, imagining can hardly be explained analogously . How could 
such e rrors about the nature of pe rception be made othe r th a n by exploit-
ing uncritica lly the more plausible assumptions about the nat ure of 
imagination ? For Hobbes ment al images' a re the paradigms of exper-
ience . And so his problem is not the problem of showing the expe r -
ientia l inferiority of images, a s he might have thought, but rather the 
proble m of e stablishing the superiority o f the manifold of s e ns e . If in 
his account perception turns out to be too like imagination , the fault 
lies in the definition of perception. Of course it would be impossible 
for Hobbes to admit that that definition may be defective - an attitude 
to which the perfunctory discussion attests, the excuse of having 
pursued the matters at length elsewhere notwithstanding. But the pre-
dicament is more complicated . The definition of perception cannot be 
challenged for it acts as the basis of the theory of experience; to re-
vise it would necessitate a radical reappraisal of the whole perspective. 
Yet, on the other hand, to weaken the status of images further and so 
create a more realistic separation of sense and imagination would have 
the not dissimilar effect of undermining the account of perception. As 
images are indeed the models for the analysis of perception, how they 
are conceived must hold firm or else that analysis would be in jeopardy. 
Hobbes struggles to separate sense from imagination, and the word 
'decaying' is meant to carry the weight of his contention, a weight 
which proves to be too great for it. No sooner does he state that ima-
gination is decaying sense than he takes it back, and the ambiguity 
makes its appearance. 
This theme of the continuity of imagination and perception joins 
with and supports another in the tradition. If the matter of experience 
comes in isolata!, independent, fleeting and insubstantial bits then 
the fact that we experience something more indicates, so the reason-
ing goes, that complex mental operations take place. The experience 
of the external world emerges as the sentient being judges on the basis 
of discrete, sensory data which survive as internal appearances. Indeed 
it was long believed that internal images were indispensable for think-
ing. St. Thomas Aquinas takes from Aristotle this view and the view 
that experience cannot be reduced to sensation and image, for appear-
ances alone are dumb . More importantly , he was one of the first to 
seriously pursue the idea that there must be mental processes which 
link the various items in order to deliver a coherent and unified ex-
perience of a material world . He argues that while images as such are 
devoid of import, they provide elements from which can be abstracted 
the meanings of the objects of appearance. As the mind requires some-
thing distinct in addressing itself to thought, all knowledge, and even 
awareness of the supersensible, depends upon reflection on images. 
In its present condition the mind cannot actually understand 
anything except by reference to images . There are two indi -
cations of this state of affairs. First, the mind is a power 
which does not operate as part of a bodily organ, and so, 
were there no dependence on sense and imagination and 
faculties within bodily organs, its activity would be unim-
paired by bodily lesion. Yet in understanding, either freshly 
or summoning knowledge already gained, the mind's activity 
must be accompanied by activity of imagination and of other 
sense-powers. When the imagination is warped, as in mad-
ness ... a man is prevented from understanding even those 
things he previously knew. Secondly, each man experiences 
in himself that when he attempts to understand a subject he 
must picture it and use images as examples to hold his 
attention . (Summa Theologica, 1265-74, pp. 234 - 5). 
To make possible the instant resuscitation of past experience and 
the acquisition of new knowledge, the imagination has to retain 
sensory impressions as a tourist collects picture postcards. 
The proper external senses are appointed to receive sensible 
forms , and so also is a common internal sense, which is 
like a joint root and principle of the external senses . The 
proper senses judge of their proper sensible objects, dis-
cerning one object from another within their proper field; 
for instance the sight distinguishes white from black or 
green. But to tell white from sweet cannot be done by the 
sight or taste, for to discern between two things implies 
knowing them both . This discrimination is the work of a 
common sense , to which are referred as in a joint- clearing 
house the perceptions of the other senses , . This sense is 
also able to sense sensation itself, as when somebody sees 
that he is seeing. This cannot be done by the proper senses, 
which merely know the sensible forms that alter them. 
Then to hold and keep these images, the phantasy of 
sense-imagination is appointed; it may be described as the 
storehouse of impressions ... (pp . 228-9) 
There is little point in quoting further, for it is plain ·enough now how he 
set up t he problem of knowledge and experience which was to exercise 
the minds of some of the greatest philosophers. 
This view of the imagination was strengthened and elaborated in 
the Enlightenment. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries clarity 
was considered a sure mark of truth, and clarity was thought best 
achieved by selecting and arranging one 's ideas, which often meant 
furnishing the mind with concrete representations or images . Even 
Descartes , who valued clarity and distinctness so highly but who argued 
in the sec ond Meditation (1641) that the imagination is dispensable 
because , as the imagination cannot cope with th e infinity of aspects of 
mat erial objects, the knowledge we have of nature comes through the 
understanding or the intuitions of mind alone, maintained that correct 
thinking consists in attending to representations. 'Of my thoughts some 
11 
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are, so to speak, images of the things , and to these alone is the title 
"idea" properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a 
chimera, of heaven, of an angel , or of God' (p. 159) .. A more typical 
example of the combination of clarity with the imagination appears per-
haps in a letter of Leibniz' s addressed to Queen Charlotte of Prus sia , 17 02 . 
As therefore our soul compares (for example) the numbers and 
figures which are in colours with the numbers and figures 
which are found by touch , there must be an internal sense, 
in which the perceptions of these different external senses are 
found united. This is what is called the imagination , which 
comprises at once the notions of the particular senses, which 
are clear but confused, and the notions of the common sense , 
which a re clear and distinct. (p . 3 5 7) 
Subsequent theories are variations on the theme. For Hume the 
imagination, which contains all ideas, themselves copies of sensory 
impressions, unites them by the principles of association , custom and 
habit. As ideas as such are distinct existence, the workings of the ima-
gination are responsible for producing the belief in the ' continu 'd exis -
t ence of body', a belief induced by the peculiar vivacity of the resem-
blance among ideas . 
This resemblance is observ'd in a thousand instances, and 
naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted per-
ceptions by t he strongest relation, and conveys the mind with 
an easy transition from one to another. An easy transition or 
passage of the imagination, along the ideas of the se different 
< ' 
and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of 
niind with that in which we consider one constant and uninter -
rupted perception . 'Tis therefore very natural for us to 
··- .... 
mistake the one for the other. (Treatise , 17 3 9 , Bk . I, 
Pt.iv,p.204) 
Hume concludes that the belief in the independent existence of 
objects without the mind is finally unwarranted. How can we justi-
fiably believe in a world of durable objects when all that we perceive 
is brief and discontinuous ? He is driven to the skeptical position 
because he takes seriously, and faces the implications of, the 
definition of perception which derives from the definition of internal 
images. It is proof of the attraction of the (implicit) derivation that Hume , 
a philosopher having an exceptional capacity for skepticism, never for 
a moment entertains a doubt concerning the received doctrine of exper-
ience. And the fact that the definition of perception which originated 
in reflection on the imagination should lead to a theory which states 
that the imagination constitutes perception speaks for itself . 
Burne's arguments had the effect of raising awareness of the diffi -
culties of formulating a satisfactory account of perception of the ex-
ternal world, of objective experience. Clearly , one way of dealing with 
such difficulties is to make the account of the imagination and percep-
tion more complex . But complexity, as we see, is not always free of 
obscurity . The theory of imagination reaches a culmination of sorts in 
Kant, whose contribution is important not only for its attempt to answer 
Hume' s problem but also for its application to aesthetic activity . 
While Hume makes the understanding dependent upon the imagina -
tion ('the understanding, that is •.. the general and more establish'd 
properties of the imagination' (p . 267) ) , Kant describes the imagi -
nation as mediating between sensibility and the understanding. As 
experience involves the co-operation of heterogeneous elements, i. e . 
sensation and concepts, there must be an interposing factor, 
possessing characteristics of both, to reconcile them. 
Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, 
and since different perceptions therefore occur in the 
mind separately and singly, a combination of them, 
such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. 
There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the 
synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the 
title, imagination. (First Critique , 1781&1787, Al20) 
Kant assigns to the faculty of imagination two main functions. One, 
the reproductive and empirical, is akin to that recognized by Hume. 
The imagination has the power to revive past impressions and to link 
them in the mind according to the principles of association. The 
other and more essential, the productive and transcendental , is 
that which, by the process of synthesis, provides sensible exempli-
fications of the categories of the understanding, exemplifications which 
are neither equatable with nor reducible to actual sensory impressions. 
This figurative synthesis of the manifold of sensible appearances , 
which gr0unds the categories in sensation , achieves the unity of 
experience in one consciousness by determining a priori the range 
of possible experiences of objects confor!Ilable to the categories 
* (B 151-2 , B 18 0-1) . 
* For a discussion of Kant's employment of the concept of imagination 
and its relation to Burne ' s , see P. Strawson, 'Imagination and 
Perception' . 
Furthermore the imagination , as Kant argues in the Third 
Critique, 1790, is active in both aesthetic appreciation and artistic 
creativity . In ordinary cognition the understanding brings concepts 
in the form of rules to bear upon the arrangements of sense supplied 
by the imagination . The experience of art allows a respite and 
release from the dictates of concepts by permitting the imagination 
the freedom to invent order in the manifold, a freedom that delights 
in not being bound by pre-existing conceptual rules. The talent of 
the artist is the talent of employing the imagination to create what 
Kant calls aesthetic ideas , or representations of the imagination for 
which no concept whatever could be adequate. Aesthetic ideas con-
trast with rational ideas for which no sensible intuition whatever 
could be adequate. The artist then attempts to embody aesthetic 
ideas in a sensible form. 
Such representations of the imagination may be termed 
ideas. This partly because they at least strain after 
something lying out beyond the confines of experience, 
and so seek to approximate to a presentation of rational 
concepts (i . e . intellectual ideas), thus giving to these 
concepts t he semblance of an objective reality. But, on 
the other hand , t here is this most important reason , that 
no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal 
intuitions. The poet essays the task of interpreting to 
sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom 
of the blessed, hell , eternity , creation , &c. Or, again , 
as to things of which examples occur in experience , e.g. 
death, envy, and all vices, as also love, fame, and the 
like, transgressing the limits of experience he attempts 
with the aid of an imagination which emulates the display 
of reason in its attainment of a maximum, to body them 
forth to sense with a completeness of which nature 
affords no parallel; and it is in fact precisely in the 
poetic art that the faculty of aesthetic ideas can show 
itself to full advantage. (§49, pp. 176-7) 
Thus the function of the imagination in art is to provide enjoyable 
and intriguing departures from the ordinary, to remind us, especially, 
that what we humanly are and what we experience are not ultimate 
realities: the aesthetic idea gestures toward, and gives a sense of, 
the absolute and unknowable. 
Theories of the imagination after this inevitably fall short of 
the heights of Kantian metaphysics, but some fail not from not trying. 
Coleridge distinguishes between Fancy, which is roughly equivalent, 
it seems, to the reproductive imagination in Kant I and the Imagination 
proper: 
· The IMAGINATION then, I consider either as primary, or 
secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the 
living Power and prime Agent of.all human Perception, and 
as a repetition in 1he finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider 
as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious 
will , yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of 
- • ' - -~ 1,. • - - ... _, - .. 
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its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode 
of its operation . It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in 
order to recreate; or where this process is rendered 
impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize 
and to unify . It is essentially vital, even as all objects 
(as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (Biographia 
Literaria, 1817 , Ch. XIII, end) 
One does not complain that Coleridge fails to sustain the profundity 
of the attribution beyond the paragraph, nor laments the unavailability 
of the suppressed 'l 00 pages'. Rather one objects to the account of 
imagination, vague as it is , as it is employed in the discussion of 
art,. for it hardly illuminates artistic creation, serving to imply, 
gratuitously , some fundamental connection between art and the great 
and all -important. The poet is said to achieve unity of thought and 
feeling by balancing and reconciling opposites, by harmonizing ideas 
and representations , and so on , but these processes so described 
seem remote from those involving mental images, let alone actual 
artistic creativity , that we may begin to think that the alleged con-
nections. are spurious . Yet even if we grant that the continuity 
obtains, that the imagination does participate in art as Coleridge 
contends , the theory of magical powers does not deliver what is 
intended, for , despite its truth , it does not make the least clear just 
what is going on in artistic creation and expres s ion. The theory is 
loose and unhelpful. But perhaps it should be sympathetically re -
garded simply as an elevated conception of aesthetic inspiration, 
amounting to an apotheosis of art and artists . 
. .. :/I 
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If there is one conclusion to be drawn from Kant and 
Coleridge it is the conclusion that whatever explanatory value the 
faculty of imagination may have vis-a-vis the constitution of per-
ception and the objectivity of experience, it comes to nothing when the 
imagination so conceived is applied to aesthetic matters. If there 
is plausibility in the idea that the imagination, apart from copying 
and retaining antecedent perceptions, distils sensation and extracts 
elements which define how experience must be , there is none in the 
suggestion that the poet works anaLogously, rather like a film editor 
following the principles of cinematic montage. The patent unaccept-
ability of this highly abstract conception of artistic creativity demon-
strates finally what has been recognized all along, namely, that 
that from which the conception emerges is itself totally unacceptable. 
We have already seen how the roots of the theory are rotten, and 
now we see how the decay infects the showy outcroppings . Per-
ception is such-and-such, and the imagination or mental imagery 
is its remnant or replica : thus the obvious features of mental images, 
it is thought , confirm the definition of perception . But this confirma-
tion cannot be, for, as we know, the definition of perception was 
formulated from certain assumptions about the nature of imagination . 
After Hobbes , interest in this theme of the relationship of sense and 
image, and of their exact constitution , vi~tually died away . It was 
supplanted by the problem of improving the account of perception 
by removing certain inadequacies . But the attempt at correction did 
not attack the source of the trouble , for such a correction would have 
entailed a wholesale revision . Instead the imagination was endowed 
0 
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with a greater, even transcendental function. And so perception 
came to be regarded officially - as it had long been tacitly - as 
dependent on imagination. The circle completes itself. 
The Kantian climb to such breathtaking vistas is bound to 
cause exhaustion and, just as significantly, to implant the conviction 
that the task remaining for lesser explorers, who are compelled to 
descend from the pinnacle , occupied so briefly, is that of forging 
a more accessible ascent, noting landmarks and obstacles once 
missed. It is plain that for one adopting the traditional perspective 
the only path, after Kant, points downward. How could an excur-
sion after the master's journey be but anti-climactic ? And how could 
the student venturer have enough energy in reserve to scale another 
peak , if indeed he could descry another not obscured by the one under-
foot ? 
It took a century for philosophy to catch its breath, and to 
recuperate sufficiently to be able to survey afresh. Only then was 
it fully appreciated that the traditional procedure moved in the wrong 
direction. If perception is primary, then it is primary; it cannot be 
manufactured by the imagination . And thus it is perverse to draw 
conclusions about the nature of perception from reflection upon mental 
images. It is argued, surely correctly, by phenomenologists and 
behaviourists alike that images are dependent upon perception; and 
both go on to maintain, though in quite divergent ways, that if images 
are so dependent then their nature , and the nature of the imagination 
itself , can be inferred from prominent elements of perception , a 
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perception of material objects which is far from reducible to sensory 
impressions. But carelessly, without reservation, these reformers 
surrender to an old tendency: if imagination and perception are 
continuous, then points at both extremes should bear a significant 
resemblance and relation - having determined the scheme at one 
end makes it possible to work to the other. The mistake of believing 
that this derivation is a prerequisite for any inquiry into the nature 
and purpose of the imagination appears representatively in two writers, 
distinctive even within their incompatible schools, who are discussed 
below in separate chapters. That it is a mistake is shown by the 
narrowness and abstractness of the issuing accounts . In fact the 
absence of an adequate account of mental imagery does not inhibit 
the search for some satisfactory description of the scope and power 
of the imagination. Free of the restraints imposed by the assumption 
of a close relation with images and thus perception, the theory of 
imagination can now incorporate and be applied to less familiar 
aspects of the mind. Although, undeniably, images do play a part, 
a critical part, in the imaginative life, the assumption that the 
imagination must be an elaborate continuation of imagery, and the 
corresponding mechanical procedure of extracting its definition, are 
without merit . 
Before the two representative ways .of extracting the character 
of imagining from the character of perceiving are examined , a new 
problem, engendered by the inversion of the traditional procedure, to 
which both studies chiefly address their efforts , is investigated. If 
the imagination is a subordinate, though still important but super-
added faculty to perception, then the interpretation of imaginative 
experience becomes differently problematic. As imagination and 
perception are basically dissimilar, is it correct to employ the same 
vocabulary to describe each ? 
Moreover, both writers , as they repudiate the tradition, find 
the established conceptions of the self, which declare it to be either 
fixed in accordance with the laws of nature that apply to all living 
species or immutable because a non-natural substratum, sharing in 
the divine, uncongenial. Against the traditional views they argue 
that the self is thoroughly dynamic, being either a contentless force 
constantly striving for the unobtainable or an aggregation of the multi-
farious and changeable dispositions manifested by the human body . 
But this unceasing dynamism of change and the indiscriminate com-
prehensiveness, by implicitly ruling out the centrality of individual 
character , make self-discovery and the treatment of internal conflict 
which demands self-definition, impossibilities. As any account of 
the self then has to cope with these rather intractable requirements 
of the person, what is offered in the last two chapters is presented 
with extreme tentativeness . 
Reflection on the manner of individual change and growth yields 
a major revision to the commonly considered structure of the imagina-
tion . Not all change in the self is brought about by judgment and 
manipulation, indeed some of the most fundamental changes occur as 
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a function of 'blind' growth. The imagination manifests itself 
not only in fabrication, as has always been agreed, but also, 
and perhaps superiorly , in generation. These two aspects, the 
generative and the fabricative, are related at crucial points and 
together outline the scope of imagination. 
. ·~---~-
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THE IMAGE AND ITS DESCRIPTION 
The preoccupation with mental imagery as the expression 
.lli!!:.. excellence of the imagination has diminished but little from 
Descartes to the present day . The peculiar fascination that mental 
images command makes that continuation not hard to understand . 
But if there has been no appreciable change in that general respect, 
there has been a development in what has sustained the interest. 
In the preceding chapter we saw how the relevant issues that 
concerned the more prominent traditional theorists derived clearly 
from the view that mental imagery is a species of sense data . As 
imagery was thought to be of the stuff of sensations,· in order to 
explain the difference between imagination arid perception it became 
f!1..c.f\ 
important to explain the distinctive mechanisms by which~as pro-
duced and thus how each datum was distinguished by the mind . But 
nowadays, when analysis prevails over synthesis , the idea that 
imagination and perception might have a common source strikes one 
as unthinkable. Perhaps , then, the popular abandonment of the 
sense data theory has removed one obstacle in the way of displaying 
the supposed autonomous nature of the imagination; but in so doing 
it has introduced a problem of its own - or we could say that it has 
carried the old problem to a new region. 
The problem is this. If, in the main, experience consists in 
the same sensory material fashioned in various ways , then the 
complementary mental processes of imaging and perceiving should 
not require divergent descriptions. Indeed, it might well have seemed 
to some that this alleged basic connection between them is borne out 
by the fact that the reports of imaging naturally employ the terms 
which are appropriate to reports of perceiving. But onoe any intimate 
connection of this sort is denied, and imagination and perception 
are presumed to separate completely, the uniformity of reports 
which indicates a unity in essence - becomes a particularly 
troubling matter, either to be explained and justified or to be shown 
merely apparent and superficial . Doubtless it is because the con-
temporary mood encourages close study of many characterizations of 
mental life that there is greater sensitivity to the uniformity of 
reports (where the existing characterizations fail to supply straight-
forward description, should more accurate ones be sought ?) • 
While it is usual to report an imaging experience by beginning 
with either 'I imagine ... ' or , for one variety , 'I visualize ... ', it 
is not less usual to say , 'I see (hear, feel. .• ) .•. ' with the same 
purpose. Now someone might assert that in t he interests of des -
criptive accuracy, the former are eminently preferable to the latter. 
For, surely, the use of perception verbs to record non-perceptual 
experiences mus t be on one reading false · and on the other misleading 
(even if such qualifications as ' in the mind ' s eye ' and 'in the imagi-
nation' are added) . It is just perverse, so his arg.ument might go, 
to persist in describing , or trying to describe, an experience in 
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perceptual terms when, say, neither the eyes nor presently visible 
objects participate . And besides, what could non-perceptual vision 
possibly consist in? Moreover - leaving these points aside but 
not out of sight - by retaining them we cater to the temptation of 
drawing out connections and resemblances where there are none to 
fit, and so we deliberately endorse imprecision and confusion. 
First I want to offer three objections to the thesis just sketched, 
and later consider some larger issues that arise from this preliminary 
debate . 
The first objection concerns our readiness to employ verbs 
of perception in reporting imaging experiences, and often using 
them when the alternatives do not quite measure up to the demands . 
For instance, the image of a former, half-forgotten acquaintance 
may arise so suddenly and so unexpectedly that only the expression 
'I saw him '. ' is deemed to capture the vividness of the experience . 
For the verbs 'imagine' and 'visualize' seem to indicate a voluntary 
project to have such an experience , and one wishes to expressly 
convey the unwilled, passive and startling character of the image. 
Doesn't the use of 'see' in this manner achieve the expression of 
that rather neatly ? But if this example is thought to represent only 
very rare occurrences, which are of no moment because they can be 
so easily submerged, it ought to be recognized that the verbs of 
perception bring a definiteness and descriptive strength to the reports 
of imaging experience, otherwise very difficult to attain . Furthermore, 
the fact that 'imagine' does not have exclusive application to imagery, 
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and that 'visualize' has no associates means that in using only 
them we would have to resign ourselves often to an undesirable 
vagueness - or silence. So as verbs of perception are banned from 
reports of imaging, an unwelcome weakness of expression is generally 
introduced into those reports. That loss of expressive power will, if 
the proposal is to be at all attractive, have to be compensated by 
advantages gained elsewhere. 
The second concerns the promised gains. We are told - at 
least it is strongly implied - that confused and mistaken ideas about 
the nature of mental imagery are due to a (naive) appeal to the 
language employed in their communication . Accordingly, we are 
asked to believe that the adoption of a 'correct' language allows 
a clear view of the subject matter, necessary for sound theorizing. 
But this position assumes that error stems from a too hasty reflection 
on unsophisticated language, that the tendency to err derives mainly, 
if not solely, from what we say. Why, however, this is not wholly 
convincing is that it underestimates the influence of the experience 
itself. If it is the case that the imaging experience is one which 
naturally provokes comparison with perception , i.e. it alone is 
responsible for the inclination to use verbs of perception , then the 
actual use of verbs of perception is a symptom and not a cause. Now 
supposing that to be true - and it is very likely true - even if verbs 
of perception were to be replaced, the tendency to bring imaging and 
perceiving too close together will not have been eradicated . Hence , 
whether or not the reports of images are 'corrected' will be largely 
irrelevant: if the real source of the error resides in the experiences 
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themselves, then how we ordinarily report them should not affect 
what we are inclined to think their nature is. Or, to make a larger 
point, foreground adjustments to language will not aid philosophical 
reflection, nor dis solve philosophica 1 problems. But there is another 
related warning. The uniformity of reports of imaging and perceiving 
invites confusion and error in a rather different way: someone could 
mistake a (past) image for a (past) perception, or vice versa, by 
forgetting how he meant a past utterance. While this possibility is 
no doubt real, the suggestion that errors of this kind always derive 
from a confusion over language begs the question whether such errors 
are not sometimes a consequence of factors outside the range of 
language. Even with a 'corrected' language errors could still be 
possible. 
If - and this is the third objection - when included in reports 
of imaging verbs of perception are suspect, then, surely, their 
grammatical objects are equally suspect. If it is wrong to suggest 
that imaging is a kind of perception, it ought to be wrong to suggest 
that that which is imagined is of a piece with what is perceived. 
For to claim that material objects could be experienced through non-
perceptual means would just be crass : this will apply as well when 
verbs of perception are not in evidence . No characterization of 
imaging (or, for that matter, of many other inner experiences) will, 
if it is to be descriptively sound , be permitted to include any term 
whose first or central application is to the external world and its 
apprehension. Thus , to uphold the dictates of the position outlined 
would serve to eliminate all or virtually all characterizations of one's 
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inner experiences, beyond the merely sensual. As this absurd and 
drastic curtailment of language and express ion is a consequence of 
the position, that alone may be taken as sufficient to refute it . 
But I do not think that its outright rejection is warranted, at least 
not warranted from what has been said so far. Rejection would be 
too hasty because there is an element of plausibility which has not 
yet received attention. It has been neglected because the state-
ment of the position has been unduly rough. After elaborating the 
position and extracting the plausible substance, we will find that 
as the issues become more complicated it will not be so easy to 
dismiss. 
The elaboration necessitates some changes. The claim that 
the use of verbs of perception (and their grammatical ·objects) in 
reports of mental images results in confusion and error, and the 
demand to eschew all such terms from such reports , are to be dropped . 
In their place comes the warning that these terms are to be treated 
with the utmost care . The aim now , rather than advising the elimi-
nation of such terms, is to stress the special status that they assume 
when used in such reports . When the specia l status is correctly 
understood , it will be recognized that severe restrictions must be 
placed on their use and t heir interpretation . One important point , 
however , undergoes no alteration : when used to report mental images, 
verbs of perception (and their grammatical objects) are fundamentally 
illeg itimat e . 
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The argument adduced to establish the special status is not 
unfamiliar. Nor indeed are the conclusions. I say 'conclusions ' 
because there seem to be two distinct, though sometimes assimilated, 
views that the argument can be taken to support . 
Reflection on the development and the growth of his language 
yields this instructive story. As man progressed through greater 
degrees of socialization , as his instincts were increasingly checked 
by the group, his inclinations were subjected to more inhibitive 
pressure . Now when an impulse is arrested, the concomitant 
energy , which should direct it outwards, is released inside the 
body. And as this process increases in frequency and intensity, 
the individual inner life unfolds. Nietzsche says it best: 'All 
instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward 
this is what is called the internalization of man: thus it was that 
man first developed what was later called his "soul". The entire 
inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two 
membranes , expanded and extended itself, acquired depth , breadth 
and -height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited' 
(On the Genealogy of Morals, II, § 16). Parallel to this process of 
internaliz_ation, it can be reasonably supposed, is a development 
in language . The language that once was used exclusively to describe 
the outer world comes, as the inner world is created, to be applied 
to that which remains when the outward expression of feeling is 
inhibited. Recently, Nietzsche's picture has been given a linguistic 
amplification by Stuart Hampshire: " ... we normally describe mental 
29 
processes and conditions in terms which have been transferred 
from an original use in application to physical objects ' {Ryle ' s The 
Concept of Mind ~ pp . 88-9) . And in another place he writes: 
'- ... we must first have distinguished certain patterns of behaviour 
in certain standard circumstances, actual or notional; and then , on 
the basis of this kind of classification, we can distinguish the various 
inner sentiments as controlled inclinations to behave in these ways 
in these standard circumstances. We arrive at the distinctions 
between the different feelings and sentiments by abstracting from 
the manifesting behaviour. In our classifications we move, as it 
were, inwards from expressive behaviour to inner feeling '' - ('Feeling 
* and Expression' , p. 155). Accordingly, the ability to explain and 
understand oneself and one's neighbours depends to a large degree 
on how much one can accurately determine of that which exists inside. 
It could well be then that the need to understand and explain the 
human psyche was a force in giving language a new dimension. 
The immense appeal of this picture is attested to by the 
importance that both philosophers see in it . Nietzsche finds in it 
the origil'1: of conscience; Hampshire finds in it a basis for a theory 
of mind between dualism and logical behaviourism . But the question 
I wish to consider is more modest : what changes are brought about , 
what happens to language, when its range is extended to the inner ? 
An answer to that question will settle the issue of whether the reports 
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of imaging experience have a special status , and if so , what it amounts to. 
* See also his 'Disposition and Memory', especially pp. 163-4. 
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To continue to spell out the position. If anything changes it 
is certainly the meanings of the terms whose range is extended. 
For outer and inner experiences are so palpably different, even 
when somehow related, that the terms which are applied to both 
must have their meanings affected. But - and this is where a 
complication is introduced - two independent theories of what change 
takes place stand out. One is that the ordinary meanings of the 
terms are exploited; that is, the terms, and by the same token the 
reports that contain them, become metaphorical. The other is that 
the terms, when used in the extended way, acquire distinct mean-
ings, which yet bear some association with the original meanings. 
That these two theories do not collapse into one is made clear in 
recognizing that the first holds that the original meanings are still 
active in the new area, while the second maintains that it is only 
an association that persists (the phenomena are so different that new 
meanings are essential for the terms to possess ·really distinctive 
descriptive power) . But to say this is not to deny that both could 
be asserted, rather confusedly , together: it could be thought that 
the terms and reports are metaphorical and by virtue of this they 
carry unobvious non-ordinary meanings. However , this possible 
confusion should be kept separate from a related but coherent and 
not uncommon view: the terms and reports are metaphorical, and to 
replace them new terms having non-ordinary meanings are required. 
So the thesis that the reports of imaging experience (and some 
other inner experiences) , which incorporate perceptually-based terms , 
divides on the issues of how their status is to be conceived and of 
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how they are to be treated. If the reports are considered metaphorical 
then, in order to provide straightforward descriptions and thereby 
permit exact study of some aspects of the inner life, literal replace-
ments must be furnished. Alternatively, if the reports are believed 
to acquire additional senses then those senses ought to be couched 
in unambiguous terms so that they can be readily clarified. 
That discourse of the inner life employs many terms transferred 
from disclosure of the outer is unchallengeable. But whether the 
borrowings become either metaphorical or ambiguous is - although 
perhaps thought to be equally unchallengeable - not immune to doubt. 
Yet the only place I know of where the position is controverted (let 
alone discussed) is in Richard Wollheim' s 'The Mind and the Mind's 
Image of Itself'. Wollheim presents objections to both the meta-
phorical and additional meaning alternatives. His arguments are 
inconclusive, but there is something to be learned from that incon-
clusiveness, and something to be learned of why such arguments 
were presumed to be needed in the first place. 
As a preliminary to establishing that our ordinary conception 
of the mind is spatial or at least tinged with spatiality, Wollheim 
considers a possible objection to his manner of approaching the 
analysis of the mind and its contents . He writes: 
We may speak of thoughts entering the mind or breaking 
in upon the mind or just being in the mind, but when we do 
so, the phrases that we use do not reflect what we actually 
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believe. They are mere turns of speech. Now whatever 
sympathy we may have with the general impulse of this 
argument . . . the argument as it stands is tendentious. 
For it assumes that we have a clear distinctions between 
what is metaphorical and what is not: which we do not 
have. As a minimum someone who uses this argument 
must show that there is an alternative way of describing 
the facts in question - here it would be, of reporting 
the relevant mental states - which could make a good 
claim to be a literal description. And I do not see that 
in the present case this condition can be fulfilled. 
(pp. 35-6) 
And after this Wollheim evidently concludes that there is no good 
reason for holding the view that such statements about the mind are 
metaphorical. I have already indicated that this conclusion is 
incorrect, that there is a persuasive reason for regarding them as 
metaphorical: and Wollheim overlooks it. The quoted passage con-
tains two main points. The first, if I may rephrase it, is that the 
want of a definition of metaphor undermines the assertion that such 
statements are metaphorical (is not a definition of metaphor tanta-
mount to an explication of the distinction between the metaphorical 
and the literal ?) • But if that is the case then an adequate definition 
is equally a condition on the attribution of metaphor to any linguistic 
item whatsoever, and thus no present attribution can be justified or 
even seen to be correct . That extremely disagreeable state of affairs 
clearly follows from what Wollheim says , but it is not the worst of 
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the consequences. If a definition is an essential requirement for 
the recognition of metaphor then anyone who sets out to define the 
notion is caught in this predicament. As an~ priori definition must 
be unacceptable, at the outset some items will have to be identified 
as exemplifying metaphor so that there will be some data to investi-
gate and something by which to assess the adequacy of the definition~ 
Otherwise there can be no starting point, and with no point of de-
parture no result can be reached. Some initially undisputed instances 
of the phenomenon must be available in order that analysis have an 
object and a beginning. But it is implied that a definition, the outcome 
of analysis, is required to identify what will count as data. It is 
not hard to see that together these two conditions have a paralyzing 
effect. Therefore the demand for a definition to be at hand to justify 
the application of 'metaphor' is extravagant. Moreover the unavail-
ability of a satisfactory definition does not discredit the term. 
The second point is that metaphor invariably rests on, or 
suppresses, a corresponding literal description; thus the existence 
of metaphor is established by supplying the underlying literal des-
cription •. Wollheim allows that strong evidence for the existence of 
metaphor would be the. formulation of an alleged literal alternative. 
Why the literal alternative is, as is intimated, a necessary accom-
paniment to metaphor is not made clear. And on what basis should 
we presume that behind every metaphor is a literal description ? It 
just may be that with regard to the reports of many inner experiences 
the transference of terms, and hence the metaphor, is irreplaceable 
and unavoidable simply because there are no literal alternatives : the 
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absence of appropriate non-metaphorical terms forced the introduction 
of metaphor. If that is true - we have not been given a good reason 
to think it isn't - then Wollheim 's minimum demand is unreasonable 
because it cannot be met. 
Behind both points, surely, lie these convictions; that a 
report of an event, whether internal or external, should be an un-
embellished representation of the facts; that reports therefore have 
to be strictly descriptive; that a description requires that each of 
its constituent terms be used in its most straightforward, i.e. literal 
descriptions. Now I am inclined to think that this view, if not 
wholly wrong, is as it stands too simple to be right. But of that more 
later. 
Wollheim also presents an argument against the second version 
of the thesis that the standard reports of some mental states re 
illegitimate. It would, if true, similarly jeopardize the retention 
of the standard reports . 
. • . when I report what I envisage by saying such 
things as that a friend is on the verge of tears, or that 
my father upbraids me, or that I hear my father upbraid 
me, I am Using words in a further or secondary sense. 
There are a number of forms such an account might take, 
depending on which word or group of words in any such 
report is held to change its sense, and each form of 
the account could doubtless be met on its own terms. 
But there is also a comprehensive objection to the 
- - ~ .- . ~ .. 
account: and that is that it is vacuous to talk of a further 
or secondary sense of a word unless we can specify a 
further way in which this sense is learnt or taught. In 
the present case there is no such way, and moreover there 
could be no such way. For suppose we were trying to 
teach someone the alleged further sense of, say, the 
word 'father'; then the only assurance we could have 
for thinking that the moment was ripe to do so, would 
be when he had reported to us what he was envisaging 
and that it was his father: and to do this , he would ex 
hypothesi have to use the ordinary sense of the word, which 
must therefore be adequate to the task. (p. 38) 
Because the learning of language and the apprehension of meaning 
depend upon a mutual recognition of publicly observable items by 
(potential) speakers, the mental image and other corn.parable inner 
experiences could not by their very nature enter into discourse at 
a rudimentary level. Their privacy serves to restrict them as subjects 
to rather sophisticated speakers. Now if the appearance of the ability 
to talk of one's images, say, more or less coincides with a linguistic 
sophistication such that the speaker has achieved a degree of 
linguistic independence where he no longer needs primary instruction 
to continue the learning process, then it would not be surprising 
that no situations where the supposed additional meanings are 
imparted come to mind . In this state of affairs the additional mean-
ings a re 'picked-up' very much like the meanings of many newly 
experienced words are. If the linguistic sophistication means that 
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the speaker is able to invent and appreciate stories, jokes and puns 
and has a capacity for comprehending metaphor and ambiguity, 
then we have good reason to believe that the ability to apprehend 
and operate with the additional meanings occurs naturally in the 
course of linguistic development. In fact these additional meanings 
would be quite easily assimilated since they bear such a close 
association with the original, standard meanings. It may well 
be that the additional meanings possessed by terms used in the 
expression of imaging experience are apprehended naturally, as a 
natural accompaniment to ordinary language learning, provided 
that a certain level of linguistic and intellectual maturity has been 
reached. And it might well be that the nature of the experiences 
themselves makes the additional meanings assimilable in just this 
way. Perhaps images and some other inner experiences constitute 
a special class. Now whether or not this account is correct I do 
not know, but the fact that it is strikingly credible suffices, I 
think, to cast doubt on Wollheim 's comparatively simplistic character-
ization of language learning. Why should every significant term 
have an individual learning situation where its meaning or one of its 
meanings can be suitably conveyed ? (A remnant of logical positivism ?) 
But , unless we have the benefit of a satisfactory theory of language 
learning (and so of meaning), this matter cannot be finally settled. 
So any argument which assumes that it is · settled will be in that respect 
unacceptable . 
The stage we have now reached is this. On ·one side stands 
the view that our ordinary description of the inner in terms of the outer 
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infects the terms so transferred with either metaphor or ambiguity. 
And neither of these alternatives in conducive to giving accurate 
accounts of the inner life : a metaphor, almost by definition, cannot 
be descriptive, and the postulated additional senses seem rather 
mysterious and mysteriously unforthcoming. At any rate, can it be 
denied that the transference has some aberrant effect on the meanings 
of the terms in question ? If it cannot, it is readily seen that that 
effect amounts to a major, and probably total, loss of descriptive 
power. Thus if we then wish to study the mental life with some degree 
of precision we must cast about for an appropriate vocabulary. On 
the other side, while it may be agreed that the terms are not strictly 
used in ordinary ways, it is objected that the changes are of no real 
moment. Indeed there are no good grounds for asserting that the terms 
become either metaphorical or ambiguous; there are no good reasons 
for construing the terms in any but their ordinary senses . Further, 
without even the prospect of finding appropriate replacements, we must 
be satisfied with, and make the best of, what we now have - either 
that or give up the attempt to describe and understand a crucial area 
of human experience . 
The dispute presents a clear choice, and seemingly , a choice 
that has to be made . But the issue is perplexing . Neither of the 
positions appears to dominate ; neither of .their arguments is con-
clusive . Still, if we are to give an account of imaging and other 
inner experiences - and that of course demands a continual appraisal 
of the terms and the experiences - then it seems that we ought to 
decide whether the terms selected are purely descriptive and adequate 
for the job or whether their use does not achieve what we think it 
achieves, by either being systematically metaphorical or obscurely 
ambiguous in pointing to that which has not yet been, nor is likely 
to be , spelled out. But after looking at what has been offered by 
both sides, how can we decide which view is correct? It should be 
clear that not enough has been offered by either to enable a choice 
(to which some confidence can be attached) to be made . And it is \ 
equally clear, I feel certain, that no advance can be made, granted 
that the present work on what bears so heavily on this dispute (i.e. 
the nature of meaning) is unhelpful and unpromising. Nevertheless, 
perhaps we have come to this point of stagnation because our arti-
culation of the problem is somewhat misconceived. A different 
approach may yield a solution (though tentative) when we feared 
there could be none. 
A reconciliation, a solution, might be secured if each side 
agrees to accept what the other states convincingly and to hold the 
tendentious inferences in abeyance . That is, the conception against 
which the dispute exists is subjected to review. So each will retain 
what is especially his and relinquish what is mutually theirs. 
As for compromise. There is a tendency for one side to under-
estimate the alteration in character undergone by the transferred 
terms: despite the special circumstances, the terms themselves 
remain unaltered. But, as the transferred terms refer to experiences 
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which are intrinsically different from the ones they normally refer 
to - and this is not always admitted - they must incur some 
significant change in character. Complementary to this , there is 
the tendency to overestimate the effect of the change in character 
such that the terms are thought to be hopelessly inadequate to the 
task. Now, in the interests of reconciliation, we might urge that 
while indeed the transferred terms undergo some change in character, 
it is not enough to defeat the attempt to communicate and interpret 
the experiences with reasonable success. The change is not so radical 
as a transformation to metaphor or obscure ambiguity but it is enough 
to disallow automatic and unexamined inferences to be drawn from 
what is said. We must not forget that the inner experiences are not 
their true ground, and because of that we must always be careful to 
ensure, by constant checking and comparison, that what is meant is 
in harmony with what is talked about. 
Admittedly this reconciliation (the proposal) is facile. Facile 
because superficial. In order to make it compelling the overriding 
conception will have to be examined. 
If I am right, both of the opponents share the conviction that 
reports (expressed in declarative sentences) can fall into two distinct 
groups : those involving metaphor and those not. And to promote · 
exactness , metaphor must be avoided everywhere. (The same goes for 
obscure additional senses. For convenience I ignore the 'two senses' 
alternative ; its exclusion will not affect the argument.) Otherwise 
the reports became contaminated with an ineradicable vagueness. 
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As vagueness is a flaw anathema to any serious investigation, it 
is therefore necessary to locate and eliminate instances of metaphor 
wherever it occurs so that the articulation and analysis of the inner 
life can proceed with soundness and certainty. The common fear 
is that, given the fact of terms having been transferred to cover inner 
experiences, the usual reports of many inner experiences will prove 
to be metaphorical , and thus a large and important slice of mental 
life will not be amenable to study. For one of the disputants the 
fear is realized; the metaphor is a fait accompli. And the next step 
is to invent or wait for the discovery of terms which can articulate 
the experiences literally. For the other the fear , while genuine, 
is in this case without foundation; the terms cannot be mataphorical 
because a definiteness and clarity can already be attained . Now if 
it can be shown that the fear is itself false , that to couch the worry 
in terms of the metaphorical versus the literal is somewhat artificial , 
then some advance might be made in resolving the dispute . 
My argument fo r a resolution falls into two related parts. First, 
some remarks on the phenomenal quality of the ex periences referred 
to, and second, some doubts about the metaphorical/literal division 
and a proposed correction . 
A most salient feature of inne r experiences (the kind we have 
been referring to) is inner containment or, i n other words ; a less 
than immediate connection with the external world . As such experiences 
a re non-perceptual this must surely be true . However, the fact that 
they are non-perceptual s eems to invite an even stronger claim , to wit, 
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that any felt connection with the external world is illusory: they 
cannot refer, directly or even indirectly, beyond themselves. And 
following out this line of thought - it can be added that any inter-
pretation of inner experience which includes perceptual or perceptually 
based terms will be gratuitous. If this sounds all too familiar, it 
should be evident that it returns us to the first rather crudely stated 
position at the beginning. It will thus not be inappropriate to remind 
ourselves of an objection, similarly crude, that was presented there. 
If inner experiences as is claimed are essentially self-contained, 
how is the strong inclination to articulate them in terms of the outer 
to be explained ? And if one specifically attends to mental imagery 
then the strong inclination clearly graduates to a peremptory demand. 
One is at a loss to see how one could possibly frame the image -
especially the image - in words while arresting all a_llusion to the 
external world. Further, even if a 'suitable' vocabulary were found , 
it would not, it could not, make sense of what one feels the sense of 
the image must be. Now this deeply felt belief that a good deal (all 
that has value) would be forfeited if we were to follow the linguistic 
revisionist is doubtless correct, and does provide a difficult item for 
the revisionist to explain away . I presume that in the end the 
revisionist will find that belief intractable, intractable because he 
will be quite unable to reassure us that his recommendations are to 
our advantage. As a reply that is fine as far as it goes. But the 
defence of standard practice can be bolstered with arguments which 
should make the nature of this belief clearer and the view it supports 
more cogent. 
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A basic condition of intelligible communication of the outer 
is that there be some range of publicly observable phenomena to 
which incontestable reference can be made. And discourse 
of public phenomena , which aims at truth not reducible to subjective 
experiences , must operate in accordance with certain standards. 
That means - to express it very briefly - that discourse aspires to 
objectivity. Now surely that applies to discourse of all phenomena. 
Thus communication of inner states, as such essentially private 
depends upon discourse of the outer. And hence the expression of 
some inner experiences, I think it safe to say, requires some allusion 
to the outer - by employing terms and invoking principles of assess-
ment appropriate to description of the outer . Those terms and prin-
ciples serve to introduce a means of communication and a critical 
factor otherwise impossible to establish . 
So terms and principles appropriate to the outer are required 
for communication of the inner. That is , I think , a very plausible 
thesis. And it could be assumed that it alone puts an end to the 
matter of justifying a linguistic practice. But there is this challenge . 
' I accept ', someone might argue , 'what you have said but not w ithout 
reservation because I do not see how yo ur argument supports the 
conclusion (which I have inferred) that we must be content with the 
status quo . Must innovation in our talk of the inner be precluded , 
a s it might take us t oo far, linguistically , from the oute r ? Are 
we not permitted to invent a nove l technical vocab1,1lary to attain an 
exclusiveness and great er refinement in expre s sion ? ' But while I 
do not deny that a rigidly cons ervative use of 'outer' t e rms might 
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have a constraining effect and that some expansion beyond them 
will be valuable, I do not think that a wholly 'inner' terminology 
will prove to be a progressive invention. And this brings me to a 
more speculative point. Communication of one's more complex 
inner feelings, as well as requiring the foundation of the discourse 
of perception, presupposes a knowledge and understanding (however 
slight) of one's mind. Now, unless we are to regard every inner 
state, having a measurable degree of depth and complexity, as 
anomalous, the knowledge and understanding of such states will 
consist in the recognition of the relevance of a certain pattern (or 
patterns). Realizing that an inner feeling more or less fits into an 
ordinary network of relationships helps to make that state compre-
hensible, because importantly a unity in, a simplicity of organization 
of, one's total mental life is discovered when it looked at first as if 
it contained a crucial. but inscrutable element. The search for and 
discovery of a pattern is essential to the belief in the value and 
coherence of one's inner feelings , for their value and coherence in 
one's general mental life consists in their pointing beyond themselves. 
So, very roughly, self-understanding is achieved by assimilating 
the inner and outer worlds, assimilating them just enough to suggest 
an analogy. 
Now if some inner experiences by their very nature force arti-
culation specifically in 'outer' terms, do ·we not then have good 
reason for taking such expressions as capable of direct and un-
swerving description ? For the fact that in some i.nstances there is 
no choice of terms (it is hard to think of alternatives) should entitle 
us to deem at least some expressions of some inner experiences 
having depth and complexity as correct and straightforward. But 
that view will not carry any weight unless we dissociate ourselves 
from a conception of meaning. So long as we think that to each 
significant term is attached a definite sense, we will be prone to 
think that when a term is in other than its normal domain either its 
sense remains unchanged or it acquires an additional one . Thus 
when us,ed in a foreign domain and used to refer to new objects, the 
term will become either metaphorical or obscurely ambiguous. Of 
course this could be denied (as Wollheim has done) by arguing that 
the transference has neither of those effects. But given that the 
atomistic conception of meaning is adhered to, this denial remains 
quite unpersuasive. My proposal is that when a more appealing 
picture of meaning is presented, the impasse in the dispute can be 
overcome. 
If we look upon words not as possessing discrete, definite 
senses which exist over and above language but rather as having 
meanings which are a function of both the phenomena they represent 
and the relationships in which they participate with other words , our 
view of metaphor and description may undergo a change . By aban-
doning the atomistic picture of meaning we at the same time rid our-
selves of a rigid and fixed distinction between the metaphorical and 
the literal , as well as a rigid and fixed distinct ion between related 
senses . The terms which have been transferred , we can suppose , 
were transferred because there was some phenomenal qualities of the 
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experiences in the new domain that suggested analogies with the 
terms' original referents. And once the transfer is achieved the 
term ceases to exist in the same relationships: the old inferences 
cannot be drawn. The new set of relationships will not parallel 
the original set. As the idea that sense is a discrete and definite 
concomitant of language has been dropped, so the idea that unless 
a term carries its ordinary (primary) sense and maintains its original 
reference it becomes metaphorical or (obscurely) ambiguous can be 
easily abandoned. And when we stop thinking of meaning as ob-
taining in an all-or-nothing way, and regard it as admitting degrees, 
we might be disposed to regard metaphor and (some) ambiguities 
in the same light. The picture I want to put across is this. Trans-
ference does not by itself make a term metaphorical or ambiguous; 
so the verbal expression of inner life need not be eith.er. The 
transferred/original distinction does not correspond to a metaphorical/ 
literal or a new sense/old sense distinction, because there is no 
one metaphorical/literal distinction and because meanings vary 
according to the phenomena referred to and linguistic relationships 
between words. If meaning depends on factors that admit of degrees 
then it to<? admits of degrees . Further , in each domain of discourse 
there are terms whose use is uncontentious and basic. When these 
terms are used normally within the domain they can be considered 
literal : otherwise more or less metaphorical or ambiguous (depending 
on the case). So figurative and literal speech and ambiguity are as 
much a reality in discourse of the inner as they are in discourse of 
the outer. 
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Does adoption of this picture suggest a more convincing 
reconciliation ? It permits the retention of the standard vocabulary 
and acknowledges definiteness and accuracy of description - that 
should please one of the disputants. Moreover, it allows that 
metaphor (or ambiguity} is a very real possibility, and not an un-
avoidable feature - that should please the other disputant. But 
even if this proposal achieves a reconciliation, it does not provide 
any immediate means for removing the persisting difficulties. For 
instance, problems which arise in an epistemological context on 
the general accuracy and certainty of the reports remain intact. 
Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the picture puts us on the 
right path, or at least a better path. 
I should stress that I do not claim that the correctness of the 
picture has been demonstrated. What I do claim is that it is more 
appealing than the others, more appealing because it is more in line 
with our intuitions about the nature of such reports: namely, that 
they can be both definite and vague. 
Mental images receive much attention because, in connection 
with the problem of describing the inner life , they appear as paradigm 
instances of inner states having a determinable content . If any 
inner state of some complexity has a defit:1ite, reportable sense, then 
doubtless the image qualifies . (Images occupy a comparable position 
here to that of pains in the problem of other minds.) Now the various 
treatments of the nature of mental imagery fall into several kinds . It 
is worthwhile to classify them . 
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As there are experiences on one side and their reports on the 
other, we can expect that the types of inquiry will be determined by 
attitudes to them: whether the experiences or their reports are 
emphasized, whether concentration on one or the other is thought 
to produce (the best) results. This division should coincide with a 
difference of bias: linguistic or phenomenological. In addition, 
inquiries can be divided on the basis of whether they assume that 
reports are systematically misleading or all right as they stand, 
whether they are, in a word, metaphorical or literal. Since these 
divisions are independent, there should yield four categories. They 
can be classified thus: (1) Reports of images are metaphorical, and 
the metaphor is to be removed by an investigation and revision of the 
reports alone. (2) The reports are metaphorical but only an investi-
gation of the images themselves will remove the metaphor. (3) Reports 
of images are literal and that can be shown by an investigation of the 
relevant concepts. (4) The reports are literal and that fact is made 
evident by inspecting and analysing the experiences themselves. 
Because this classification deals with extremes it is crude. Still 
it does give a scheme by which any particular inquiry can be ordered 
and understood, both in i solation and amidst its rivals. Two pro-
minent examples: Gilbert Ryle's work on the imagination comes under 
the first heading, and Jean-Paul Sartre's ~nder the last. Ryle argues 
for linguistic replacements to the normal reports of acts of imaging, 
though of course the consequences reach further than simple adjust-
ments to language . Sartre directs much of the attention away from the 
image as such (or 'analogue' as he calls it) so that (a) the content of 
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the imaging experience becomes external to it , i.e. through inten-
tionality the imaging consciousness aims at that which exists over 
and against it - thus the contents of the reports are literal since 
non-private entities are referred to, while (b) the composition of 
the analogue is shown to display strong continuities with perception -
thus the use of verbs of perception in the reports is vindicated. As 
Sartre's arguments are complex and peculiarly expansive, I shall 
devote more time to them than to those of others. Unfortunately his 
work on the subject, when neither ignored nor dismissed, has been 
insufficiently discussed . That is another reason for the imbalance. 
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III 
A PHENOMENOLOGIST'S ACCOUNT 
The general attitude to the nature of mind in the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contained the view that there 
exist discrete, independent mental entities, whose composition, 
combination and manner of appearance determine the kind and 
quality of experience. These theories made little advance beyond 
quite arbitrary postulations of collections of mental processes and 
powers, that were invented to explain the complexities of thought 
and experience. The unquestioned confidence in this atomistic 
assumption and the belief, so strongly held , that a correct theory of 
mind could only be achieved if a coherent account of the behaviour 
of these entities could be found, certainly secured the doctrine ' s 
longevity . It is evident that near the beginning of this century 
work along that line stagnated - if only because the doctrine ' s most 
attractive embodiments proved unsuccessful. And that opened the 
way to a challenge to the heart of the matter. If the principle that 
all experience is essentially a construction of one basic building 
material were abandoned, and a principle formulated, which would 
be faithful to experience as it is, and not as it is assumed to be, 
then a theory so developed is bound to be accurate. 
Such a line of thought, voiced by Edmund Husserl in several 
voluminous attempts to fulfil that promise, inaugurated a major 
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philosophical movement. His writings have been the source of 
inspiration for many, but most importantly for the present study, they 
were the prime influence on Jean-Paul Sartre's critique and theory of 
the imagination. I shall say only enough about Husserl to introduce 
Sartre's philosophical orientation; a more elaborate discussion, in 
any case, would lead too far afield. Besides, I am not concerned 
whether Sartre has correctly interpreted, at every point, Husserl's 
methodology and ideas; nor whether his disagreements with Husserl 
are well founded. It is one conclusion of this chapter that the method 
which Sartre alleges to have followed enters as a lame appendage. 
Sartre's two volume study of the imagination remains the most 
extensive and impressive examination of the subject to date. In 
the first, L' Imagination, the leading atomistic theories undergo 
incisive criticism and are rejected in toto, while Husserl' s main 
ideas are proclaimed as furnishing - though not without some modi-
fication - the foundation for any future inquiry. In the second, 
L 'Imaginaire, the programme announced in the earlier book is most 
ambitiously pursued. (All references will be made to the accessible 
English translations . Unfortunately , in several places I have found 
it necessary to amend the anonymous and badly flawed translation 
of L' Imaginaire.) 
To anyone who has read both , it will have been apparent that 
while the attack on previous theories is often brilliant and un-
answerable , the suggestions derived from their destruction a re nearly 
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always doubtful; but worse, the theory that arises from them is 
an abysmal failure. Perhaps if Sartre were to have applied the same 
standards of criticism to his own constructive work, he might have 
produced something quite invaluable - or nothing at all. Never-
theless it is the only study that I know of which pushes the tradi-
tional issues and points of concern to their very limit. For that 
reason alone it warrants close inspection. But more importantly, 
to my mind his failure demonstrates the futility of pursuing a certain 
avenue of philosophical inquiry. 
What Sartre has borrowed from Husserl can be grouped under 
three headings: the attack on psychologism, the phenomenological 
method and the principle of intentionality . Very briefly, in Logical 
Investigations, Husserl inveighed against psychologism, or the 
attempt to account for the necessity of logical truths in terms of 
psychic phenomena and psychological laws , by pointing out that 
whereas psychological laws are generalizations and admit excep-
tions, logical truths are universal and irrefutable. Thus logic cannot 
be founded on psychology. Subsequently, in Ideas, psychologism 
comes to mean any attempt to give a probabilist, subjectivist, or 
relativist account of the essential structures of experience . He 
insists that each type of experience must have an essence that i s 
discoverable : otherwise how could the nature of experience ever 
be investigated with certainty ? As a corrective to all empirical 
theories, Husserl proposes a method which, when put into practice, 
will reveal the essences of experience in intuition, unsullied by 
any empirical or metaphys ical prejudice , and in fact, detached from 
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any prior conceptual framework. When all such impositions have 
been removed, when the 'reduction' has been performed the 
experience in question will present its essential structure. The 
first essential characteristic to be uncovered is that experience as 
a whole has the property of intentionality, the property of being 
conscious of something. This fact is most important; indeed 'con-
sciousness is always a consciousness of something' becomes the 
guiding principle of phenomenology. Expressed simply, the prin-
ciple means that consciousness is always directed upon objects, 
whether external objects or internal conscious acts, whose existence 
transcends ('overflows') consciousness; that is, no conscious act 
can assimilate an object that it apprehends . Placed in direct oppo-
sition to the reductivist principle, it is seen to provide the basis for 
the rejection of the following views: external objects are appre-
hended indirectly; experience consists of a passive registering of 
psychic items; an object of experience is nothing more than the 
. synthesis of a set of psychic items; an exhaustive description of 
that which is immediately present to consciousness amounts to a 
complete account of experience; the behaviour of psychic items , 
and therefore experience, is governed by psychological laws of 
association. 
The import of intentionality should be evident from that thumb-
nail sketch: consciousness does not contain static psychic items, 
rather it is a dynamic force directed upon things which it cannot 
absorb, upon things existing in their own right over and against 
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consciousness . This attribution of dynamism to consciousness is 
the Husserlian theme that seems to have impressed Sartre most . 
In a very short article publicising the principle of intentionality 
and Husserl' s pre-eminence ('Une idee fondamentale de la pheno-
menologie de Husserl : l 'intentionnalite ' ), Sartre writes : 'What is 
a table , a rock , a house ? A certain assemblage of "contents of 
consciousness 11 , a class of such contents. 0 digestive philosophy ! 
Yet nothing seemed more obvious : is not the table the actual content 
of my perception ? Is not my perception the present state of my 
consciousness ? Nutrition , assimilation ! ' Against this 'digestive 
philosophy' , the principle of intentionality restores to consciousness 
its irreducible self, its assert ive power. 'To know is to "burst 
forward 11 , to tear oneself out of the moist gastric intimacy , veering 
out there beyond oneself, out there near the tree and yet beyond it , 
for the tree escapes me and repulses me , and I can no more lose 
myself in the tree than it can dissolve itself in me . I'm beyond it ; 
it ' s beyond me .' But his excitement br ings him to an extreme 
interpretation of intentionality , at least an interpretation that 
diverges significant ly from Husserl ' s . He goes as fa r as to claim 
that consciousness is devoid of all content : 'All at once consciousness 
i s purified , it is clear as a strong w ind . There is noth ing in it but 
a movement of fleeing itself , a sliding beyond itself ... for con-
s c iousness has no "ins ide ". It is just this being beyond it self , th i s 
a bsolute flig ht , this refusal to be a substa nce which makes it a con-
s c iousne ss . • But , de spite t he s tre ngt h of conviction d isplayed in 
this passage , we sha ll see t hat he is fo rced to modify t his view and 
allow the introduction of something 'inner'. 
Sartre makes a great deal of Husserl' s revolutionary ideas, 
presenting them as the foundation for definitive answers to the 
problems of philosophical psychology,. One might find oneself 
susceptible to that enthusiasm; and if so one ought to be careful 
that the enthusiasm is not misplaced. Such enthusiasm should be 
seen to be generated by the rejection of traditional views, and not 
· the promise of the ideas that are heralded as their successors . 
When one attends to the manner in which the proposals have been 
created, the revolution seems not to be as revolutionary as all that . 
It is important to recognize that the main proposals are direct con-
traries of the views they are meant to replace. At least part of what 
motivated the introduction of intentionality can be expressed thus: 
the theory that perception is mediated by sensory items is unsatis-
factory; therefore external objects are apprehended directly . 
Another example comes in the passages quoted above; the movement of 
thought can be encapsulated in this way : it has been shown to be 
incorrect to consider consciousness a receptacle of psychic entities; 
hence consciousness must be empty of all content, it must be nothing. 
While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such a procedure -
looking for truth in the opposite of the unacceptable - to employ it 
in order to fashion a full -scale intellectual revolution is to over-
estimate its effectiveness . Surely a genuine intellectual revolution 
involves the overcoming of a certain general perspective , where 
certain ideas and their opposites are set aside in favour of a funda -
mentally different point of view . The extent of change likely produced 
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by the this-can't-be-so-ergo-its-opposite-must-be procedure 
cannot, I believe, begin to approach the complete break demanded 
by a revolution deserving the name . In particular, the fact that 
the main problem which Sartre sets for himself, arises in accordance 
with the procedure, does not inspire confidence in the soundness 
and value of his solution. What will emerge in the ensuing dis-
cussion, is that Sartre's revolutionary stance is blocked by an 
inability to break free of traditional attitudes. His standpoint is 
certainly a shift within the tradition, and not a total renunciation 
of it. 
Rightly critical of psychological atomism, Sartre adopts the 
diametrically opposite view that the mind or consciousness is a 
thoroughly dynamic,freely spontaneous force. Now one immediate 
obstacle in the way of making this view convincing, is the apparent 
static and independent nature of mental imagery. If it can be shown 
that menta 1 imagery is dynamic and no hindrance to the spontaneity 
of thought, then a most troublesome difficulty has been removed 
and the phenomenological method will be exhibited in the strongest 
light . And if, at the same time, it can clarify the nature of that least 
explored of 'psychic structures', the imagination, then the method 
has undoubtedly proved its validity. 
In assessing how Sartre has fulfilled these objectives, I 
shall look at his criticisms of traditional theories and to what extent 
he has overcome traditional mistakes and assumptions , the pheno-
menological method and how it is utilised, his theory of imagery, 
and finally the theory of imagination as it emerges from the account 
of men ta 1 imagery. 
In L' Imagination, for the large part, Sartre deftly surveys 
the most prominent theories of imagination, marshalling many incisive 
and unanswerable criticisms against theories advanced by Descartes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume as well as Ribot, Alain and Bergson. I shall 
canvass, however, only those criticisms which yield positive proposals. 
Generally, the various theories are accused and found guilty of 
a "' naive metaphysics of the image'· . That is to say, they have fallen 
victim to the temptation of supposing all modes of existence to be more 
or less akin to the existence of material objects. The temptation 
is succumbed to ' as soon as one shifts from pure contemplation of 
the image as such to thinking about images without forming them ' and 
here ·;one slides from essential identity of image and object to an 
alleged existential identity. Since the image, in this case, is the 
object, one draws the conclusion that the image exists in the same 
fashion as the object '; {pp . 3-4). Any theory embodying this mistake 
of making the image into an inert mass with a quasi-physical existence 
is preclud~d from satisfying the two chief requ irements of an adequate 
theory of the imagination . ; It must account for the spontaneous dis -
crimination made by the mind between its images and its perceptions . 
And it must explain the role that the images play in the operations of 
thought 1 (p . 11 7) . Once the mental image assumes the status of 
a thing on a par with external objects of consciousness , and perception 
and imagination are taken to consist in the same basic ingredient , 
then the incontrovertible fact that I know absolutely when I imagine 
and when I perceive cannot be accounted for . And once the processes 
of thought are said to be governed by inflexible laws of association , 
then the freedom, creativity and spontaneity of mental life have 
been denied. Any theory which presents the image as a quasi-
physical entity is faced with this dilemma : either mental images are 
external to consciousness , in which case the latter is deprived of 
all its freedom , or they are introduced into consciousness and ' 'the 
whole universe follows after, solidifying consciousness at one stroke, 
like a supersaturated solution ; {p . 118) . 
If image and perception are fundamentally identical, how can 
a clear distinction between them be maintained ? No doubt is ever 
raised against the assumption that each experience must belong to 
one category or the other; the possibility of an indeterminate, com-
posite experience is neither considered nor feared . It is remarkable, 
to Sartre's mind, that despite the importance of the assumption , the 
theories so far advanced are powerless to justify it. 
Needless to say, Sartre accepts the assumption but , unlike 
his predecessors, he does not try to avoid the issues it raises . He 
claims that the categorical difference between imagination and per-
ception is given immediately to consciousness. This is so, we pre-
sume, because the usual attempts to found the distinction on meta-
physical bases are "conjuring tricks" ; 1:the data of inner experience 
are transformed into external relations between contents of conscious -
ness and a world, and immediate differentiations among contents are 
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replaced by classifications of them in terms of something else-' 
(p. 86). Sartre states that there are three possible solutions to the 
problem of formulating a distinction on this basis, and believes 
that by showing that all three are inadequate he has confirmed his 
conclusion. 
The Humean criterion of intensity is praised for at least 
acknowledging the immediacy of the distinction; each impression 
displays its nature without comparison or further interpretation. But 
it must be rejected. Why, if the difference is just one of intensity, 
are we not always confusing images of the same minimum intensity ? 
' And why does not an image of an artillery shot seem to be an actual, 
small cracking sound ? ' (p. 87) . Furthermore, if this criterion were 
the only ground for discrimination, then there ought to be intermediate 
experiences '-compounded of real sensations and images, halfway 
between waking life and dream ·; (p. 88). A difference in quantity 
does not add up to a difference in quality. 
According to the second, the dominance of perception is 
explained by a continual struggle among sensations; the victor ' s 
reward is to be entitled 'perception'. And it is claimed that the 
properties_ of externality and localizability which characterize 
perception-sensations contradict the putative external and localized 
image-sensations. But , Sartre points out, sensations cannot contra -
dict one another, only judgments can. He gives this counter-
example: •· I hear the faint sounds made by the maid in the next 
apartment. At the same time I distinctly recall, in its rhythm , its 
timbre, its intonation, a statement I heard utte red the day before 
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yesterday. How can the faint creaks in the next apartment"reduce" 
the "coherent sensation" of the statement when they cannot even 
drown out the faint sound of voices from the street below ? Would 
we not have to say that the creaking sounds distinguished between 
what had to be cut out and what should be given pas sage ? Would 
not such creaking sensations already be judgmental ? ;• (p. 92). 
Making perception and imagination the outcome of sub-mental pro-
cesses violates the spontaneity and immediacy of mental discrimi-
nation. (Ironically, this counterexample, as we shall see, causes 
Sartre acute embarrassment with regard to his claim that imagination 
and perception are mutually exclusive.) 
The third holds that percepts and images are essentially 
similar, but separated into two realms by judgment. Some are 
selected to construct an objective world, while the remainder are 
relegated to the imaginary. Presumably selection is made by com-
parison tests for reliability, coherence and richness. But such tests 
could never yield anything but probable hypotheses. '·No one would 
grant that to establish the difference between an image and a per-
ception one must resort to an infinite reference system. Let every-
one consult his own inner experience. I am seated, writing, and see 
the things around me . Suddenly I form an image of my friend Peter. 
All the theories in the world are helpless against the fact that I knew, 
the very instant of the appearance of the image that it was an image ·1 
(p . 96) . Probable evidence cannot strictly support a judgment of 
absolute certainty . 
The common fault is that all three take images and perceptions 
to be composed of the same sensory material: '-Start by asserting the 
essential identity of two things, and you have removed, by the very 
nature of such an affirmation, all possibility of distinguishing them 
later' (p .101 ) . Moreover, to regard mental images as autonomous 
sensory entities serves to place them outside thought, as objects 
to be studied, compared, deciphered, measured, anticipated and 
banished. Thought, then, becomes reduced to the apprehension of 
these entities and their relationships. And as slave to these entities, 
as wholly determined by their law-governed appearance and inter-
action, thought loses its integrity and autonomy: nothing can is sue 
from it originally. If these independent psychic entities are sus-
ceptible to being reborn, there are problems that arise concerning 
how and where they reside when not attended to· by consciousness. 
And if they can interact 'behind the scenes', then tha.t implies that 
there is a region of unconscious mental activity . If there is an 
unconscious, what real power does thought possess ? 
In characteristic either-or fashion, Sartre infers from these 
remarks some large-scale conclusions. Images and perceptions 
do not consist of the same basic matter, nor are they presented to 
consciousness in the same manner; they differ crucially in animating 
intention. Past mistakes can only be avoided if a new conception of 
mind is adopted : j'A choice must be made ; either images remain inert 
elements , in which case the role of spontaneity .must be limited to 
the apperception of relations between images which elicit each other 
according to the laws of association; or, consciousness is organiza-
tion, systemization, and the flow of psychic facts is guided by 
controlling themes, in which case the image can no longer be 
assimilated to an opaque, received content" (p. 113). In order to 
keep thought wholly spontaneous, no opaque, inert sensory content 
can be allowed to enter consciousness. It follows that conscious-
ness, devoid of all impediments, is always transparent to itself, as 
well as uniquely self-determining . This amounts to the supreme 
ontological law of consciousness: 'for a consciousness the only 
way of existing is to be conscious that it exists-i (p. 115). If 
consciousness must always be fully known to itself, then no inert 
entity with its manifold properties can traverse the boundaries of 
consciousness. And, since '' there are only two types of existence, 
as thing in the world and as consciousness' (p. 116), consciousness 
must be empty. Consequently, the image cannot be a sensory content; 
it must be a pure spontaneity. 
· But what more is it ? Due to the repudiation of previous theories 
and methods, how to even begin to answer that question is not at all 
obvious . Sartre urges that a new method is needed, a method that 
will be incapable of producing mistakes because it will be applied 
to the examination of experience in its raw state . However, here 
it should be noted that Sartre has already overtaken himself. In the 
first chapter of L'Imagination, the new method is exercised to establish 
some fundamental theses, which find a crucial place in the argument 
just summarized. So even that conclusion (the image is a pure 
spontaneity) depends upon what is yet to be announced, and 
accordingly, what yet should be put into practice. 
All previous inquiries into the nature of menta 1 imagery, 
Sartre maintains, have taken off on the wrong foot. The reason for 
their failure is twofold: their theories stemmed from metaphysical 
presuppositions, fashioned independently of the data to which they 
apply; their various attempts to grasp the essence of psychic 
phenomena by adducing psychological facts were in vain. The 
first is responsible for rendering the image into a quasi-physical 
item, and the second for managing only probabilistic definitions of 
imagination and perception. Assuming this diagnosis to be correct, 
he claims that the only right strategy is obvious. Faithfulness to 
experience is to be guaranteed by scrutinising it as it is actually 
lived through, and allowing one's conclusions to arise naturally 
from the investigation. This direct and unprejudiced confrontation of 
experience should ensure - if anything will - that the essential 
structures of experience are made manifest . These conditions, as 
we have been prepared to expect, are the salient marks of Husserl ' s 
phenomenological method. 
While no right thinking philosopher could object to the eschewal 
of intellectual prejudice, he might not so easily agree that mental 
processes are distinct, separable and possess essential structures . 
But, as Sartre forcefully contends, the failure to find universally 
acceptable definitions of mental phenomena has denied progress of 
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a really significant kind to psychology; and the task of producing 
definitions belongs to the philosopher. 
According to Sartre, the natural sciences have advanced so 
rapidly because the phenomena of which they treat can be exactly 
classified, thus enabling a sure method to be followed and ade-
quate laws to be formulated. In contrast, the development of psycho-
logy has been retarded by conflicting theories and experimental 
results . This lack of agreement is due to deeper disagreements over 
the nature of psychological phenomena. We notice, too, that 
backing up the investigation in the natural sciences of contingent 
facts are logical certainties of mathematics: laws of nature are 
characteristically expressed in mathematical terms. But embarras-
singly - at least for anyone who wishes to model the science of the 
mind on the science of nature - psychology lacks an ·analogous 
foundation. The aim, then, of phenomenological psychology is to 
anchor the inductive investigation of empirical psychology to the 
intuitive knowledge of our experience. As Sartre writes in a mono-
graph on emotion, which was published after the first but before the 
second book on the imagination: "If we want to found a psychology 
we must go beyond the psychic, beyond the situation of man in the 
world, even to the very source of man, of the world and of the 
psychic; to the transcendental and constitutive consciousness that 
we attain through a 'phenomenological reduction', or 'putting the 
world in brackets' . It is this consciousness that must be interrogated; 
and what gives value to its answers is that it is mine II (Sketch for 
a Theory of the Emotions, p. 22). This remark shows that the intuitive 
. . . 
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knowledge alluded to is far removed from what is normally referred 
to by these words - a very extraordinary sort of intuition as it 
turns out. 
Sartre offers this explanation: ';Phenomenology is a des-
cription of the structure of transcendental consciousness based on 
intuition of the essences of these structures. This description takes 
place, of course, on the level of reflection; but reflection must not 
be confused with introspection, which is a special mode of reflec-
tion aimed at grasping and establishing empirical facts. To transform 
the results of introspection into scientific laws there must ensue an 
inductive transition to generality. There is another type of reflec-
tion, utilised by the phenomenologist, which aims at the discovery 
of essences. That is to say, it begins by taking its stand from the 
outset on the terrain of the universal" (L'Imagination, p. 128). Thus 
it is claimed that the 'universal' is reached by the suspension of the 
natural attitude, which consists in all factual beliefs about the world. 
But just why this temporarily induced amnesia should transport one 
to a state of profound contact with raw experience - whatever that 
might be - is left unexplained. Unfortunately, Husserl, the inventor 
of the me.thod, is of no greater help (Cf. Ideas § 31). If we wish to 
follow the method, we must be satisfied with what we have been given -
nothing more is offered. Nevertheless, although the destination is 
uncertain and the means of transport undet'ined, the novice may still 
want to take the mystical journey and never mind the details . If he 
is unable to embark unassisted, perhaps he can be .guided, perhaps 
he can learn the method through imitation. 
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A good illustration of the method in action appears in the 
opening paragraphs of L' Imagination. Sartre reflects on a parti -
cular, ordinary experience and reaches some staggering conclu-
sions: 
I look at this white sheet of paper lying on my desk. 
I perceive its shape, its color, its position. These 
various qualities have traits in common. To begin with, 
they present themselves as beings whose existence in 
no way depends on my whim, as beings of which I can 
only take note. They exist for me, but they are not 
myself. Nor are they some other self. In other words, 
there is no spontaneity upon which they are dependent, 
neither mine nor that of any other consciousness. They 
are at once present and inert . This inertness of the 
content of perception , which has often been remarked, 
is being~in-itself. 
... This inert shape, which stands short of all spon-
taneities of consciousness, which must be observed and 
learned about bit by bit, is what we call a "thing". 
Never could my consciousness be a thing, because its way 
· of being in itself is precisely to be for itself; for con-
sciousness, to exist is to be conscious of its existence. 
It appears as a pure spontaneity, confronting a world of 
things which is sheer inertness. From the start, there-
fore, we may posit two types of existence. (pp. 1-2) 
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The breathtaking rapidity at which the ontology is constructed is 
not without parallel. I do not think it inappropriate to compare it 
with the opening pages of Hume's Treatise. Now the only differences 
in procedure that I am able to detect between them are that Hume 
states his conclusion immediately ('' All the perceptions of the human 
mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds •.. '), and that he 
claims to have arrived at it after inspecting a large number of various 
'perceptions'. Evidently there is no significant difference in method . 
But this cannot be right, the phenomenologist will say. If Hume had 
actually employed the phenomenological method, there could be no 
disagreement over ontology. It is the phenomenologist' s dictum 
that the reductive method yields universally valid results. But 
unless he can show how the 'terrain of the universal' is to be 
ascertained, that dictum is without support. Suppose our novice 
earnestly attempt to follow Sartre's example. He per·ceives the 
sheet of white paper lying in .front of him. It is certainly not part 
of him. But what is he himself ? He reflects deeply and carefully , 
and discovers nothing more than the qualities, dispositions and 
abilities of a complex physical organism. He concludes that there 
is only one kind of existence. So he contradicts his teacher; where 
lies his mistake ? If his failure to reproduce the results of his teacher 
jeopardises his chances of becoming a phenomenologist - if he has 
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made a mistake - then by what criteria is success to be decided ? 
Presumably , the validity of the results is determined by a complete 
'reduction ' to and correct 'description ' of 'transcendental consciousness '. 
It is to Sartre's (and Husser!' s) discredit that no appropriate 
criteria are offered. Unless the novice has a definite procedure 
to follow, he has no means of checking whether he has adequately 
'stepped back' from the natural attitude and whether the description 
of what he encounters is wholly accurate. Is there anything in, or 
absent from, the account of our novice's investigation which suggests 
that he has erred somewhere along the line ? And now this question 
can be asked: does Sartre's account of his own investigation demon-
strate that he has been true to the method ? Without a clear pro-
cedure, a necessary feature of a truly scientific method, Sartre has 
no grounds on which to criticise our novice's results, nor, for that 
matter, vice versa. If, in criticising our novice's claim, Sartre 
resorts to a plea of special privilege, that is, as a phenomenologist 
he has exclusive contact with the 'transcendent ', but is unable to 
give support for his results other than adducing the fact that the 
novice's claim diverges from his own, then, certainly, he has fallen 
into dogmatism, a dogmatism to which the reductive method was 
alleged to be the final antidote. Sartre insists that ' the first step 
of a concrete psychology must be to get rid of metaphysical postulates '• 
(p. 101), and yet the first few pages of L' Imagination are a quite 
straightforward violation of that guideline . The method allegedly 
employed to establish the ontology is meant to guard against pre-
judice and secure absoluteness. Clearly,, it does not, and cannot, 
achieve these aims . And , as the method is so obscurely presented 
and even more obscurely employed , it surely must be regarded as a 
spurious basis for Sartre's philosophising. Furthermore, because the 
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method does not appear to carry any appreciable weight in the actual 
process of arriving at his re stilts, it does not illuminate the invention 
and/or discovery of his idea;s; and, by the same token, it does not 
distinguish his philosophising - how the ideas are generated - from 
any other philosopher's . So , for that reason, we can ignore the 
method , such as it is , with impunity, and assess his results by 
subjecting them to the standards of criticism generally applied. 
This needs saying, for while ignoring the method we must recognise 
that it is responsible for a certain unrational tendency in his thinking. 
The felt impressiveness of the appeal to 'intuition' and the use of 
'description' prevent Sartre from questioning his results when they 
become obviously untenable. His frame of mind seems to be: if 
it is experience as such that I investigate , then any contradiction 
in my results must reflect a contradiction in nature . 
I mentioned above that Sartre diverges from Husserl on some 
important issues. One of these concerns (the nature of) the subjective 
matter of consciousness. Sartre states that, according to Husserl, 
the object of consciousness is "outside consciousness (except in 
the case of reflective consciousness), or is transcendent''' (p. 131). 
Nonetheless, 'Husserl does not deny the existence of visual or 
tactile data which constitute a part of consicousness as immanent 
subjective elements. But these are not the, object. Consciousness 
is not directed toward them; rather, through them it aims at the 
external thing . This visual impression which is currently part of my 
consciousness is not the red. The red is a quality of an object , a 
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transcendent quality . This subjective impression which is no 
doubt an "analogue" of the red of the thing, is only a "quasi-red". 
That is to say, it is the subjective matter, the "hyle", on which 
operates an intention transcending itself and trying to snare the 
red out there' (p . 132). Therefore , for Husserl , the image is neither 
identical with the subjective matter nor with the object : 'the image 
ceases to be a psychic content. It is not in consciousness in the 
guise of a constitutive element. Rather, in the consciousness of a 
thing in image Husserl distinguished, as in perception, an imaging 
intention and a hyle enlivened by the intention . The hyle naturally 
remains subjective, but by the same token the object of the image, 
unattached to the pure "content" resides outside consciousness as 
something radically different ' (p. 133). The image is a certain 
manner that consciousness has of apprehending an object . So too , 
perception is a kind of apprehension , having its own 'intentional 
structure '. Thus for Husserl the fundamental difference between 
mental imagery and perception rests on their distinct ' intentional 
structures ' . 
But Sartre disagrees . Intentionality alone , he argues,· cannot 
be adequate because , if the subjective matter is uniform for images 
and perceptions, then the insoluble problem arises of how to explain 
the seemingly arbitrary decision of consciousness to animate this 
bit of subjective matter to act as an image ·and that bit to act as a 
perception. Husserl tried to forestall tha t problem by attributing 
motivation to consciousness, such that consciousness wills the 
kinds of experience. But Sartre points out that if the subjective 
matter is uniform then there could be no valid motive for choosing one 
-
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bit pf subjective matter to function as an image or a perception . 
And if the motivational selection is arbitrary , the possibility of 
formulating a distinction between imagery and perception has been 
ruled out. The lesson that Sartre extracts from this should not be 
surprising . In order to completely differentiate imagination and per-
ception , a distinction , he concludes, must be made on the level of 
subjective matter : the subjective matter of mental images must be 
itself a spontaneity (pp . 141-2) . Below we shall see how he tries 
to define the subjective matter as a spontaneous creation of con-
sciousness. 
With the passages, quoted above, from Sartre's article on 
intentionality in mind, one might be quite puzzled by this intro-
duction of what is plainly 'inner'. Here we have come up against 
a striking ambivalence in Sartre's thought . On the one hand , he 
claims without qualification that consciousness is empty; and on 
the other that it has - if only in imaging - a specifiable content . 
Although Sartre does not explicitly deal with the problem posed by 
these contrary views, I think it is possible to construe a reconciliation (of sorts). The exegesis will lead into some of his major doctrines . 
At times Sartre is prone to make uncompromising declarations. 
There are no better example s for our purposes than those found in 
.. " L'Etre et le neant. 'Consciousness has nothing substantial ... 
it is total emptiness ' (p. lvi); 'We must renounce those neutral 
mental "givens" which, according to the system of reference chosen , 
find their place either "in the world" or "in the psyche"' (p. li). 
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The danger in admitting 'contents' into consciousness is that a 
problematic passivity is allowed in as well. There can not be 
laws of consciousness or motivations external to consciousness 
either: 'Otherwise ... we should fall into that too common illusion 
which makes consciousness semi-conscious or a passivity' (p . lv). 
Therefore, 'The first procedure of a philosophy ought to be to expel 
things from consciousness and to reestablish its true connection 
with the world' (p. li). But while such a procedure might be attrac-
tively applied to the dominating psychic structure, perception, its 
unrestricted use would tend to banish from at least one other psychic 
structure what so obviously must be retained. And if it is waived in 
order to retain what ought to be retained, then some adjustment must 
be made , some explanation given. 
The policy of eliminating all 'contents' from consciousness 
(or anti-immanentism) is most strongly advanced when Sartre has 
only perception in view. All consciousness is consciousness of 
transcendent objects, which exist apart from and independently 
of cognition, and whose properties far outnumber those that can be 
apprehended in any cognitive act. When I perceive, the objects 
of my perception are there before me; nothing comes between the book 
that I see and touch, and my apprehension of it; I experience it 
directly ~ The book is before me; I perceiv:e it : that is all there is 
to say. He goes no further. Quite justifiably , one feels that very 
little has been advanced. Has he not disregarded every serious 
problem of the nature of perception ? If he has disregarded them, 
it is because he does not believe that they are of any importance. 
They are of no importance, it seems, because from Sartre's pheno-
menological point of view they do not arise. It is thus no exaggera-
tion to say that for him perception is unproblematic. That is a most 
curious feature of his philosophy. But it is curious because he takes 
perception as unproblematic and not because he takes some aspect of 
the mind as unproblematic. Indeed, Sartre's philosophical approach to 
the analysis of the mind resembles the one that he reacts so strongly 
against insofar as both share an unquestioned appeal to an area of 
mental life, but differ in the area chosen. 
To put it crudely, it was characteristic of the traditional 
approach to take mental images as data par excellence of the mind, 
and appeal to them - if only implicitly - so as to make sense of 
perception. Mental imagery was the unquestioned starting point, and 
the nature of perception the commanding problem. Complementary 
to this, Sartre takes perception as the psychic structure, or con-
sciousness, llil[ excellence,and makes it serve as the model by which 
to explain the nature of mental imagery. This comparison is a 
valuable aid to the assessment of Sartre's renunciation of previous 
theories of imagination. 
According to Sartre, perception consists principally of a per-
ceiver, or perceptual consciousness, and the transcendent object to 
which that consciousness is directed . Now do we find analogous 
elements in mental imaging ? Immediately the investigation gives 
rise to this problem. There is an obvious (phenomenological) difference 
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between my thought of some object and my actual visualization of 
it. The latter contains something - in the loosest sense of 'thing' 
lack,ing in the former. What is it in visualization that 'fi lls in' my 
consciousness ? It cannot be the object, because that exists out-
side my consciousness. ('It is not a something but not a nothing 
either.') Sartre refers to it variously as 'impressional matter ', 
'representative element', 'analogue', or 'psychic factor'; and con-
tends that it is a but not the sole constitutive element of the imagina-
tive consciousness. Sometimes however, when considering both 
mental imagery and perception together I he attributes an 'impressional 
matter' to perception as well. But that 'impressional matter' is dis-
tinct from that which participates in the imaginative consciousness; 
' In perception the actual representative element corresponds to a 
passivity of consciousness . In the image, this element, in so far as 
it is primary and incommunicable, is the product of a conscious 
activity, is shot through and through with a flow of creative will ' 
(L'Imaginaire, p. 15). But if a 'representative element ' functions in 
perception, then there ought to be problems about the nature of its 
participation, particularly how perception can be said to present its 
objects directly and what sense can be given to the claim that all 
consciousness is pure and non-passive. In any case, what should 
be noticed now is that the declaration of the emptiness of conscious-
ness opposes the view that consciousness contains inert, autonomous 
entities , but not in Sartre's scheme of things - oddly enough - the 
view that consciousness can produce a malleable 'psychic matter' 
which is dependent in greater and less degrees , according to the 
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type of consciousness in question, on the creative power of the mind. 
Indeed, it is this latter view that Sartre advances. In this respect, 
is his theory of mind so radically different from ones which introduce 
sense data ? The main difference between them lies in Sartre's 
rejection of the idea that the 'subjective matter' is a material akin 
to physical matter, and that it has primary status in the analysis of 
the mind and experience. As I understand him, Sartre holds that the 
transcendent object and the animating intention of consciousness 
directed at that object are the chief determining factors of experience; 
'subjective matter' in perception is irrelevant, but in the imagina-
tive consciousness of some importance. And in both perception 
and imagination the 'subjective matter' does not interfere with the 
dynamism of consciousness, because it is subject to consciousness . 
So the reconciliation - for what it is worth - is achieved. His 
anti-immanentism undergoes some modification, and amounts to a 
rejection of the old variety of 'hard' psychic matter while intro-
ducing a more adaptable 'soft' variety. To "empty" must be added 
"of the unsuitable psychic material": that takes some of the wind out 
of the anti-immanentist' s sails. Now whether Sartre can make better 
sense of his sophisticated version of the nature of the 'subjective 
matter' (particularly as it occurs in the imaginative consciousness) 
than the psychological atomist had , is a question whose answer will 
become evident later . 
Sartre fails to consider some difficulties that arise from his 
theory of consciousness; but he does not neglect them all , for his 
handling of one produces a fundamental doctrine. In perception , as 
distinct from the imagination, the transcendent object is present 
to consciousness. But clearly, there are cases where consciousness 
aims at an object that it takes to be present but there is no such 
object present, and cases where the object that is expected to be 
encountered is recognized to be absent or non-existent. Failures 
of the former sort (perceptual error) he inexcusably does not con-
sider; it is the more interesting latter sort that absorbs his attention. 
His attempt to understand the phenomenon of seeing that such-
and-such is absent results in the hypostatization of non-being. In 
order for non-being to have a place in perception it must meet two 
conditions: first, it must be existent and transcendent, and second, 
it must be a real object of consciousness and as such have a real 
presence. He writes that 'not to be "there" means still to be' 
(L 'Etre et le neant, p. xlix), and 'To say that consciousness is 
consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself 
as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives 
itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it' (p. lxii), 
and 'The necessary condition for our saying not is that non-being be a 
perceptual presence in us and outside us ' (p. 11). Since, he seems 
to argue, perceptual consciousness demands real, present existence 
as its object, the perceptual consciousness of absence or non-
existence must as well demand real, present existence. And , taking 
imagination as parallel to perception, he claims that imagination 
too involves presence . He says in L' Imagination that mental images 
are 'only procedures for rendering objects present in .a certain way ' 
(p . 64) . As we shall see there is a similarity between perception 
of non-being on the one hand and imagining on the other. In 
imagination, for Sartre, the analogue (which includes, in common 
terminology, the mental image) functions as the manifestation of 
presence. Though, despite the similarity, it is doubtful whether 
removal of the paradox of a perceived present absence will effect 
a dissolution of the corresponding paradox of an imagined present 
absence. 
Sartre analyses the consciousness of imagery into three 
components: the animating intention, the analogue, and the intended . 
transcendent object. As he tends to treat them separately so shall I. 
If L' Imagination ends with an appeal to an unduly technical, 
esoteric method, L' Imaginatre opens on a remarkably conciliatory 
note. Sartre understates: 'The method is simple: we shall produce 
images, reflect upon them, describe them; that is, attempt to 
determine and to classify their distinctive characteristics' (p. 2). 
The images that he discusses form a group both broad and narrow : 
broad because it includes images other than mental images, but 
narrow because the images (with one minor exception - listening 
to a symphony - which, in any case, comes outside the main argu-
ment) are all exclusively visual . That restriction is significant . 
The reflection on some mental images yields four distinc-
tive characteristics of the imaginative consciousness; namely, (1) the 
image as a consciousness , (2) the phenomenon of quasi-observation , 
(3) the image involving a nothingness, and (4) spontaneity . 
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Against the long-standing tendency to conceive mental images 
as akin to physical objects, Sartre offers a knock-down argument, 
which shows just how ridiculous that assumption is . If the propo-
nents of the traditional view are to be taken at their word, then their 
claim amounts to an assertion that the object is in the image and 
that the image is in the mind. He locates an expression of this 
incoherent view in Burne's Treatise: 'But to form the idea of an 
object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; the reference 
of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which 
in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as 'tis impossible to 
form an idea of an object, that is possest of quantity and quality, 
and yet is possest of no precise degree of either; it follows, that 
there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that is not 
limited and confin'd in both these particulars' (p. 2 0). To this remark 
he might well have added : 'Now since all ideas are deriv'd from 
impressions , and are nothing but copies and representations of them, 
whatever is true of the one must be acknowledged concerning the 
other •.. An idea is a weaker impression; and as a strong impres-
sion must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality , the 
case must be the same with its copy of representative' (p. 19) . 
If, Sartre objects, the idea of an object bears only an extraneous 
relation to the object , and the idea must possess all the qualitative 
determinations of the real object, then what can this mean except 
that in having an idea of an object, the object is exactly reproduced 
in the mind . 
. . 
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The refutation of immanentism is straightforward and embar-
rassingly simple: 'When I perceive a chair it would be absurd to 
say that the chair is in my perception. Ac_cording to the terminology 
we have adopted, my perception is a certain consciousness and the 
chair is the object of the consciousness. Now I shut my eyes and I 
produce an image of the chair I have just perceived. The chair, now 
occurring as an image, can no more enter into consciousness than it 
could do so as an object. An image of a chair is not, and cannot 
be a chair. In fact, whether I perceive or imagine that chair of 
straw on which I am seated, it always remains outside consciousness' 
{p. 4). Thus if we wish to preserve an unmitigated distinction 
between consciousness and objects in the world, we cannot allow that 
the mind could be populated by such objects or copies of such objects. 
So it is perverse to even suggest that in visualizing a . chair a peculiar 
copy of a chair is present to the mind, and equally perverse to maintain 
that the mental image itself behaves in accordance with mechanical 
laws , for only an object in the world can be really subject to such 
laws. 
Now it should be clear that by talking of the imagined object 
and the mental image separately , we have described two aspects of 
immanentism. Immanentism is, Sartre says , a 'double error' : 'We 
believed, without giving the matter any thought, that the image was in 
consciousness and that the object of the image was in the image' (p. 2). 
With regard to the latter , Sartre urges that the only proper objects of 
consciousness are transcendent objects (i.e., objects which can be 
described without referring to any apprehension of them). A mental 
image, then, is 'nothing other than a relationship' between con-
sciousness and the transcendent object' (p. 5), it refers to 'a cer-, 
tain manner in which the object makes its appearance to conscious-
ness, or, if one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness 
presents an object to itself'. The image does not harbour the object 
and the image is not self-contained . Like perceptual consciousness, 
the imaginative consciousness is directed on transcendent objects. 
That is the first characteristic of the imaginative conscious-
ness, which introduces the new, dynamic model of the mental image, 
and begins to demolish the old, static one. The remaining three 
characteristics continue the process. 
We have been told that the only proper objects of conscious-
ness are 'outside' it, or the non-reflective consciousness is never 
directed upon itself. Yet in considering some mental images where 
there are no definite external objects of which they are clearly images, 
it is naturally tempting to refer to the object given in the image (or , 
for Sartre, in the analogue) as the object of the image. I visualize 
a chair stretching, shrinking and finally disintegrating. Certainly 
I have no particular chair in mind; it is entirely my own creation . 
And I have destroyed it . Granted the chair is an imaginary object, 
why cannot imaginary objects be genuine objects of consciousness ? 
If all mental images were as a matter of fact images of objects cur-
rently existing (as in the case of visualizing the chair upon which one 
is seated) , then Sartre ' s view of the image as a relationship would 
be highly attractive . But as it is with the variety of images , it would 
seem that we are a t times drawn to give a real , external object as 
the object of the image and at other times to give a privately created, 
imaginary object. So to forestall that sort of criticism of his theory, 
Sartre argues that objects given in the image cannot by any means 
satisfy the requirements of a genuine object of consciousness . When 
consciousness is unable to secure the presence of the real object, 
it fashions a substitute. Yet, even when that substitute has been 
produced, consciousness never ceases to aim at the transcendent 
objects. But if the intended transcendent object is known to be 
non-existent or to be fictional, then what sort of relationship obtains 
between imaginative consciousness and its objects ? Rather bizarrely, 
Sartre seems to maintain - he says nothing to the contrary - that the 
'relationships' obtaining between fictional objects, non-existent 
objects, absent objects, etc. and consciousness are identical. 
An object of perceptual consciousness possesses an indefinitely 
large number of determinate properties, whereas an object given in 
the mental image exhibits only those properties that are immediately 
apprehended. Indeed the latter is determined wholly by the conscious-
ness of it: 'the object of perception overflows consciousness con-
stantly; the object of the image is never more than the consciousness 
one has of it; it is limited by that consciousness; nothing can be 
learned from an image that is not already known' (p. 8) . It is 
already known definitively because it is just that knowledge which 
reacts with impressional matter to produce the object in the image. 
It is the apprehension of the results that creates the (illusory) impres-
sion that the object in the image is observed, and since observed , a 
genuine object of consciousness. The object in the image cannot be a 
genuine object of consciousness because 'the image teaches nothing , 
never produces an impression of novelty, and never reveals ny aspect 
of the object ... No risk, no anticipation : only a certainty . My 
perception can deceive me, but not my image. Our attitude towards 
the object of the image could be called "quasi-observation" ... 
If I produce an image of a page of a book, I am assuming the attitude 
of a reader, I look at the printed pages . But I am not reading. And, 
actually , I am not even looking, since I already know what is written 
there' (p . 9). Perception involves the acquisition of knowledge -
an ongoing learning process . The mental image, on the other hand, 
is merely a manifestation of already assimilated knowledge and ex-
perience. As wholly a product of consciousness, the image is con-
sciousness, and therefore it or the object in the image cannot be an 
object of consciousness . The attitude of quasi-observation allows 
only quasi-objects. So, as the object in the image is not an object 
of consciousness but can be treated as if it were some such object , 
we might speak of the phrase 'object in the image' as a £aeon de parler, 
" · which refers to the synthesis of the 'representative element and the 
element of knowledge'. The object in the image inasmuch as it can 
be talked _about and described is something, but because it is not a 
transcendent object it is nothing. 
Although much of the discuss ion suggests a distinction between 
the object of the image and the object in the image as I have tried to 
indicate , some remarks show that Sartre either does not wish to make 
the distinction (consistently) or is confused about it. Besides 
'· . . 
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frequently referring to the object in the image (l'objet dans l 'image) 
as the ob~ect of the image (l'obiet de l'image), he complicates 
matters by introducing the expression 'l 'objet ..fil1 image'. While 
it apparently acts as a synonym of 'the object in the image', more 
likely it means both kinds of object in union. If so, the expression 
serves to limit the objects of imaginative consciousness. But that 
limitation causes problems: 
To construct a certain consciousness of a table as an 
image is at the same time to construct the table as the 
object of an imaginative consciousness. The object in 
the image [ en image] is therefore contemporaneous with 
the consciousness I have of it, and it is determined 
exactly by that consciousness: it includes nothing in 
itself but what I am conscious of; but, inversely, every-
thing that constitutes my consciousness has its counter-
part in the object, a knowledge concerning the object. 
In the act of consciousness the representative element 
and the element of knowledge are united in a synthetic 
act. The correlative object of that act becomes at one 
ap.d the same time a concrete, sensible object , and an 
object of knowledge . This gives rise to the paradoxical 
result that the object is present t~ us externally and inter-
nally at the same time . Externally , for we observe it; 
internally , for it is in the object that we perceive what it 
is . (pp . 9--1 0) 
Whether Sartre is deliberately running both kinds of object together, 
or simply does not have a firm grasp of the distinction, or both, it 
is not easy to say. But what is certain is that, by having exer-
cised more care with regard to this matter, he could have spared 
himself some strong criticisms, and , by the same token, some unfor-
tunate mistakes . For instance - apart from the obvious objections 
to the quoted passage - there is a very serious criticism that can 
be levelled against the presentation of the all-important third 
characteristic of the imaginative consciousness, namely , that it 
posits its object as nothingness . 
The third characteristic of the image describes a crucial 
contrast with perception : 'Every consciousness posits its object, 
but each does so in its own way . Perception, for example , posits 
its object as existing. The image also includes an act of belief , 
or a positing act' (p. 11). The positing act of imaginative con-
sciousness, can take several forms : 'No doubt there are some per-
ceptual judgments which involve a neutralized act of positing . This 
is what happens when I see a man coming towards me and I remark 
"this may be Peter". But this suspended belief refers only to the man 
who is coming . I doubt only whether he is Peter, not that it is a 
man. In a word, my doubt necessarily implies a positing of a type 
of existence: a man i s coming towards me . On the other hand , to 
say II I have an image of Peter " is equivalent to saying not only 
" I do not see Peter" but also " I see nothing at all" . The char~cter -
istic of the intentional object of the imaginative consciousness is 
that it does not exist and is posited as not existing , or that it is not 
posited at all ' (pp. 12-13). 
~
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We are reminded that all consciousness is consciousness of 
something, and that each consciousness (or psychic structure) dis-
tinguishes itself by a unique act of positing the object to which it 
is directed. In perception, the object is posited as existent and 
present (only later, in L 'Etre et le neant, does Sartre allow a per-
ception of absence), while in imagination, the object is, generally, 
posited as absent. The contrast, as described in L' Imaginaire, is 
sharp : the positing of the object as absent 'can manifest itself only 
in an imaginative act' (p. 217). But now which object is posited as 
absent ? Surely the object of the image need not be absent . Con-
sider this : I stop reading, close my eyes, and visualize the book I 
hold in my hands . I visualize it in that location . There is no doubt 
that my imaginative consciousness is aimed at the book in my hands; 
and therefore I am quite unable to posit it as absent. (I can entertain 
the possibility of its absence , but that is another matter.) And 
suppose I visualize myself ? Surely it is nonsensical to maintain that 
I posit myself as absent; absent from what ? It may be pointless 
to visualize what is present and can be seen adequately , but that is 
another matter; the matter at hand is the nature of mental imagery. 
(Perhaps Sartre., since he does stress that imagination attempts to 
get what perception fails to, has confused the 'aim' of consciousness, 
d irectedness, with the 'aim' of consciousness, motivation .) None-
theless, since one normally shuts one's eyes when visualizing, 
a qualification to the effect that the object is absent from sight 
could be introduced. But that possibility is not entertained by Sartre, 
and anyway, if it were introduced, it would violate the all-or-nothing 
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spirit of nothingness as well as the principle that perception and 
imagination are mutually exclusive attitudes of consciousness. Is 
the object in the image, then, posited as absent ? We might agree 
that it meets the general condition of being a certain nothing: it 
is not an object of consciousness. But what could it mean to say 
that that object can be posited, more specifically , as 'non-existent, 
or as absent, or as existing elsewhere' ? It seems very odd to con-
tend that in one case the object in the image is posited as non-existent, 
and in another, as existing elsewhere. Clearly no sense can be 
made of that . 
I suspect that the reason Sartre has failed to give a coherent 
account is that he has extended the characteristic of nothingness 
too far. He extends its coverage from the object in the image - where 
it readily fits - to object of the image. And that leads to the inter-
pretation of nothingness as absence, etc. It may be that in the 
great majority of cases , the object of the image is absent, or non-
existent , or etc . , but that fact does not amount to a necessary 
feature of mental imagery. 
The final characteristic, spontaneity, emphasizes the non-
passivity of the imaginative consciousness. As the image (or the 
created object) is a spontaneous construction of consciousness , the 
awareness of the image is immediate and complete. The imaginative 
consciousness is nothing substantial and never fixed. Thus the old 
metaphor makes way for the new: 'the consciousness of the image 
is not at all like a piece of wood floating on the sea, but like a 
. . 
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wave among waves ' (p. 14). (If consciousness contains nothing 
solid ~ it must be all fluid.) 
Next, Sartre examines phenomena which are commonly called 
images, with the intention of demonstrating important similarities 
and di ssimilarities among mental imagery, photographs , portraits , 
reflections , mimicry, schematic drawings , hypnagogic imagery, and 
so on. But the primary objective is to pave the way for the specu-
lative inquiry (The Probable) into the nature of the mental analogue. 
If we doubt that the mental image incorporates a material (of a 
rather special sort) we need only compare ' my initial empty intention 
with my mental image of Peter. At first I wanted to produce Peter 
out of the void, and then something loomed up which filled in my 
intention ' {p. 18) . The nature of the material in the men ta 1 image 
is to be clarified by clarifying the material of other forms of imagery . 
This procedure is sound , argues Sartre, because as all the forms 
share an identical function (to wit, to represent what is not present 
to perception) they are species of the same genus; and therefore 
their respective analogues are closely related in composition. Photo-
graphs , pqrtraits and schematic drawings require some perceived 
material for the imaginative consciousness to animate . Differences 
among them, according to Sartre , are due to the degrees to which the 
various materials make demands on the imaginative consciousness 
to produce a satisfactory analogue. The upshot of the investiga-
tion is that as the material becomes more impoverished in representa -
tional detail and perceptual 'stability' , the more the imaginative 
consciousness must contribute to establish and sustain the image. 
The discussion moves from a consideration of photographs and 
portraits whose material is richest in observational detail and repre-
sentational quality, to pantomime, sketches and schematic drawings 
where an increasingly greater participation of the imager is required 
to effect a successful and full image. What form does the parti-
cipation take ? Deficiencies in the material are compensated by an 
imposed organization. The organization is achieved through the 
activity of knowledge-directed eye movements. It cannot be denied 
that knowledge (and past experience) and the focusing and re-
focusing of (as well as movements of) the eyes are significant factors 
in the creation and recognition of images based in perception. More-
over, it is not implausible to suggest that the inferior representa-
tive quality of an ink blot (compared to a photograph ,. say) necessi-
tates more effort and greater concentration on the part of the imager. 
To be sure, ready-made images such as photographs and portraits 
depend less for their existence on the imager than the accidental 
images in blots and wallpaper . Now, taking into account the immense 
number and variety of perceptually-based images, it might reasonably 
be supposed that their differences will prove to be a function of a 
complementary relationship between the richness of the perceived 
material and the contribution of knowledge . If such things could be 
calibrated , then it might even be expected that the differences 
between neighbouring cases will be slight , and that .the overall 
effect will be that of a continuous change from photographs on one 
extreme to blots on the other. Indeed it is just such a fictional 
model of distribution that Sartre finds so attractive, and which he 
tacitly appeals to when arguing that there exists a mere difference 
of degree between photographic images and mental images. 
Extrapolation must be sound : the gap between images in 
blots, which depend upon present perception, and images in the 
mind, which preclude present perception, has to be filled. Hypna-
gogic images, those images that emerge from the retinal 'light-
display' during the period just prior to sleep, occupy that crucial 
intermediate stage. They resemble images in blots insofar as 'the 
material is plastic: in the one arabesques, faint forms, in the other 
lights without contours' (p. 55). Often they both arise in similar 
circumstances : when one is tired and trying to sleep, the images 
that emerge from patterns in (say) wallpaper become an amusing if 
sometimes distracting preliminary to slumber. But wa°h hypnagogic 
imagery, consciousness is less free; it is at once enchained and 
fascinated, because hypnagogic phenomena belong to consciousness 
and are not contemplated by it. 'In falling asleep the motor basis 
of attention is weak . From it there results a different type of presence 
for the object. It is there, but without externality; we cannot observe 
it, that is -, cannot make hypotheses and control them. What is lacking 
is precisely a contemplative power of consciousness, a certain way 
of keeping oneself at a distance from one's. images, from one's own 
thoughts , thus permitting them their own logical development , instead 
of depositing upon them all of one ' s own weight, of throwing oneself 
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into the balance, of being judge and accused, of using one's own 
power of synthesis to make a synthesis of whatever sort and no 
matter what' (pp. 49-50). The lack of contemplative power is an 
inherent feature, because, as Sartre says, the material (i.e. , the 
phosphenes) is in the eyes, and therefore not external (p. 51). But 
if this is so, then, keeping in mind the dichotomy -of being-in-itself 
and being-for-itself, the material is 'wholly consciousness' -
or else, if he wishes to confer a hybrid status on the phosphenes , 
partly internal and partly external, he has violated that dichotomy. 
Now if the material of hypnagogic imagery is wholly internal, how 
can there be a mere difference in degree between images in blots 
and hypnagogic images ? Furthermore, if the material of hypnagogic 
images is wholly internal, what distinguishes them from mental 
images? 
We may not be surprised that here Sartre uncovers another 
paradox. He argues, it seems, that, despite the differences in 
material, there is no discontinuity between images in blots and 
hypnagogic images because the latter too involves perception: 'in 
the hypnagogic consciousness the object is posited neither as in the 
process of appearing nor as already having appeared; one is suddenly 
aware of seeing a face' (p. 45). This conclusion does not tally 
with my own reflection on similar experiences , not because I hold 
the opposite, but because it is not clear how I could have been 
using my sight in total darkness with my eyes closed . Sartre implies 
that the phenomena of seeing a face in perception and of seeing a 
. - . ~ . . .. 
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face in hypnagogic images are essentially alike. But this simi-
larity of verbal expression does not demonstrate a fundamental 
identity of the phenomena concerned, rather it presents a problem : 
what leads us to describe such obviously different phenomena with 
the same terms ? It is therefore necessary to ask Sartre .: What kind 
of awareness ? Vision ? In what way ? He tries to explain: 'I do 
not~ the teeth of the saw (I only see phosphenes), but I know that 
what I see is a figure of the teeth of a saw' (p. 52). And further on 
with yet another example: 'The image is not posited as an object, 
but as a representation. One sees if not a cat at least a representa-
tion of one; or, to be more exact, ~ is about to ~ s. non-existent 
cat ••• it is because consciousness feels itself but slightly en-
chained that it posits its object as object as non-existent. It posits 
itself as seeing a cat; but since it is aware, in spite of all, of the 
origin of the vision, it does not posit that this correlative exists. 
Whence this paradox: I really do see something, but what I see 
is nothing' (pp. 55-6). Doubtless - since Sartre leaves the matter 
at that - we are asked to believe that the 'vision' in hypnagogic 
imagery is like ordinary vision in every respect except that no object 
is seen ~. Faced with such a clear absurdity, which is paraded as 
a significant discovery, the attempt to make the view in question 
intelligible cannot proceed. Besides, the incoherence is too obvious 
to warrant comment. Yet something remains to be said on how Sartre 
is driven to adopt it. 
Pressure mounts on two sides . On one: Hypnagogic images 
differ from images in blots primarily in that the former depend on no 
external material. That fact alone would seen to be sufficient to 
open a wide gap between them and leave hypnagogic images very 
close to mental images. On the other: Assuming that only one kind 
of imagery (namely, mental imagery) can be completely internal, 
hypnagogic imagery must exhibit some aspect of externality. It 
can bear some externality only if it does not possess the characteristic 
of quasi-observation. So real perception must be involved. Now no 
wonder the opposing sides cannot be reconciled: their aims are plainly 
contradictory. Of course Sartre realizes this; but, since the paradox 
is a result of phenomenological reflection, it must be accepted. 
Perception, then, according to Sartre , connects hypnagogic 
imagery with imagery involving perceived material, and so keeps it 
separate from mental imagery. What makes this separation only 
partial is the (relative) dependence of the material. As Sartre puts 
it : 'in the hypnagogic consciousness the material is practically 
inseparable from the consciousness we have of it, since it is 
radically transformed as consciousness seizes hold of it, and this 
not only in its functions, but in its very structure' (p. 5 6) . It should 
be recognized however that examination of the material present in 
hypnagogi_c imagery is not beset with the problem - inherent in the 
attempt to examine the material present in mental imagery - of 
identifying it. In fact there are no possible means of locating and 
inspecting the material present in mental imagery. While . subtraction 
of the imaginative consciousness from the apprehension of a portrait 
leaves the canvas , no such comparable residual entity remains when 
the consciousness of the mental image ceases : 'This is due to the 
fact that when the imaginative consciousness is destroyed its 
transcendent content is destroyed with it; no describable residue 
remains, we are confronted by another synthetic consciousness 
which has nothing in common with the first' {p. 61). S;ince the 
mental image is inseparable from its material, and the annihilation 
of the imaginative consciousness makes the material itself irretriev-
able, there is nothing for phenomenological reflection to apprehend. 
In order to determine the nature of this material we must 'leave the 
sure ground of phenomenological description and turn to experimental 
psychology. That is, as in the experimental sciences, we form 
hypotheses and seek confirmation in observation and experiment' 
{p. 62). Although true phenomenological reflection fails us at so 
crucial a point, it has, fortunately, provided enough equipment, by 
way of general facts applicable to all forms of imagery, to allow 
'The Probable' to achieve a certainty of its own. The shortcoming 
of the method does not, Sartre insists, spell disaster. 
From the treatment of various members of the image family , 
Sartre concludes that the differences among them derive solely from 
the interaction, between the material and knowledge , which produces 
the analogue; intentionality undergoes no transformation. In all, 
consciousness is directed upon a transcend~nt object by means of an 
analogue; and since it is possible to ' intend' the same object by 
employing distinct analogues (e.g ., a photograph of J . -P . S . and a 
caricature of J . -P . S . ) , the differences among imagery must rest on 
variations in the composition of the analogues . But not just any 
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material will be susceptible to the animating intention and know-
ledge of imaginative consciousness. The material must be such as 
to allow knowledge to upgrade the impoverished material to the level 
of representation. The transformation is effected by the 'penetration 
of knowledge' : 'Knowledge is not substituted in its ideational form 
for the weak material. As knowledge it cannot fill in the gaps of 
intuition. It must undergo a debasement ... It becomes intuitive 
in the form of pantomime; it flows in the movements. A new pheno-
menon appears: the symbolic movement, which, by its very nature 
as movement, belongs to intuition , and , by its meaning, belongs to 
pure thought. But it can happen that knowledge becomes directly 
incorporated with other sensible qualities, as in the case of hypna-
gogic images. We shall see that this degradation of knowledge is 
not exclusively an imaginative phenomenon and that it also is to be 
found in simple perception' (p. 59). (If the transformation occurs in 
perception, then it cannot be as bizarre as it might seem.) Now 
if the analogue of the imaginative consciousness is essentially a 
manifestation of knowledge, then any theory that supposes the 
mental image to be a sensory item must therefore be incorrect. But 
while this ~onclusion is attractive, the strength of the argument 
depends on his project of defining the nature of the analogue. And , 
as we shall see , the proposal that emerges from that project is not 
a persuasive , let alone intelligible , alternative . 
Knowledge is inextricably bound up with the intention of the 
image, for the intention always directs consciousness at something 
. 
. 
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specified, however vaguely. Nevertheless, knowledge itself can 
exist in a 'free state '. My knowledge that Peter is tall and blond, 
for instance, remains inactive and 'pure' until it undergoes a 'radical 
transformation' when I actively employ it in the formation of a mental 
image of him. Somehow, in the formation of the image, my pure 
knowledge that Peter is tall and blond becomes an imaginative know-
ledge that aims at the 'realization' of that fact. Sartre writes: 'Things 
present themselves as presences. If we begin with knowledge, the 
image will arise as a result of thought trying to make contact with 
the presences. This birth of the image coincides with a debasement 
of the knowledge which no longer aims at the relationships as such 
but as substantial qualities of things' (p. 7 5). If knowledge in-
augurates the creation of the image by aiming to represent what it 
contains in a pure state, what is it that supplies the ingredients of 
the representation in the form of an analogue ? 
There are two components, affectivity and movement, either 
of which may exist alone in determining the analogue - but their 
union gives the best result : 'The complete image includes an 
affective analogue which presents the object in its basic nature and 
a kinaest.hetic analogue that externalizes it and gives it a sort of 
visual reality ' (p. 93) . So Sartre hopes to explain the (quasi-) 
apprehension of sensations and feelings that are produced by the 
real object of the image, and how visualization corresponds to visual 
perception insofar as the image represents objects as they are 
actually (or can be) experienced in perception . 
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As all consciousness is consciousness of something, feeling 
too is intentional - but 'ih its own way'. Sartre stresses that feeling 
is not a subjective state which is only accidentally related to neutral 
objects: rather objects themselves carry affective qualities. Other-
wise one could feel hatred without hating or finding anything worthy 
of hate. Thus: 'To become conscious of Paul as hateful, annoying, 
sympathetic, disturbing, winning, repulsive, etc. is to confer upon 
him a new quality, to construct him along a new dimension ... [ these J 
qualities constitute the sense of the object ... they are its 
affective structure; they permeate the entire object ... the feeling 
presents itself therefore as a species of knowledge (connaissance). 
If I love the long, white and delicate hands of that woman, this love, 
which is directed on these hands, can be considered to be one of the 
ways they have appeared to my consciousness. It is a feeling which 
is directed towards their delicacy, their whiteness, the animation of 
of their movement : what could a love mean if it were not a love of 
these qualities ? ••• love does not intend the delicacy of the 
fingers which is a representative quality : it projects a certain 
tonality on the object which may be called the affective sense of 
that delicacy, of that whiteness ... these subdued affective struc-
tures .. · , constitute the deepest reality ... The representative 
retains a sort of primacy. The animated, white and delicate hands 
appear first as a purely representative complex and then bring about 
an affective consciousness which confers upon them a new meaning' 
(pp . 77-8). But now what happens when the object is absent, when 
the object is visualized ? In order to answer that question , we must 
first determine what pure feeling contributes to consciousness. 
Without knowledge and sensible representation, 'I become aware 
of tthe hands ] as an undifferentiated mass which defies all des-
cription. And this affective mass has a character which lacks clear 
and complete knowledge: the mass is present. What this means is 
that the feeling is present and that the affective structure of objects 
constitutes itself in correlation with a determined affective conscious-
ness. A feeling is thus not an empty consciousness: it is already 
a possession. Those hands give themselves to me under their 
affective form' (p. 79). Suppose then that I produce an imaginative 
consciousness of those hands, which is a synthesis of knowledge 
and affectivity. 'I know that the object which is there, transcendent ~ 
[? J , confronting my consciousness, stands for two white and 
delicate hands; at the same time I feel that whiteness and that deli-
cacy, and particularly the nature of hands always so intimate, so 
personal. But, at the same time, I am aware that these hands have 
not as yet come into existence. What is before me is a substitute 
for these hands, concrete, full, but unable to exist by itself. When 
that substitute is present it delivers the hands to be completely ... 
Let us recall the essential characteristic of the mental image: it is 
§.. certain way §11. object has of being absent within its very presence ' 
(p. 81). (With that possibility of imaginative presence, of what value 
is perception ?) 
When the image is complete , the object is not , s t rictly speak -
ing , present, for its real presence obtains only in perception; rather , 
what Sartre wishes us to say is that , its presence is present . I believe 
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that Sartre is led to this desperate-sounding thesis because, in 
not wanting to discredit the genuineness of the feelings concerned, 
he finds himself forced to claim that the object of the image, although 
absent, must in some sense be present. The pattern of his thinking 
seems to be this : Isn't my visualization responsible for the feelings 
that I now have ? Aren't the feelings genuine ? And don't real 
feelings require real, 'positive' objects ? Therefore the cause of 
these feelings must be something that truly exists, something there 
before me. Even though the object is absent, I am affected as if it 
were there. So it must in some way be present to me - if all its 
qualities are present, and particularly those that constitute its 
1
'deepest reality ', then surely the object is as good as present. 
But if we are puzzled about how this presence of an object 
obtains, about how whiteness and delicacy, say, can enter into the 
mental image , about how such qualities can be detached from their 
owner , we are given no illumination. Sartre states, it seems, that 
the qualities are indeed present because the feelings are experienced, 
and , conversely , that the feelings are experienced because that 
which gives rise to them is present (is a presence). And there is 
no apparent exit from this circular argument. Moreover, there is 
a further problem about the perplexing notion of presence. What, 
we might ask, is the difference in consciousness between the pre-
sence of an object when the object is present, and the presence of 
an object when it is absent ? If Sartre replies that the difference 
rests in the positional acts of consciousness , then we might ask 
as well whether the positing act is arbitrary or depends on the nature 
of the presence itself . If the former , then we seem to have reverted 
to the problem of how to define the dichotomy between perception 
and imagination when the phenomenal ingredients are identical. 
If the latter, then we must find the difference between kinds of 
presence . Later on , Sartre refers to the feelings in the imaginative 
consciousness as imaginary feelings , which require 'non-being in 
order to exist' (p. 167). So, presumably, he might be prepared to 
call the corresponding presences, imaginary presences. But the 
introduction of the adjective does not remove unclarities. 
The problem of explaining how movement can function as the 
analogue, unlike the problem of explaining how affectivity can, 
does not involve the question of transformation: ' ... when a 
movement is given by sense other than sight , the consciousness 
that apprehends it is already imaginative and not perceptual •.. 
since the structure of the consciousness of movement is imaginative , 
it undergoes no modification when the image is richer' (p. 91). (The 
reader will immediately object that by ruling out tactile perception 
of movement, the first ciaim is clearly false. Sartre's carelessness 
invites such off-target objections.) Sartre contends that movement 
is not a transcendent object of consciousness , but a synthetic 
unity of discrete impressions. Following Husserl, he ascribes to 
the consciousness of movement two specific intentions, namely, 
retention, which directs consciousness back to the impressions that 
have been destroyed, and protention, which allows consciousness 
to anticipate impressions. Both together constitute .the meaning of 
the visual impression of movement and the meaning of form produced 
by movement. Important too are the kinaesthetic sensations {pro-
duced by movements of the eyes) which sustain these intentions 
after the visual sensations have disappeared. This fact explains how · 
it is possible to be conscious of a visual figure, described by move-
ment, when the eyes are shut. The illustration given is: trace a 
figure eight in the air with the finger, and then shut the eyes and 
repeat. Now Sartre attributes to the imaginative consciousness or 
imaginative knowledge of movement both retention and protention, 
which react with kinaesthetic sensations to produce the analogue: 
' ... when we form an image of an object, the kinaesthetic impres-
sions which will accompany certain contractions, certain voluntary 
displacements of organs, will always serve as substitutes for a 
visual form' (p. 92). Actual movements of the eyes, because they 
produce the appropriate kinaesthetic sensations, are therefore 
nece_ssary for the formation of the image. 
But phenomenological reflection reveals that this is quite 
untrue. I am able - and I suspect the reader is as well - to 
visualize a figure eight without moving my eyes in the slightest. 
I do not deny though that eye movements can facilitate the formation 
of the image: that is evident in the attempt to visualize an object 
in motion. Sartre confesses that the impossibility he felt in trying 
to visualize a moving swing while keeping the eyes stationary demon-
strated that eye movements are essential . While one might agree that 
it is very difficult to satisfactorily visualize motion while keeping the 
eyes stationary, one is not thereby forced to accept - and it does 
not follow - that it is equally difficult to visualize a static object 
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while keeping the eyes stationary, nor that eye movements are 
necessary for the production of the analogue of the imaginative 
consciousness. Rather tellingly , Sartre neglects to mention and 
discuss the eye movements and kinaesthetic sensations that 
accompany sound heard in the mind ' s ear. 
If, as Sartre contends, the analogue of the imaginative con-
sciousness is constituted by knowledge, affectivity and movement 
which together are inextricably bound up with intentionality, there 
arises the problem of showing how it is possible to intend an object 
as it exists now via an analogue that represents it as it was in 
the past. If intentionality is bound up with the analogue, it 
would seem that it cannot go beyond that analogue . Sartre acknow-
ledges the paradox but remains unbothered by his inability to re-
solve it . In fact, he goes as far as to claim that it is irresolvable 
because the phenomenon itself is paradoxical ~ He states flatly 
that the mental image is a contradictory synthesis, just because it 
is possible to direct one ' s consciousness at the object as it now 
exists via an analogue of how it was in the past . The image in-
volves a 'fusion of intentionalitie s ' (p . 104) . The inte ntiona lity 
o f k nowledge involves a 'belief ' i n finding oneself before the object 
as it is now , and the intentionality of the analogue gives the pre-
sence of the object . And he says - but not in so many words - that 
it i s the firs t int entionality that determines what is to count as the 
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object of the image.* Why that intention should dominate is not 
made clear. Moreover, if it always dominates, it would seem to 
be incorrect to speak of a fusion or synthesis of intentionalities. 
And if there is no complete synthesis, then the 'inherent contra-
diction in the image' will divide the imaginative consciousness. 
And thus the view that consciousness is unitary and wholly spon-
taneous is undermined. Once we allow that an imaginative con-
sciousness could involve a mixture of visual, auditory and tactile 
analogues, consciousness becomes even more fragmentary. Con-
sequently, Sartre is faced with this dilemma: if he wishes to pre-
serve his theory of consciousness, he must reject the account of 
the mental image; if he decides not to reject that account, he must 
revise the theory. 
Sartre assumes that perception is accompanied by an affective 
reaction (p. 3 O) , and that perception (at least vision) requires cer-
tain eye movements (p. 3 6) . Now from the fact that both factors are 
incorporated in the composition of the analogue in visualization, we 
might be inclined to conclude that, for Sartre, imagination and per-
ception are closely related. Unless knowledge, affectivity and 
* By admitting a plurality - at least a duality - of intentions in the composition of the imaginative consciousness, Sartre gives the 
earlier thesis that 'the image is defined by Jts intention' an ambiguity . At any rate, Sartre suggests a distinction made more clearly by Bernard Williams in 'Imagination and the Self'. Williams distinguishes between 
what is visualized and what is imagined. To apply this distinction to Sartre ' s example (see below): what is visualized is Peter as he was in Paris while what is imagined is Peter as he is now in Berlin. 
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movement are derived from the relevant perceptual experiences, it 
would not seem possible to produce a certain mental image. But, 
disconcertingly, Sartre contradicts that inference. At the end of 
the inquiry into the nature of the analogue, Sartre declares: 'the 
image represents a certain type of consciousness which is absolutely 
independent of the perceptual type' {p. 107). The claim that per-
ception and imagination are absolutely independent is, to say the 
least, a palpable overstatement: a distinction does not entail 
absolute independence. The overstatement leads into a gross error 
when he proclaims that imagination and perception ' represent the two 
main irreducible attitudes of consciousness' and therefore 'they 
exclude each other' (p. 13 8). While, as he would certainly point 
out, it is true that there is an irresolvable competition between 
trying to concentrate on the book that is seen in front of one and try-
ing to visualize the book at the same time, it is quite another matter 
to maintain that - to revert to an earlier example - a similar con-
. flict exists when trying to visualize the book while attending to the 
fee 1 of it in one's hands . 
The volte - face should be apparent . Sartre seeks to remove the 
mystery of the nature of mental imagery by showing how it is con-
tinuous with other forms of imagery, in particular , how the analogue 
in the mental image is fashioned out of elements that are present in 
imagery having a perceptual base (p. 20). Yet he comes to 
argue that because visualization does not require an accompanying 
perception, no imagery at all involves such perception: dichotomy 
replaces continuity. After having arrived at the destination , he 
renounces the route taken . 
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Sartre treats the mental image as the paradigm of the imagina-
tive consciousness, and takes the unreality of the object in the 
image to be the crucial feature. Accordingly, that feature becomes 
the key factor from which he develops - with great speed - a theory 
of imagination. 
The object in the image is essentially impoverished; it lacks 
real spatial and temporal determinations. Qualities of time and space 
as they appear in the image are qualities of the object as such: they 
are intrinsic and non-relative. That is: 'In perception I can never 
know whether an object is large or small unless I have the means 
of comparing it with other objects or myself. But the object in the 
image carries its smallness within itself' (p. 145). For that reason 
the object in the image is unreal or a nothing: 'the type of existence 
of the imagined object as long as it i§_ imagined differs in nature 
from the type of existence of the object grasped as real. And, cer-
tainly, if I now form an image of Peter, my imaginative consciousness 
includes a certain positing of the existence of Peter in so far as 
he is, at this very moment , in Berlin or London. But while he appears 
to me in the image, this Peter, who is now in London, appears to me 
as absent.. This absence in principle , th is essential nothingness of 
the imagined object, is enough to distinguish it from objects of 
perception . What then must consciousness be in order to be able to 
successively posit real objects and imagined objects ? ' {p . 2 09) . 
The short answer is that in order to imagine , consciousness must be 
able to posit unreal objects , or to posit nothingness in relation to 
the whole of reality (p . 2 12). 
The unreality of the object in the image is extended to cover 
the objects in all forms of imagery. Appreciating the force of this 
extension, and thereby flouting common sense , Sartre contends that 
when one apprehends the character depicted in a portrait, one 
ceases to apprehend the portrait as part of reality.* He argues 
that the light on the cheek depicted in the portrait is irrevocably 
specified by the painter - all that the exhibitor can do is to illumi-
nate the canvas, and that if the portrait should be destroyed by fire, 
only the canvas will be burnt - not the unreal object. From this he 
concludes that the unreal object or the character depicted 'appears 
immediately to be beyond the reach of reality' (p. 213). And t_his 
distinction between real and unreal objects establishes , he implies, 
an absolute dichotomy between imagination and perception. In 
pursuing this larger claim , he abandons the belief of a varied de-
pendency between imagination and perception , a dependency which 
he has already exploited . In order to apprehend the portrayed character, 
'consciousness', he writes , ' must be able to deny the reality of the 
picture, and it can deny that reality only b~ retreating from reality 
grasped as a whole. To posit an image is to construct an object on 
the fringe of the whole of reality, which means therefore to hold the 
real at a distance, to free oneself from it, in a word, to deny it' 
(p. 213) . 
* For a similar thesis that in viewing a painting the spectator 
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cannot attend simultaneously to the painted canvas and the scene depicted, see E. Gombrich, Art and Illusion , p. 237. It is convincingly 
criticised by R. Wollheim , 'Reflections on Art and Illusion', pp . 279-80 . For a criticism of Sartre see H , Ishiguro, 'Imagination', 1966, pp. 176-7. 
If, in order to apprehend the character depicted in a portrait, 
the reality of the painted canvas must be denied, and because that 
denial can be accomplished only with a concomitant denial of reality 
as a whole, then, since the real is an exclusive property of per-
ception, it follows that the apprehension of the character depicted 
in all its rich detail cannot be a process involving the co-operation 
of an interaction between imagination and perception. It would seem 
that, if the painted canvas is to be a factor in the production of the 
imagined object, it can act only as a catalyst by arousing the appro-
priate imaginative consciousness, but not itself entering into or 
sustaining that consciousness. And thus, as elicitor and not sus-
tainer, the painted canvas is precluded from serving as the material 
for the analogue. Evidently the most effective, if not the only, pro-
cedure for excluding the perception of a painted canvas is to close 
the eyes; and so, from Sartre's claims, the ludicrous consequence is 
that the best way to apprehend the character depicted in a portrait is 
not to look. Moreover , since in every imaginative consciousness 
reality as a whole is denied, no perceived matter could function in the 
formation of the analogue (at least in the continued formation of the 
analogue) _ - and that makes all forms of imagery on a par with menta 1 
imagery. Since, when imagining is complete and at its fullest, every 
feature of reality, without distinction, is denied , the painted canvas 
ought to bear the same relation to the image that it supposedly elicits 
as one's perceptual vicinity bears to the visualization of an absent 
friend . So Sartre ' s attempt to finally divide imagination and per-
ception ends in advancing the quite untenable thesis that there is no 
106 
difference of real consequence between visualization and the ap-
prehension of a portrait. And this thesis contradicts the claims 
that were made regarding the differences among portraits, cari-
catures , drawings and so on. 
After that virtual recasting of the data (the prying away of all 
imagery from the world) , Sartre proceeds to make even more of the 
fashioning of the unreal and the accompanying denial of the real. 
It is, he states, this surpassing of the real which constitutes man's 
freedom: unless man is able to transcend the world, he will be 
determined by what the real offers. 'We can affirm fearlessly that 
if consciousness is a succession of determined psychical facts it is 
entirely impossible for it ever to produce anything but the real. 
For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape 
from the world by its very nature; it must be able by its own efforts 
to withdraw from the world. In a word it must be free' (p. 213). 
And the creation of the unreal involves 'a two-fold nothingness : 
nothingness of itself in relation to the world , nothingness of the 
world in relation to itself ' (p. 216). Nevertheless Sartre' recognizes 
at least implicity - the dangers in the categorical separation of 
the real and the imaginary; and so he admits an influence of the real 
on the imaginary . He tones down the emphasis placed on withdrawal 
by saying that the denial of reality accompanies the ordinary positing 
of the world as real; but even more than that 'to posit the world 
as a world and to "negate " it are one and t he same thing ' (p. 214). 
And ··= · ·. he trie s to draw the two realms together - .or , rather, to 
prevent them from moving too far apart - by attempting to establish 
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a connection between ' situations' (the different immediate ways of 
apprehending the real as a world) and the production of the unreal 
object . The exercise of the imagination must be a response to how 
the world is; otherwise it is arbitrary and unintegrated with its 
counterpart. Thus the production of the unreal object is always the 
' negation' of the world from a particular point of view; e.g., the 
visualization of an absent friend requires the 'situation' where the 
friend is recognized not to be present. But, then, the apprehension 
of the world is essential to imagination, and so the denial of the 
world can never be (fully) realized. We encounter yet another 
paradox : in order to imagine consciousness must deny and surpass 
that which it requires to establish itself. Sartre wants it both ways: 
that imagination is completely detached from perception and the real, 
and that the imaginary is in some way dependent on the real. How can 
consciousness both 'be free from all specific reality' and at the same 
time require a 'situation' to define itself ? (pp. 215-6). The only 
answer forthcoming - the only answer that I am able to discern - is 
that that is simply the way it is. But this resignation of sorts should 
not distract us from this inherent self-defeat in the realization of 
the imaginative consciousness . 
The extravagant opinions to which the uncritical acceptance 
of a paradox can lead is exemplified in the !inal section of 
L' Imaginaire . Here Sartre contends that 'the work of art is an un-
reality' and so is to be contemplated only in the imaginative attitude . 
And as aesthetic appreciation can occur only in the imaginative atti-
tude , beauty must be exclusive to it : ' ... the real is never beauti-
ful . Beauty is a value applicable only to the imaginary' (p. 225) . 
108 
But what of ugliness ? If,, as is suggested, all aesthetic qualities 
are exclusive to the imaginary, then ugliness too ought to be . 
But, unpredictably, Sartre denies that the real is aesthetically 
neutral, and attributes what must amount to ugliness to the world: 
there is a 'nauseating disgust that characterizes the consciousness 
of reality'. That must mean either that ugliness is not an aesthetic 
quality, as it derives from the real, or that some aesthetic qualities 
all negative ones - are not products of the imagination, in which 
case the apprehension of bad works of art would be strictly percep-
tual. Whichever, Sartre cannot consistently maintain that the world 
is disgusting and that the aesthetic is wholly unreal. 
Now the imagination offers the only means of escape from the 
intolerable world. Unfortunately, just how satisfying the escape 
can be is not adequately discussed. Anyway, Sartre himself seems 
to have no definite opinion on that point: he vacillates between 
asserting that the imaginary possesses an uncommon richness and 
that the image suffers from an essential poverty (pp. 168-9). But 
such withdrawal from and rejection of life cannot prevent or assuage 
pain, for ~he imaginary needs. to be supported at every point by 
wretched reality. That fact is hardly consoling . (After all , Madame 
Bovary's imaginings - does Flaubert's novel bear more than an 
accidental relation to L' Imaginaire ? - did not compensate her cir-
cumstances nor prevent her destruction.) Indeed, if escape is always 
fleeting then we must despair . And it does not diminish our despair 
to learn in the last few lines that the 'great beauty in a woman kills 
the desire for her ' since 'we cannot simultaneously place ourselves 
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on the plane of the aesthetic and on the plane of physical posses-
sion' {pp. 225-6). We are advised that in order to desire her 'we 
must forget that she is be,autiful, because desire is a plunge into the 
heart of existence, into what is most contingent and most absurd'. 
Consequently Sartre is unable to stop the dichotomy from dividing 
consciousness into warring factions : the admiration of a woman's 
beauty and the desire thereby excited are not only mutually exclu-
sive but mutually combative. 
Thus we arrive at this general conclusion. If spontaneity, 
wholeness and transparency signify health and freedom of conscious-
ness then - contrary to the initial, basic intentions - Sartre's 
philosophy as it incorporates a theory of the imagination culminates 
in the attribution of essential sickness and impotence to man. That 
above all is why his work disappoints. 
By deriving the features of mental imagery as a whole from 
visualization alone, Sartre, as I have suggested above, has placed 
more weight on visualization than it is capable of bearing. Even 
if all that he advances on the nature of visualization were correc.t, to 
extend those findings to auditory , olfactory , gustatory and tactile 
imagery would be a highly dubious manoeuvre . Suppose it is true 
that the analogue and the unreal object ar~ constituted by knowledge, 
affectivity and movement , and that those terms can be satisfactorily 
explained along the lines drawn . What , then , in the sound heard 
in the mind's ear , corresponds to the unreal object ? What movements 
are involved in the make-up of the analogue ? These questions and 
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others like them make it plain that, for whatever is said about 
visualization as Sartre conceives it, the kinds of mental imagery are 
different enough to preclude an adequate theory of one from being 
adequate for all. The preoccupation with visualization is bound 
to lead astray. 
In the last chapter he spends some time discussing the ex-
perience of listening to a symphony, but that effects no modifi-
cation; the portrait example would have done just as well. Apart 
from that minor exception he is silent on non-visual kinds of imagi-
nation. Worse still, within the field of visual imagination he 
restricts his attention - for obvious reasons - to examples where 
either the specifications of the image are given to immediate per-
ception in greater and less degrees, or the specifications are due 
to past experience . Nowhere is it even hinted that the imagination 
has the power to traverse the bounds set by past and present ex-
perience. The analogue, whether the mental image or the portrait, 
is an essential ingredient of imaginative consciousness; and the 
analogue is constituted by knowledge , affectivity and movement, 
all of which are determined by experience already assimilated through 
perceptuat consc iousness . Henc e the imagination itself contributes 
nothing ; it is thoroughly parasitic on perception . That being so , 
the promise to introduce a dynamic factor , , or to make the imagina-
tion complet ely dynamic , by way of the principle of intentionality , 
has not altogether been fulfilled . The production of the image (or 
analogue) may well be dy namic and spontaneous ; but, more impor-
t antly, the imagination a s limit ed to that which is already pos sessed 
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and represented in the analogue is static. What is imagined is 
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defined by what can only be realized in the analogue, i.e. the 
unreal object. So, in this respect at least, despite the revolu -
tionary claims, Sartre's theory resembles his predecessors' insis-
tence that the imagination mirrors, and cannot go beyond that which 
has been acquired through, perception. 
To what extent has Sartre made advances ? The traditional 
view that the mind contains independent ready-made 'contents' and 
that experience consists in the conscious registering of them, ·is 
replaced by the view that consciousness is always directed beyond 
itself, and that each psychic structure consists in a particular and 
irreducible synthesis of forces. Sartre maintains that no psychic 
structure, with special emphasis on the imaginative consciousness, 
can be reduced to a collection of discrete parts (cf . p .. 106); 
but there is a discrepancy between this conception of his work and 
the work itself. Granted, his analysis of the image is not as crude 
as (say) Hume' s, but the gain in sophistication does not divorce 
him from the atomistic approach . Discrete psychic items make way 
for amorphous psychic structures , but still the attitude to the 
analysts of the mind has not changed : to clarify the nature of the 
mind or indeed the nature of the imagination, first distil the com-
ponents. Evidently, for both , the model to be applied to philo-
sophical investigation is the scientific analysis of the composition 
of a substance, and as science becomes more sophisticated so too 
the model . 
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In another respect, however, it can be argued that Sartre 
has, as it were, opened up the imagination. He extends the coverage 
of the term beyond mental imagery to images of various (external) 
kinds, i.e. photographs , caricatures, etc. And that surely is a 
significant enlargement over the traditional restrictions. Never-
theless what he gives with the right hand, it seems he takes back 
with the left. As I tried to show above, external images lose their 
physical attachment and are assumed into the imaginary realm to 
occupy a place beside mental images. That which is stretched 
quickly shrinks to something like its former, but now somewhat 
altered, shape. 
In connection with the question of the range of imagination, 
we might be inclined to feel that the few rather pedestrian examples 
that Sartre uses fail to meet the description of the imagination as 
(so Sartre puts it) 'one of the four or five great mental functions' -
but of course he is not alone in choosing unimpressive illustrations. 
Rich and provocative examples, described in sufficient detail , are 
perhaps what is needed to keep faith with the importance of the 
imagination. With this topic in the philosophy of mind in particular, 
the kind of examples determine what can be accomplished, because 
to find the most striking examples is to partly discover what one 
is trying to say. In talking of detail, I am conscious of the kind 
of detailed scrutiny that Sartre brings to bear on the nature of the 
imagination: it is that peculiar examination which e~tablishes a link 
between Sartre and the empiricists . The fact that he fails to present 
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a satisfactory account indicates, I think, that any like-focused 
scrutiny will fail. The problem, as I see it, is to find what things 
will support detail (aspiring to richness and depth) and support 
it in such a way as to conve,y a real grasp and illumination of the 
matter at hand. 
Finally, insofar as Sartre's theory of the imagination fails, 
the account of the reports of imaging experience fails too. While 
the actual content of the imaginative consciousness is located out-
side it, as object of the intention, thereby showing the description 
to be unproblematic, the shift of focus does not serve to alter the 
centrality of the image (or analogue) itself. The image has a life of 
its own, it can be described. And it can be described in perceptual 
terms because it is composed of elements (knowledge, affectivity 
and movement) germane to perception but which are activated so as 
to c reate the (real) presence of the object intended. But since this 
notion of presence and the explanation of the composition of the 
analogue remain incoherent, the use of perceptual terms in the des-
cription of the analogue has not been vindicated. Sartre begins by 
denying the existence of the inner and ends with the unresolved 
difficulty of determining its true description. 
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IV 
A BEHAVIOU_IUST'S ACCOUNT 
That what is seen as the content and power of the imagina-
tion is a function of one's general view of the nature of the inner 
life escapes, I think, the grasp of particular argument. Thus the 
aim of this chapter will be to show that the thesis gains confirma-
tion in the context of examining an all-embracing theory of mind. 
Certainly what Sartre ascribes to the faculty of imagination is 
governed by the sole inner force, the centre and essence of con-
sciousness, intentionality: as the intentional structure virtually 
exhausts the content of any mental act, the imagination is re-
stricted to fixing on absent objects. So too, Gilbert Ryle's account 
of the imagination is best understood by first approaching his 
view of the mental world as a whole. Now it goes without saying 
that Ryle's philosophical perspective and motivations are radically 
distinct from Sartre ' s; although, as has been pointed out, they 
do share an (implicit) objective in trying to cope with the descrip-
tions of the inner life, in particular when the topics are mental 
imagery and imagination . And there is some agreement - though 
superficial but which tends to be exaggerated - which connects 
with the refutation of the outstanding traditional theories of mind . 
Otherwise there is no common ground : each point of congruence is 
surrounded by large contrasting areas • 
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A fitting subtitle to The Concept of Mind (to be supplied in 
aid of coming to grips with the whole work) might be 'the disparage-
ment of the inner'. Indeed this phrase suggests the salient 
theme in the discussion of the following : Ryle' s overall programme , 
its motivation and direction; his attitude to the inner life, the 
views on sensations, feelings and self-knowledge; and how the 
programme and the attitude lead to an uneasy ambivalence in the 
treatment of imagery and imagination. 
A useful preface to his magnum opus is the much earlier 
statement on philosophical methodology in 'Systematically Mis-
leading Expressions'. There, principles and opinions are enun-
ciated which, although much of the accompanying detail has evi-
dently been abandoned, survive in the later writing. Ryle argues 
that 
There are many expressions which occur in non-philo-
sophical discourse which, though they are perfectly 
clearly understood by those who use them and those who 
hear or read them, are nevertheless couched in gram-
matical or syntactical forms which are in a demonstrable 
way improper to the states of affa irs which they record 
(or the alleged states of affairs which they profess to 
record). Such expressions can be reformulated and for 
philosophy but not for non-philosophical discourse must 
be reformulated into expressions of which .the syntactical 
form is proper to the facts recorded (or the alleged facts 
recorded) . (pp . 41-2) 
As such expressions can be grouped into a small number of types 
which are apt to mislead in certain ways and which are similar 
insofar as they are 'all temptations to "multiply entities"', he 
calls them systematically misleading. The proposed criterion for 
determining whether a candidate expression misleads systema-
tically is logical. The following passage presents the criterion 
and conveys the temper of much of his argumentation. 
We meet with and understand and even believe a 
certain expression such as 'Mr Pickwick is a fictitious 
person' and 'the Equator encircles the globe'. And we 
know that if these expressions are saying what they 
seem to be saying, certain other propositions will 
follow. But it turns out that the naturally consequential 
propositions 'Mr Pickwick was born in such and such a 
year' and 'the Equator is of such and such a thickness' 
are not merely false but, on analysis, in contradiction 
with something in that from which they seemed to be 
logical consequences . The only solution is to see that 
being a fictitious person is not to be a person of a cer-
tain sort, and that the sense in which the Equator girdles 
· -the earth is not that of being any sort of a ring or ribbon 
enveloping the earth . And this is to see that the original 
propositions were not saying what they seemed on first 
analysis to be saying . Paralogisms and antinomies are the 
evidence that an expression is systematically misleading . 
(p. 60) 
Now Ryle appears to assume that all errors of a philosophical kind 
are engendered by naive reflection on such expressions. So for 
him the philosopher's task becomes the replacement of misleading 
expressions by those which have no tendency whatsoever to mis-
lead. For the analyst must search for syntactic . forms which will 
'exhibit the forms of the facts into which philosophy is the enquiry'. 
Apart from the oddity of allowing that the contradictory pro -
positions could ever seem to be 'naturally consequential', and 
therefore apart from the doubt that arises over the inherent mis-
leadingnes s of such expressions, there is not a little obscurity 
associated with t he ideas of a form of a fact and a properly mirror-
ing linguistic form. His self-acknowledged inability to adequately 
elucidate these ideas, however, does not undermine his confidence 
in either the belief that a certain relationship obtains between 
language and the world or the belief that philosophy ought to consist 
in the analysis of language so as to uncover the real, non-super-
ficial linguistic forms which reveal the nature of reality. We do 
encounter both in The Concept of Mind, though they are present in 
new garb- or perhaps it is more correct to say that we meet their 
descendants . Ryle undertakes to refute Cartesianism or the theory 
that postulates a separate and independent realm of the mental, as 
it is surely guilty of ' multiplying entities '. And the technique is 
to expose the error by showing how it confuses categories , how it 
attributes the set of mental phenomena to the same logical type as 
the physical, and in so doing absurdly creating a spiritual realm, 
analogous to but over and against the physical. 
My destructive purpose is to show that a family of 
radical category-mistakes is the source of the double-
life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost 
mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this 
argument. Because, as is true, a person's thinking, 
feeling and purposive doing cannot be described 
solely in the idioms of physics, chemistry and physio-
logy, therefore they must be described in counterpart 
idioms. As the human body is a complex organized unit, 
so the human mind must be another complex organized 
unit, though one made of a different sort of stuff or 
structure. (pp. 19-2 0) 
But Ryle's procedure - commendable though some of its aims are -
manages not only to exorcise the ghost from the machine but also 
to deliver man from an inner life, at least an inner life · meriting 
some interest and having some content. And as the inner life is 
extinguished so the imagination becomes debilitated. 
Ryle' s worries are plain, if not plainly expressed; there is 
more than enough to suggest them. If a person is essentially a 
Cartesian ego , a despairing consequence follows. Each man is 
fundamentally incomprehensible to all others , while yet thoroughly 
transparent to himself. And thus it is immediately evident that a 
firm belief in the duality of man as a spiritual and physical com-
posite corrupts the ordinary confidence displayed in the day-to-day 
dealings with others. If dualism were correct and we truly believed 
it, then every exchange of greetings, every instance of co-
operative activity, every act of affection would be beset by a 
destructive suspicion, a suspicion not provoked by discernible 
features but by a theoretical conviction that makes it basic and 
pervasive. As the real person, the other's soul, is inaccessible 
to me, beyond the reach of my observational powers, so I cannot 
ever know, ever be in the least certain that what I observe corres-
ponds to what is the case. Every facet of my relationships and 
activities with others is thus contaminated by this disconcerting 
thought: 'I cannot and should not trust anyone's words and actions 
because what anyone actually thinks or feels can never be dis-
closed to me'. This continually nagging thought produces an 
ineradicable feeling of detachment from others and from the world. 
As real human contact and real involvement in the affairs of the 
world are precluded, a gap opens between oneself and ·the world. 
And the recognition of the unbridgeable gap generates, under-
standably, the problem of depression, frustration and loneliness 
the problem seems absolutely incurable for a redemptive higher 
being, a supernatural companion is no longer believed in. It 
should be noticed as well that the problem covers not only the im-
poss ibility_ of my reaching the other , but also the impossibility of 
the other reaching me . I am known completely and exclusively to 
myself. So even if I could somehow , say through extra-sensory 
means , reach the other, the problem will not have been resolved 
unless the other can ,similarly reach me . In order to be fully engaged 
w ith others and fully integrated in the world , I must know that I am 
capable of fathoming another (though not necessarily always) and 
that he is capable of fathoming me (though not necessarily always). 
I want to know and I want to be known: both conditions have to 
be met. Now Ryle deals with both conditions, with both the doubt 
and the isolation under the topics of Knowledge of Other Minds 
and Privileged Access. 
an adherent of the official theory [dualism J 
finds it difficult to resist this consequence of his 
premises, that he has no good reason to believe that 
there do exist minds other than his own. Even if he 
prefers to believe that to other human bodies there are 
harnessed minds not unlike his own, he cannot claim 
to be able to discover their individual characteristics, 
or the particular things that they undergo and do. 
Absolute solitude is on this showing the ineluctable 
destiny of the soul. Only our bodies can meet. (p. 16) 
If the doctrine of the ghost in the machine were true, 
not only would people be absolute mysteries to one 
another, they would also be absolutely intractable. In 
_ fact they are relatively tractable and relatively easy 
to understand . (p. 110) 
A residual difference in the supplies of the requisite 
data makes some differences in degree between what I 
can know about myself and what I can know about you , 
but these differences are not all in favour of self-
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knowledge. In certain quite important respects it is 
easier for me to find out what I want to know about you 
than it is for me to find out the same sorts of things 
about myself. In certain other important respects it 
is harder. But in principle, as distinct from practice, 
John Doe's ways of finding out about John Doe are the 
same as John Doe's ways of finding out about Richard 
Roe. To drop the hope of Privileged Access is also to 
drop the fear of epistemological isolationism; we lose 
the bitters with the sweets of Solipsism. (pp. 149-50) 
The resolution of the problem requires, as Ryle points out, the 
rejection of the absolute primacy of self-knowledge. But less 
persuasively it also seems to require forfeiting the power of self-
consciousness, that is, the difference that coming to know what one 
is might make to one's future self. 
Ryle intends to secure our psychic well-being by restoring 
confidence in the 'wealth of information about minds , information 
which is neither derived from, nor upset by, the arguments of 
philosophers' by way of showing how the dualist distorts that infor-
mation. Bu~ unlike, say, the phenomenologist who refutes Car-
tesianism by exhibiting its unfaithfulness to lived experience , to 
the experience of being in the world, Ryle attacks the doctrine for 
the absurdities it generates while at the same time arguing for a 
peculiar form of behaviourism: his indirect strategy does not mean 
that he is less determined to fuse mind and body. Still the revu lsion 
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he feels for dualism repels him too far in the opposite direction. 
For Ryle there are no halfway houses. In rejecting one extreme 
philosophy of mind he adopts another, indeed one that also suffers 
from an unfaithfulness to and an undervaluing of the 'wealth of 
information about minds' that we possess. 
The pattern of the argument is not subtle. The elevation of 
the mind to a spiritual realm makes bodily manifestations of mental 
items virtually irrelevant. But as the belief in such a realm is 
both false and incoherent, the mind must be solely a function of 
behaviour. 'I try to show that when we describe people as exer-
cising qualities of mind, we ate not referring to occult episodes of 
which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring 
to those overt acts and utterances themselves' {p. 2 6). Behaviourism 
is the only viable alternative. But it would be wrong to identify 
Ryle' s theory with mechanism or crude behaviourism. When we 
describe people in mental terms 
... we are describing the ways in which those people 
conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour. 
True, we go beyond what we see them do and hear them 
say , but this going beyond is not a going behind , in the 
sense of making inferences to occult causes; it is going 
beyond in the sense of considering, in the first instance, 
the powers and propensities of which their actions are 
exercises . (p. 5 0) 
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Our inquiry is not into causes (and §:.. fortiori not into 
occult causes), but into capacities, skills, habits , 
liabilities and bents. (p . 45) 
Further, reinforcing the behaviourism is a 'literalist theory of 
* language ', whose roots we have already scanned . According to 
Ryle the dualist has fallen into error and confusion by taking the 
common reports of mental phenomena too strictly. Ryle' s scheme 
of things permits existence only to that which can be observed 
directly or indirectly (with the aid of instruments) and little else; 
sensation, which does not come into the favoured position , becomes 
problematic , an oddity which lies on the fringe of what matters. 
Thus since our experience is delimited by what is ordinarily ob-
servable , we must expect and demand that our language , when it 
meets the basic requirements of precision, will reflect that homo-
geneity - a homogeneity still incorporating diversity - and not 
make reference to fictional realms of existence. There is one homo-
geneous world, so there is or ought to be one range of cohesive 
descriptions that articulate that world. The view and the demand for 
linguistic rigour accompany an inordinate sensitivity to metaphor, yet 
a sensitivity founded on a very narrow conception of metaphor. That 
is, Ryle thinks that the genesis of a metaphor determines its nature 
or meaning . Whether a supposed metaphorical term could be justi-
fiably construed in a manner opposed to its history is a consideration 
that does not cross his mind . 
Ryle seems greatly impressed by the fact that reports or des-
criptions of mental phenomena frequently include terms which have 
* I borrow the phrase from Stuart Hampshire , 'Ryle 's The Concept 
of Mind'. 
been transferred from a primary application to physical phenomena. 
Now why is he so bothered by, for example, the innocuous phrase 
'in the head', used normally to locate thoughts, images and some 
sensations ? The explanation lies with the opinion - which he 
expresses only implicitly - that the use of a transferred term (or 
metaphor) should, in order to be legitimate, correspond to the use 
of the original term in a point-for-point parallel. Obviously, a 
perfect analogy is impossible here, and any attempt to follow out 
the suggested parallel demonstrates the absurdity. 'No one thinks 
that when a tune is running in my head, a surgeon could unearth a 
little orchestra buried in my skull.' And the implication is that 
only such a bizarre discovery could possibly warrant the use of the 
phrase when just minimum accuracy is demanded. However, he 
suggests that 'in the head' does in fact mean nothing more than 
'metaphorical nearness' or 'imaginariness'. So apparently, 'I saw 
it in my head' is equated with 'I visualized it'. But the proposal 
does not satisfy, for the two expressions are clearly dissimilar 
in meaning. Anyway Ryle states that whether or not it does satisfy 
is unimportant. The general argument stands. The phrase 'in the 
head' (and others like it) 'can and should always be dispensed with' 
for their use inclines their 'employers to the view that minds are 
queer "places 11 , the occupants of which are special-status phan-
tasma' (p. 40). Evidently for Ryle all metaphors of the mind are 
conceits . 
The position gets its force from the opinion that a metaphor 
or transferred term entails a perfect analogy between, in this case, 
the psychological and the physical , and from the opinion that the 
unreflective man is unable to resist the resulting, preposterous 
consequences. But what reason do we have for believing that there 
are no metaphors based on one or a few analogous features ? Is 
it so implausible that terms were transferred and metaphors intro-
duced on the slightest resemblance and suggestion ? As for the 
second opinion: If Ryle' s view of metaphor were right, each of us 
would be responsible for fostering absurd ideas of the nature of mind , 
when such ideas are neither intended nor found credible. Perhaps 
the fact that we do persist in our linguistic habits is evidence that 
we do not share his view of metaphor. 
But he goes so far as to claim something much bolder . He 
denies that there are any points of contact, however tenuous , 
between the mental and the physical, or that there exist experiences 
and states of mind that genuinely invite the use of such transferred 
terms. Consider the following . 'The statement "the mind is its own 
place" , as theorists might construe it, is not true, for the mind is 
not even a metaphorical "place"' (p. 50). This sentence says more 
than what he immediately goes on to say, namely, that there are 
not covert performances which cause or prefigure overt performances 
and which .exist in their own space. Indeed the final clause, I feel 
certain , can be read only as an outright denial of a real analogy 
between the psychological and the physicat. Any experience which 
seemingly inspires a metaphorical description must be illusory, 
because such metaphors entail absurdity: no mental state whatsoever 
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could thus be protrayed by a metaphor : metaphor precludes accuracy . 
Now this exposure of the alleged meretriciousness of a large class 
of mental states gives impetus to the rejection of the notion of an 
inner life. 
But to say that Ryle denies the inner life, however, is not 
to say that he also denies the existence of inner items . 'It is part 
of the function of this book to show that exercises of ·qualities 
of mind do not, save 2.§£ accidens , take place "in the head", in 
the ordinary sense of the phrase, and those which do have no special 
priority over those which do not' (p . 40). When Ryle surveys the 
inner, as we have been prepared to expect, he finds only the rela-
tively tangible, the relatively discrete, the relatively obvious. He 
finds feelings , sensations , images and frames of mind (i . e . thoughts) , 
which together, he thinks , exhaust the inner dimension of the mind. 
And the question implicit throughout is whether any or all of these 
can add up to an inner life as it is ordinarily conceived ? The 
explicit, skeptical reply is No , not by any means . 
The internal occurrences related to emotion include thrills, 
pangs , twinges , throbs and wrenches . But these feelings , we a re 
often reminded , do not ent er into nor are relevant to the exp lana -
tion and understanding of intelligent human behaviour . At most they 
are signs of agitations (i.e. conflicting inclinations) and moods , but 
the n negative signs : 'Roughly, we do not ... act purposively 
because we experience feelings ; we experience feelings , as we 
wince and shudder, because we are inhibited from acting purposive ly' 
127 
(p. 103). Thus feelings, it seems, are in the main indifferent 
by-products of acting and experiencing, except on occasion when 
they are made conscious because, normally, disagreeable; and 
when they are made conscious they always distract us from the real 
matter of experience, external objects. Emotion manifests itself 
in inclinations and moods as propensities, which are expressed in 
'law-like propositions'; thus emotion is not episodic and occult 
but dispositional and overt ; This indicates an important restriction. 
The mental covers those characteristics - capacities, inclinations, 
skills, habits, etc. ~ whose existence is determined on the basis 
of publicly observable evidence, behaviour, and so which are 'con-
stituted' by such evidence, behaviour. In fact Ryle states unequi-
vocally that internal occurrences lie outside the pale of the mind : 
Those human actions and reactions, those spoken and 
unspoken utterances, those tones of voice; facial 
expressions, and gestures, which have always been 
the data of all the other students of men, have, after 
all, been the right and the only manifestations to study . 
They and they alone have merited, but fortunately not 
received, the grandiose title ' mental phenomena '. (p . 302) 
Similarly sense impressions, while essential to perception, 
do not constitute perception . What is more , as they are not objects 
of observation they cannot be objects of consciousness or mind 
this has consequences for the theory of mental imagery: 
It makes sense to speak of someone refraining from 
watching a race or of his suspending his observation of 
a reptile, but it makes no sense to speak of someone 
refraining from feeling a pain, or suspending the tingle 
in his nose ... 
Sensations then, are not perceivings , observings , 
or findings; they are not detectings, scannings, or 
inspectings; they are not apprehendings , cognizings , 
intuitings , or knowings . To have a sensation is not 
to be in a cognitive relation to a sensible object. There 
are no such objects. Nor is there any such relation. 
Not only is it false ... that sensations can be objects 
of observation; it is also false that they are themselves 
observings of objects. (p. 2 04) 
That a sensation fails to measure up to the requirements of an object 
of consciousness is shown by the absence of, in Ryle's words, a 
'neat' sensation vocabulary. For it is evident that sensation terms 
are derived from perceptual contexts, while sense impressions 
themselves are bereft of sensory qualities . Moreover bodily sensa-
tions take their descriptions from their external causes, and those 
which do not allude to the subject's collateral responses. So 
exclusive_ sensation terms are somewhat aberrant. Ryle concludes 
the chapter on sensation and observation by expressing a doubt as 
to the validity of the notion of sensation which he has made great 
use of; but it is the kind of reservation which does not undermine 
his project - rather it supports the project. He asks whether the 
philosophical or technical concept of sensation might be artificial , 
considering that it is a quite sophisticated concept , and one that 
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is certainly remote from that applicable to ordinary accounts of 
experience. If the concept is only an artificial creation of those 
who think philosophically about such matters - and Ryle thinks 
that it is - then so much the worse for the view that experience 
or the mental life consists primarily of sensations. As reference 
to sensations (internal occurrences) need not, and normally does 
not, enter into adequate descriptions and explanations of mental 
characteristics, we have good reason to relegate them to a sub-mental 
rank. And the absence of a really adequate vocabulary of sensation 
demonstrates the less than central position of sensation in the com-
position of the mind. As internal occurrences are virtually indes-
cribable so they are virtually irrelevant . 
Thoughts too claim an inner location, but they are not reducible 
to inner occurrences. A thought is a feature of the organism as a 
whole; it is a state of readiness, a 'set ', to do this or that. This 
state or frame of mind may be accompanied by feelings, sensations 
or images but it neither consists in these nor a special activity 
or episode existing along side them: 
A person who thinks of something as something is, 
-ipso facto, pr\fW\ed to t hink and do some particular 
further things; and t his particular possible future that 
this thinking paves the way for r:ieeds to be mentioned 
in the description of the particular content of that 
thinking - somewhat as the mention of where the canal 
goes to has to be incorporated in our account of what 
this adjacent canal-stretch is. Roughly, a thought 
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comprises what it is incipiently, namely what it is the 
natural vanguard of. Its burthen embodies its natural 
or easy sequel. ('A Puzzling Element in the Notion 
of Thinking' , p. 403) 
It is a mistake to think of thoughts as separately identifiable items 
in the mind for thinking is a feature of those human activities, 
actions and states which are conscious, non-mechanical and pur-
posive. 
This account of thought and thinking is objectionable less for 
what it says than for what it leaves out. Thinking is not a separate 
event over and against ordinary human activities (exercises of in-
telligence), so it is not over and above them either. The poverty 
of this view comes to the fore frequently but typically and reveal-
ingly in the description of vanity. While it is surely correct that 
vanity does not consist in the having of specific feelings (e.g. 
twinges, thrills), even though we expect the vain man to have cer-
tain feelings in certain situations, it is just as surely wrong to 
assert that this character trait as such amounts to no more than a 
disposition or tendency to behave in various ways: ' .•. no other 
momentary actualizations of chronic vanity need to be postulated 
than such things as boasting, daydreaming about triumphs and avoid -
ing conversations about the merits of others' (p. 84). The vain 
man is prone to behave in just those ways , but the most salient 
feature of vanity seems to have been omitted. To be sure the vain 
man thinks himself unapproachably superior and thinks all others 
more or less contemptible. He is so preoccupied with these thoughts, 
they are so dominant and pervasive, that he is blind to his real 
merits and defects as well as the merits and defects of others. 
Above all he possesses a deficient and grossly distorted view of 
society and his place in it, a view greatly at odds with that of his 
vanity-free fellow man. It should be clear that Ryle' s account of 
thought as inceptive is powerless to portray satisfactorily the vain 
man's state of mind, the pattern of his thinking, and the effects 
of such thinking on his behaviour. Although perhaps the 'vain man 
never feels vain' he does think vainly. Here is one instance of 
Ryle's having overlooked a piece of information about minds. But 
more importantly, this impoverished account of thinking infects 
the account of imagining. 
Limiting the mental to tendencies, skills, habits and so on, 
all of which are manifested solely in behaviour, naturally affects 
the conceptions of the self and self-knowledge. An austere concep-
tion of the self joins a crude conception of the attainment of self-
knowledge: 
The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and 
propensities is an inductive process, anl· induction 
t9 law-like propositions from observed actions and 
reactions. Having ascertained these long-term qualities , 
we explain a particular action or reaction by applying the 
result of such an induction to the new specimen, save 
where open avowals let us know the explanation with-
out research. (p. 164) 
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And he goes on to remark that the appraisal of persons is straight-
forward (at least for the experienced observer); judgments of 
character can easily be definite, reliable and wholly objective. 
Accordingly dissemblers are reproached for providing the main 
obstacle to character assessment; without pretence there would 
never be any dis location between. how someone appears and how 
he is. 
But clearly the truth of the matter is just the reverse. Judg-
ments of character, even those formulated by sensitive experts, are 
nearly always tentative, partial and difficult. As Ryle fails to be 
fully alLve to the complexity of character and the problems of its 
definitions, so his account of self-knowledge tends to the ludicrous. 
For he argues that acquiring knowledge of oneself is almost equi-
valent to acquiring knowledge of others - the chief difference lies 
in the unequalled acquaintance that one has of oneself. Since, the 
argument seems to go, there are no inner, occult occurrences form-
ing the mental life, all mental characteristics should be discoverable 
in the same manner : I become aware of my sleepiness by noticing 
my yawns; I find out that I am bored by observing that I say to 
myself and others that I feel bored {p. 99). So the relationship 
between me and my body (behaviour) is essentially the same as the 
relationship between me and you. I am of course in a better position 
to monitor my own private acts. 'We eavesdrop on our own voiced 
utterances and our own silent monologues. In noticing these we 
are preparing ourselves to do something new, namely to describe 
the frames of mind which these utterances disclose ... I can pay 
heed to what I overhear you saying as well as to what I overhear 
myself saying, though I cannot overhear your silent colloquies 
with yourself' (p. 176). But certainly my awareness of myself and 
my body is hardly like my experience of you. Suppose, however, it 
is. Suppose that in order to determine my own character and the 
particular states of my body, I must weigh, the evidence and make 
appropriate inferences from my "unstudied" talk and behaviour, from 
the words and movement that issue from my ingrained dispositions. 
Now suppose too that my character consists of some traits which 
upon reflection I consider thoroughly undesirable. What can I do ? 
Going from Ryle's remarks, the answer seems to be Nothing. The 
picture of man that emerges - it can be best expressed in non-
Rylean terms - divides him into a natural self (that which is the 
individual in essence, the body and its dispositions manifested in 
behaviour) and a reflective self (that attitude of mind adopted occa-
sionally when the individual becomes conscious of his natural self). 
Now it appears that the reflective self is confined to mere discovery, 
for no room is allowed for it to be active or action-propelling. On 
matters of dictating policies of character revision , it must remain 
impotent. Since dispositions are extensive, non-particular and 
thereby intractable, they must be beyond the control of reflective 
decision -::- anyway the decision itself will be just an instance of 
another disposition. And how can one disposition extinguish or 
generate another ? I can modify your behaviour and, by the same token, 
your dispositions by my own, but I do not understand how to apply 
these same methods to my own case. Thus we are asked to believe , 
as I understand it, that whereas correction and guidance of others 
exists, self-correction and self-guidance do not. ' • . • knowledge 
of what t here is known about other people is restored to approxi-
mate parity with self-knowledge' {p. 149) . But we can add : 'at 
the expens e of neglecting radical differences so as to defeat the 
proposed restoration'. 
In the endeavour to equalize self- and other-knowledge, Ryle 
claims that what is inner or unobservable by another is no impedi-
ment to intimacy. He tries to reassure us that we lack no skills 
of penetration because there is, first of all, nothing to penetrate 
and because, further, anything that is pushed or kept behind the 
scenes will, in the right circumstances, be released. Indeed to 
be unforthcoming requires special, sophisticated techniques; we 
have to be always on our guard to prevent disclosure; great efforts 
are needed. 'To be reticent is deliberately to refrain from being 
open ... the natural thing to do is to speak one's mind, and the 
sophisticated thing to do is to refrain from doing this ... We 
have to take special pains to keep things back , only because letting 
them out is our normal response' (p. 17 3). If vigilance is inter-
rupted, if one relaxes, the floodgates open. Thus we have nothing 
to fear : treated with proper tact and sympathy, anyone can become 
an open book. Now if this is right, not only have absolute lone-
liness and isolation been ruled out , but even loneliness and iso-
lation of lesser magnitudes. The tone, if not the words, of the follow-
ing pas sage says as much. 
There are respects in which it is easier for me to get 
such knowledge about myself than to get it about 
someone else; there are other respects in which it is 
135 
harder. But these differences of facility do not derive 
from, or lead to, a difference in kind between a person's 
knowledge about himself and his knowledge about other 
people. No metaphysical Iron Curtain exists compel-
ling us to be for ever absolute strangers to one another, 
though ordinary circumstances , together with some 
deliberate management serve to maintain a reasonable 
aloofness. Similarly no metaphysical looking-glass 
exists compelling us to be for ever completely disclosed 
and explained to ourselves, though from the everyday 
conduct of our sociable and unsociable lives we learn 
to be reasonably conversant with ourselves. (p. 173) 
It is hard to see how, once loneliness is eradicated in this manner, 
other critical problems and disturbances can invade the mind. But 
it is quite a bit easier to understand why the reflective self is 
capable of only discovery and interpretation; it need only discover 
and not improve for when the nature of the individual self is pro-
perly perceived, all problems dissolve. As all philosophical problems 
are solved (or dissolved) by laying bare the categorical structures 
of language, so all (non-trivial) problems of the soul vanish when 
it is recognized that they rest on an incorrect theory of mind. And, 
so I wish to contend, when such problems no longer obtain, the 
demands made on the imagination diminish correspondingly. The 
conception of mind as uncomplicated and 'exterior' makes for a 
quite modest conception of the imagination. 
Psychic well-being is thus attained by removing the source 
of all such psychic problems: the inner life. The evacuated, de-
centralized self leaves insufficient room for substantial problems 
to enter; and what remains inside is unimportant and susceptible 
of only the most meagre descriptions. 'If you do not divulge the 
contents of your silent soliloquies and other imaginings, I have 
no sure way of finding out what you have been saying or picturing 
to yourself. But the sequence of your sensations and imaginings 
is not the sole field in which your wits and character are shown; 
perhaps only for lunatics is it more than a small corner of that 
field. I find out most of what I want to know about your capacities, 
interests, likes, dislikes, methods and convictions by observing how 
you conduct your overt doings, of which by far the most important 
are your sayings and writings. It is a subsidiary question how you 
conduct your imaginings, including your imagined monologues' (p. 60) . 
The poverty and insignificance of the supposed inner life are demon-
strated by the unremarkableness of feelings, sensations, frames 
of mind, and - though somewhat recalcitrant - images. Now the 
error of this thesis stems from this argument. If 'inner' can be con-
strued accurately (i.e. literally), then it should refer to that which 
lies inside· unobserved, namely feelings and the rest. But since 
they do not add up to anything approaching what is thought to be an 
'inner life', the expression is vacuous. 
As the picture of sensations (especially pain) that Ryle pre-
sents suggests that they are never more than minor annoyances , so 
the picture of imagining , as we shall see, suggests that images are 
_.-a. 
I 
always inconsequential interruptions in the matter of living. But 
just as pain can envelope one in intense suffering, so images can 
become objects of an obsession - Madame Bovary represents a not 
uncommon type. The similarity stops here, for while every one 
is capable of undergoing intense suffering, only a few have, and 
need, a developed imagination. He who has little use for an 
imagination is one whose psychic core is a passive function of 
environmental factors, one who is wholly subject to external in-
fluence. Such a person differs in nature from one whose source 
of life derives from independently arrived-at thoughts and feelings, 
whose identity depends upon continual reflection and analysis of 
principles and projects, themselves the products of a strong self-
determination. Thus if there is any truth in Ryle' s account of 
imagining, it will not be true of every one. 
Now the account of imagery and imagination is circumscribed 
by this ambivalence: mental images are always negligible items, 
but yet certain exercises of the imagination crucially involve the 
having of certain images. Accordingly Ryle undertakes to demon-
strate that even when a certain exercise of the imagination does 
involve having a certain image, the image itself commands only 
peripheral interest, if any at all. The virtual irrelevance of the 
image becomes evident after the usual metaphorical reports of imaging 
experience are replaced with correct , literal ones . First , imaging 
experiences are shown not to be susceptible of unconditioned, 
perceptual descriptions; thus images are claimed to be illusory 
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objects of consciousness, so hardly worthy of attention. Second, 
it is argued that having an image is an unextraordinary instance of 
imagination or make-believe , where mental images play no part. 
The chief difficulty for Ryle, which he fails to overcome, is that 
mental images - as distinct from other internal occurrences - com-
pel recognition and representational descriptions. They cannot be 
so easily pushed aside. 
We have been prepared for the argument that perception verbs 
are wildly inappropriate to reports of imaging experience . Visual-
izing is totally different in kind because visualizing takes place 
when the object in question is not an object of sight. Moreover, it 
is incoherent to speak of an internal likeness being perceived by 
the mind's eye ; whatever images are, they are not privately viewed 
pictures. Therefore - since the preceding can be generalized - it 
is preposterous to maintain that imaging is a species of perceiving, 
by, in particular, describing an imaging experience as a kind of 
perception. But if the concept of imaging cannot be subsumed under 
the concept of perceiving, it can nonetheless be subsumed under 
a related concept so as to allow a fairly rich stock of descriptions: 
I want to show that the concept of picturing, visualizing , 
or 'seeing' is a proper and useful concept, but that its 
use does not entail the existence of pictures which we 
contemplate or the existence of a gallery ih which such 
pictures are ephemerally suspended. Roughly, imaging 
occurs, but images are not seen. I do have tunes running 
in my head, but no tunes are being heard , when I have 
them running there. True, a person picturing his nursery 
is , in a certain way , like that person seeing his nursery, 
but the similarity does not consist in his really looking 
at a real likeness of his nursery, but in his really seem -
ing to see his nursery itself, when he is not really seeing 
it. He is not being a spectator of a resemblance of his 
nursery, but he is resembling a spectator of his nursery. 
(p. 234) 
As I understand it, the visualizer resembles the seer insofar as 
both think of the nursery and in thinking exercise their knowledge of 
the nursery. But in saying that we have anticipated. 
The arguments that shift the focus of attention away from the 
mental image are the same that associate imaging experiences with 
apparent perceiving . And the narrow conception of metaphor -
prominent here too - serves to relegate mental images to that limbo 
of the (virtually) ineffable, already populated by sensations and 
feelings . 
Ryle assumes that the use of unqualified verbs of perception 
in reports of imaging experience entails the 'doctrine' that imaging 
involves the perception of immaterial objects. But it is simply ab -
surd to postulate such internal replicas; and 'besides no allusion 
to an image or internal occurrence is ever required in the report of 
an imaging experience. For instance, when a child imagines that 
her doll is smiling , neither does a smile form on the doll's lips nor 
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does a picture of the smile mysteriously become attached to the doll's 
face . There is only a doll and a child fancying (or picturing - Ryle 
equates them) that it is smiling, nothing more. And nothing forces 
us to talk of mental images, internal occurrences, when describing 
her fancying. But clearly, to take this example as irepresentative 
already prejudices the issue. These one-sided considerations in-
spire this announcement. 'There is not a real life outside, shadowily 
mimicked by some bloodless likenesses inside; there are just things 
and events, people witnessing some of these things and events, and 
people fancying themselves witnessing things and events that they 
are not witnessing' (p. 235). (As Stuart Hampshire has noted and 
Bernard Williams demonstrated, this claim is as it stands false, for 
not all imaging is imagining that one perceives. It is false unless, 
of course , 'witness' is given a very charitable reading indeed.) 
However, this dichotomy of human activity does not amount to 
a refusal to admit the existence of (what we normally refer to as) 
mental images. Indeed the position is more complex and less cate-
gorical. Though somewhat obscure and difficult to formulate pre-
cisely, it comes to this. If images are objects of consciousness, 
they must display properties of objects of perception . As they do not 
they cannot be described, and so cannot be referred to in the arti-
culation of the imagination, and by the same token cannot participate 
in the determination of the mental. They , the k ne sais guoi, exist 
as raw material, as the foundation for some exercises of the imagina-
tion. But the foundation is subterranean, not ascertainable and so 
not relevant to the apprehension and appreciation, or indeed corn-
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position, of the superstructure. They are essential ingredients for 
some imaginative acts, but can always be safely ignored; they can 
be alluded to but never directly talked about. (A curious reticence.) 
Therefore, Ryle advises,we should not assert 'there are mental 
images' for this sentence implies the existence of perceived, im-
material copies; instead we should say 'imaging occurs' for this 
carries no such implication. It is a telling feature of Ryle ' s argu-
ment that some common, innocuous expressions are given biased, 
controversial interpretations. Perhaps that is why, ironically 
enough, one is constrained to employ an analogy, a metaphor when 
explicating his position. 
The incoherence of postulating mental images as internally 
perceived, immaterial copies , then , disallows the description of 
imaging as a seeing, hearing or smelling. Hume mistakenly sub-
sumed both 'impressions' and 'ideas' under 'perceptions'. There 
are not experiential data and their mental copies. The distinction 
resides not in the raw material of experience but rather between 
different forms of behaviour and thought, between what is really 
done and that which simulates what is really done . The distinction 
embraces the difference between the genuine and the counterfeit . 
Now since imaging and imagining in general fall into the latter cate-
gory , the relevant descriptions will incorporate verbs of perception as 
they occur there. If ' perceive' lies on one side, then ' seeming to 
perceive' lies on the other. Thus imaging, because it demands arti-
culation in perceptual terms but is not a kind of perception, must 
be an example of 'seeming to perceive'. To understand what this 
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means, we have to look at the other phenomena associated with 
apparent perception. Visualizing, so the argument goes, is seeming 
to see but so too is seeing something in a photograph; hearing a 
sound in the mind's ear is seeming to hear but so too is hearing a 
recording of the sound. In fact, visualizing a friend, say, is so 
closely related to seeing his photograph that they differ only inasmuch 
as the latter imagining is aroused by a particular item. 'The genus 
is seeming to perceive, and of this genus one very familiar species 
is that of seeming to see something, when looking at an ordinary 
snapshot of it. Seeming to see, when no physical likeness is 
before the nose, is another species. Imaging is not having shadowy 
pictures before some shadow-organ called 'the mind's eye'; but 
having paper pictures before the eyes in one's face is a familiar 
stimulus to imaging.' (p. 240). (Remember that Sartre, in the end, 
also denied a difference in kind between visualizing and apprehend-
ing a picture.) If that is the only real difference between seeming 
to see X in a photograph and seeming to see X in the mind's eye, 
. then it is puzzling to think how anyone could still seem to see X 
when the photograph of X is withdrawn from view and nothing else 
happens - or does there remain an invisible stimulus in the space 
vacated by the photograph ? What could incline the subject to 
assert ' I see_m to see X' when no representation of X is present ? 
Nothing, apparently . But then what distinguishes the experience of 
visualizing X from the experience of visualizi,ng Y ? Just the appro-
priate expressions. So I discover whether I am visualizing and what 
I am visualizing by attending to what I say . Now even if the imager 
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need not refer to an internal occurence when reporting his experience, 
there are cases where others must refer to such an occurrence when 
accounting for his claim of having such an experience. The 'ana-
logue' (Sartre's term) cannot always be ignored. 
A question too can be raised against the immediate success of 
the proposal. Is the subsumption of imaging (or even apprehending 
a likeness) under apparent perception free of metaphor, at least 
metaphor as Ryle conceives it ? Granted the dichotomy of fancy-
ing and. perceiving, do all phenomena which are correctly referred to 
by 'seeming to perceive' reside on the fancying side ? Consider, 
for example , situations where a person spots an object in the middle 
distance, which looks to him to be such-and-such, but he is un-
certain. He might report his experience by saying 'I think I see such-
and-such'. And finding the identification wrong, he may well be 
unwilling to withdraw either assertion; 'There was no such-and-such 
to be seen, but still I did seem to see one' . If such a defence is 
acceptable - how could it not be ? - it is likely that the original 
application of 'seem to perceive' is to just such ·phenomena: the 
mere fact that verbs of perception are the chief components suggests 
as much. Besides the use of 'seem to see ' in reports of visualizing 
or viewing photographs feels somewhat odd , and far less natural than 
its use in reporting actual perception . Indeed, doesn ' t the phrase 
'seem· to perceive' normally indicate uncertai!ltY about the content 
of a perception ? If this is so then the availability of ' seem to per-
ceive ' for reporting imaging experience results from the transference 
of it from the domain of perception t o t he domain of fancy . And it is 
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Ryle' s contention that such transference invariably produces 
metaphor. The primary application of 'seem to perceive' and its 
near relatives , then, has been mis located, with the effect that no 
literal benefits obtain when their use is preferred to the use of 
unconditioned verbs of perception - some muddles and metaphors. 
When used to report a visualization both 'see' and 'seem to see' 
become metaphorical and so subject to the same complaint. Ryle 
may indeed have recognized - unconsciously - how unsatisfactory 
the proposal is, for 'seem to perceive' does not appear in the cli-
mactic part of the discussion of imagination. 
Now that we have denied both verbs of perception and verbs 
of apparent perception to reports of imaging experience , we may 
begin to wonder in what state that leaves the articulation of fancy. 
'To visualize' , 'to picture' , 'to image', 'to fancy' and 'to imagine' 
remain and together comprise the maximum literal vocabulary for 
the expression of imaging acts. Once it is realized that for the 
sake of Ryle' s idiosyncratic view of literalness we must forfeit 
expressive power, we may also begin to wonder whether things 
have gone too far. No longer should we say , for example, 'I hear 
him in my mind's ear' and 'I am listening to him on record ' ; to 
avoid absurdity we must say 'I fancy I hear him , but I am not listen-
ing to a reproduction of his voice' and 'I fancy I hear him as I listen 
to a reproduction of his voice' . The unappealing quality, the awk-
wardness of the latter pair call for an appraisal. Waiving Ryle's 
charge of metaphor, what real advantage do the latter have over 
the former ? Are they clearer, more precise ? Do they accurately 
display the nature .of the phenomena ? When the former are properly 
understood (as they are commonly understood, or anyway after 
certain alleged and crass implications are shown to be wrong) the 
supposed differences in precision and intelligibility surely disappear. 
Once we rid ourselves of the idea that imaging consists in the mental 
perception of immaterial copies and , for that matter, the temptation 
to think in these terms, we have to my mind no good reason not to 
employ the former, and good reason to prefer them for brevity and 
ease of expression. That being so , it is hard to see what adverse 
effects the alleged metaphorical expressions actually do have. If 
from the context it is clear that the assertion 'I see such-and-such ' 
articulates an imaging experience, then the person who realizes 
that fact will not be misled in the slightest degree. Furthermore, 
if one has a problem about the nature of imaging constant use of the 
latter expressions by itself will not solve it. The use of verbs of 
perception to describe perceptual experiences does not make evi-
dent the nature of perception - Ryle's view notwithstanding. Why 
should it be different with the imagination ? Yet, Ryle argues, the 
right descriptions point the way to the explication of the nature of 
the imagination of which imaging is a characteristic instance. 
Naturally the positive theory of imagination will complete the theory 
of imaging . 
Either images in the mind matter (are crucial) or they matter 
not at all . They would matter only if it could be shown that they 
meet the requirements of being copies of things and events in the 
world, i.e. that they are actual objects of consciousness . But 
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this cannot be shown for the thesis is absurd . Hence no des -
cription of an exercise of the imagination need refer to anything 
other than that which is expressible in terms pertaining to overt 
behaviour. (If an exercise of your imagination centrally involves 
the occurrence of an internal item, then your mental life is to that 
extent enigmatic.) Now since imaging is not intrinsically different 
from all other exercises of the imagination, its nature will be un-
covered in the process of uncovering the nature of all the various 
exercises of the imagination. And Ryle presents a very broad list 
of examples from which the general theory is to be extracted : 
The mendacious witness in the witness-box, the inventor 
thinking out a new machine, the constructor of a 
romance, the child playing bears, and Henry Irving are all 
exercising their imaginations; but so, too, are the judge 
listening to the lies of the witness, the colleague giving 
his opinion on the new invention, the nove 1 reader i the 
nurse who refrains from admonishing the 'bears' for their 
sub-human noises, the dramatic critic, and the theatre-
goers. (p. 243) 
By treating all of these on the same footing, Ryle commits the error 
of assuming, it seems, that each exhibits the imagination to the 
same degree. We should not be surprised then ,by the rather weak 
analysis advanced. Those elements that link such diverse examples 
will not yield the desired incisiveness. 
While no nuclear (= internal) operation is common to these 
various examples of imagination or make-believe , some general 
features are . A study of pretence sheds light on make-believe. 
First , in pretence , as in make - believe , the pretender may be de -
luded in varying degrees , or not at all , by his own performance . 
The reason people imagine they see things without realizing they 
a re only imagining , is that not everyone i s 'as judicious or critical 
as could be wished '. Second ; 'To describe someone as pretending 
is to say that he is playing a part , and to play a part is to play 
the part , normally, of someone who is not playing a part , but doing 
or being something ingenuously or naturally ' (p . 245) . So t alk of 
pretending involves talk of that which is ingenuous . Consequently 
act s of pretence are of a higher order than ordinary acts , for the 
description , or execution , of the former requires the descr iption , 
or thought of , the latter - but not vice versa . Thus an analogy is 
drawn : pretence is to the ingenuous as the imagination or make-
believe is to the 'factua l' or ' ordinary '. 
How closely assoc iated a re pretence and imagination ? Very , 
for t hey both belong to the uniform category of higher-order behaviour . 
Ryle mentions t hree differences . (1) ' •.. we use words like "play", 
"pre t e nd ", a nd "act the part", whe n we t hink of spect ators f inding the 
performance more or less convincing , whereas we u se words like "fancy" 
and "imagine " whe n we are thinking of the actor himself be ing ha lf-
c onv inc ed '. (2) ' ... we us e words like "play" and "pretend " for 
de libe ra t e , concerted , a nd re he arsed perfo rmances , whereas we are 
more re ady to us e words like "fancy" and "imagine" for those acti-
vitie s of make - be lieve into w hich people casually a nd. e ve n invol -
unta rily drift.' (3) ' .•. we app ly the word s "pret e nd" a nd "act the 
part", where an overt and muscular representation is given of what-
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ever deed or condition is being put on , while we tend, with plenty 
of exceptions, to reserve "imagine" and "fancy" for some things 
that people do inaudibly and invisibly because "in their heads" , 
i.e. for their fancied perceptions and not for their mock-actions ' 
(p. 2 50). Thus Ryle contends that any difference between pretence 
and imagination or make-believe is due to merely superficial, verbal 
contingencies : indeed the phenomena referred to by both belong to 
the same class. This is fortunate for whereas the concept of ima-
gination or make-believe a lone seems impregnable, the concept of 
pretence is readily amenable to inspection. So we understand the 
nature of imagining by virtue of understanding the nature of pretending. 
However, there is one important difficulty. Unlike (1) and (2) 
above, (3) suggests that a 'more radical difference' separates ima-
gining from pretending, the difference adduced when the uniqueness 
of imaging is argued for. 
To begin with , it is wrong to suppose that imaging involves 
sensation or quasi-sensation, for imaging occurs when no appropriate 
perception occurs and, by the same token, when no appropriate 
sensations impinge; and further, there is, Ryle states, nothing akin 
to sensations. If we were to believe in quasi - sensations , we could 
not avoid Burne 's error; and such an error is fatal to the belief in the 
activity of human intelligence as manifested in behaviour . This 
denial of quasi-sensations does not conflict with the view attri -
buted to him above , but it does indicate how much Ryle wishes to 
suppress all mention of mental images . As the description of my 
perception does not include a description of, or reference to, my 
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sensory states, so the description of my imaging never requires the 
reference to an internal occurrence. Besides, there is no adequate 
vocabulary for describing some such raw material, either sensory 
or 'mental' , (The question, of course , is whether we are as obli-
vious of the latter as we seem to be of the former.) Perceiving 
entails having sensations and thinking, but it is thinking which pri-
marily constitutes the experience. Imaging too entails thinking, but 
it cannot be said to entail more because we completely lack, it would 
seem, the means for referring to anything else without immediately 
falling into nonsense . .And what is beyond language must be unim-
portant; suspected deficiencies in language merely register the 
insignificant. 
So nothing of an internal character divides imaging from other 
varieties of imagining. It remains, then, to show that the covert 
aspect of imaging can be exaggerated, and that the covert instances 
of imagining are closely associated with overt instances. When 
this is accomplished, the characterization of imaging and the other 
varieties of imagining as sophisticated (higher-order) capacities will 
bind them firmly together . Thought and knowledge are the key ele-
ments in all such higher-order acts. Imaging is simply one way of 
thinking about , and using one's knowledge of , the world , so as to 
'realize ' what one would be getting if one were genuinely behaving, 
or , in this case, genuinely perceiving. 
At first glance, the difference between, say , acting a part and 
imaging might appear to be due signally to the difference between a 
physical manifestation and a mental manifestation, between what is 
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done with the body as opposed to what is done in the mind . Rather 
the difference is 'nothing but a consequence of the difference between 
perceiving something and bringing something about'. All variation 
in higher- order phenomena stems from the inherent qualities of 
'lower-order' phenomena. That is as it should be, for higher-order 
phenomena are wholly dependent on 'lower-order' phenomena. Now 
as perceiving is not a performance, so neither is fancied perceiving : 
... perceiving is not bringing anything about. It is 
getting something or , sometimes , keeping something; 
but it is not effecting anything. Seeing and hearing are 
neither witnessed nor unwitnessed doings, for they are 
not doings . It makes no sense to say ' I saw you seeing 
the sunset', or 'I failed to watch myself hearing the music' . 
And if it makes no sense to speak of my witnessing , or 
failure to witness, a piece of hearing or seeing, .§:. fortiori 
it makes no sense to speak of my witnessing, or failing 
to witness , a piece of fancied hearing or fancied seeing . 
No hearing or seeing is taking place. (p. 253) 
Even though there is a distinction (for what it is worth) between getting 
something and bringing something about, it does not divide one kind 
of imagining from another. The connection is provided by instances 
where imaging contains the inhibition of an inclination to perform. 
Some exercises of the imagination involve overt behaviour; and 
some which do not, Ryle argues, occur as deliberate abstentions from 
behaving overtly. In particular, fancying that one is · hearing a tune 
amounts to a 'utilization of the knowledge of how the tune goes'. 
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And knowing a tune is in part being able to follow it, which in turn 
includes having the appropriate expectations. It involves, too, the 
'thought of following or producing the tune', but does not require 
the awareness of an internal reproduction of the tune. 'It is not 
humming very, very quietly, but rather it is deliberately not doing 
those pieces of humming which would be due, if one were not trying 
to keep the peace' (p. 255). Now Ryle thinks that this account can 
be extended to the other forms of imaging. Visualizing such-and-
such is a utilization of how such-and-such looks; 'it is thinking how 
it should look': 
The expectations which are fulfilled in the recognition 
at sight of Helvellyn are not indeed fulfilled in pic-
turing it, but the picturing of it is something like a re-
hearsal of getting them fulfilled. So far from picturing 
involving the having of faint sensations, or wraiths of 
sensations, it involves missing just what one would be 
due to get, if one were seeing the mountain. (p. 255) 
(To forestall obvious counterexamples, Ryle describes the imagining 
of an unknown or imaginary thing or event as a 'piece of double 
imagining'. As well as fancying that one is witnessing the thing or 
event , one fancies that one possesses the relevant knowledge and 
expectations . ) 
If we need make no reference to internal occurrences, then 
imaging can be construed as an unextraordinary instance of imagining, 
or pretending . And thus imaging can be characterized · in this way : 
Imaging requires the utilization of perceptual knowledge in the form 
of a thought of the thing or event in question, so as to furnish the 
imager with the means of pretending (to himself) that he is per-
ceiving when (he is aware) he is not. But clearly, this characteri-
zation is extremely inadequate, because, for one, it is much too 
broad, and broad because vague. It provides insufficient detail for 
it does not enable us to distinguish between instances of make-believe 
and instances of imaging. I can, can I not ? , pretend (to myself) , 
without imaging, that I see before me a mountain I know well. Indeed 
I can supply such vivid descriptions of it and its setting in words and 
gestures that I even begin to get the 'feel' of being in its vicinity . 
But at no time do I rely on visualizing the mountain; I frame no mental 
images. Now the difference between this kind of picturing and pic-
turing in the mind's eye, where words, gestures and open eyes tend 
to interfere with the imagining, has to be accounted for . Ryle 
seems to sense , I think , that he should say more, for he employs the 
suggestive notion of realizing to capture the peculiar quality of 
imaging ; to wit : 'A person with a tune running in his head is using 
his knowledge of how the tune goes; he is in a certain way realizing 
what he would be hearing, if he were listening to the tune being 
played ' {p . 252) . The use of 'realizing ' here - desp ite the rider ' in 
a certain way' - sounds all too metaphorical, that is, metaphorical 
to a Rylean-sensitive ear . On the other hand , if 'realizing' is taken 
to mean (as Ryle would surely declare it to mean) ' something like a 
rehearsal of getting one ' s expectations of seeing something fulfilled ', 
then the word i s hardly effective in conveying what is so distinctive 
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about imaging. In fact, this 'literal' meaning seems more appli-
cable to the example of make-believe just sketched . For if the 
'literal' meaning is equally appropriate to imaging, we still find 
the description of visualizing as ' something like a rehearsal' per-
plexing . In what sort of rehearsal does one neither speak the lines, 
nor gesticulate, nor grimace ? And does not this use of 'rehearsal ' 
sound also like a metaphor Ryle wishes to avoid ? Needless to say, 
Ryle can clarify neither 'realize' nor 'rehearse' as he exploits them: 
the respective riders , 'in a certain way' and 'something like' , betray 
the bluff. Moreover, it should be clear enough that the account of 
imaging depends on an oblique allusion to mental imagery as ex-
hibited by both these words. It is equally clear that Ryle is not 
entitled to this unacknowledged allusion . The account purports to 
remove the supposed mystery of imaging by showing how it is one 
exercise - and an unextraordinary one at that - of the imagination. 
Though in treating imaging as so unextraordinary , he is quite unable 
to explain why imaging yet remains so distinctive . 
The weak account of imaging reflects the impoverished account 
of the imagination. But the account of the imagination is unsatisfactory 
for more (though not unrelated) reasons than the generality stemming 
from indescriminate application. The denial of the inner life has the 
effect of eliminating features of a serious and deeply personal nature, 
and so of restricting the problems and issues· in life to t hose responding 
to practical ('external') activity. The activity of the imagination then , 
consists variously in playing , supposing, inventing , acting - sophi-
sticated behaviour which augments and enhances quotidian reality. 
But apart from this platitudinous conclusion, no significant , positive 
thesis emerges from Ryle's discussion. However, it has a major 
negative consequence. The imagination, certainly each man ' s most 
personal and private possession , becomes, as it fails to find a self 
or inner dimension to operate on, estranged from the individual . 
* * * * * * * * * 
NOTE 
Although Ryle undertakes to steer away from the mental 
image (the internal occurrence) in order to free the analysis of 
imaging of all metaphor (as he conceives it) , he is forced to employ 
in the analysis important terms which , when interpreted literally, 
are both unclear and inadequate to his purposes . Responding to Ryle' s 
failure , some have advanced the opinion that the metaphor imputed 
to reports of imaging experience is removed by paying closer atten-
tion to the reports, and , so, to the image itself . 
Influenced by Wittgenstein's random and inconclusive remarks 
on aspect-se~ing, Hid~ Ishiguro argues that aspect-seeing (e.g . 
seeing the person in the portrait) is continuous with visualizing , and 
thus the familiar association of visualizing with seeing is justifiable . 
Instances of aspect-seeing can be described with the formula 'X' s 
s een as Y' s'; 'In the case of mental image s the X' s disappear, as it 
were , and we are left with activities of II see ing as Y".' This baffling 
claim is supported by a phenomenological argument : 
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... suppose one sees a person in a photograph and 
next imagine that half of it fades away. I can still see 
the remainder of the photograph as an image of a person. 
Suppose that more and more of the photograph vanishes, 
and I continue to see the person in the remaining traces. 
Finally I can find myself seeing the person in my mind's 
eye when I perceive nothing before me . ('Imagination', 
1967, p. 50) 
Now to say that there is a resemblance between aspect-seeing and 
perception is one thing; to say that they differ only in degree is quite 
another . And the fact that seeing the person in the mind's eye follows 
so easily and so naturally from seeing the person in the vanishing 
photographic traces proves, to my mind, no more than that very fact 
itself. I shall be persuaded of a continuity only when a real experiential 
'slide' is shown to exist between an experience essentially involving 
sensory stimulation of the eyes and an experience where no such 
stimulation takes place. Sartre, remember, argues for continuity by 
treating the ' analogue ' as a debasement of knowledge : elements of 
perceptual consciousness become dominant in imaging consciousness . 
But , despite the great elaborateness of his work , the alleged con-
tinuity is not made less obs c ure . It should be noticed , too , that 
Ishiguro uses a tactic similar to Sartre ' s . To. show that the second 
sense of ' see ' (i . e . that which covers aspect-seeing and visualizing) 
is a legitimat e s e nse , she mainta ins that all s ee ing consists in 
aspect - seeing : 
Obviously the two senses of 'see' are not different from 
each other in the way in which, say, the verb 'draw' 
could mean either 'pull' or 'depict'. I would like to 
suggest that we understand the two senses of 'see' 
because under normal conditions when I claim 'I see X', 
'X' gives both kinds of object of sight. I am using 'X' 
both extensionally and intentionally. I am as it were 
claiming to 'see X and X' where the first 'X' is used purely 
referentially, and the second 'X' to describe how I see the 
object. In other words, in normal conditions when I say 
'I see X' I am making a claim both about the presence of 
X (which I believe has causal links with the visual ex-
periences I am having) , and also about my mental state or 
visual experience which makes me describe or identify the 
object I see as 'X' . It is precisely because it is, as it 
were , a logical truth that ' see X' means 'see X as X' in 
normal conditions , that 's ee ... as X' gets the meaning 
it does have and can get detached and be used to make 
claims of the form 's ee Y as X'. Not only can I claim to 
see Y as X when I am unsure whether Y is X, and even 
when I know perfectly well that Y is not X, but I can, as 
in mental imagery, claim to see X where t here is no X that 
I claim to see as X. (p. 54) 
Thus , to display a relationship between imaging and perceiving, we 
must assume that all perceiving is aspect-perceiving . . But even if 
this dubious extension of aspect-perceiving were correct, it would 
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not help us to cope more effectively with the very puzzling nature 
of imaging. It would merely allow the problem to be enunciated 
in a special way. 
In a similar fashion, Alastair Hannay maintains that imaging 
is a kind of perceiving because their structures correspond. The 
argument depends on a distinction which is virtually identical to 
the one Ishiguro makes between features of verbs, namely, the dis-
tinction between perceiving materially, which demands the presence 
of a certain material object, and perceiving intentionally, which makes 
no such demand. Hannay uses the same distinction, but it has the 
reverse effect: whereas Ishiguro tends to ascribe the workings of 
imagination to perception as a whole, Hannay makes imaging into a · 
perceiving. ' ..• there is no linguistic strain or loss of point 
whatever in calling imaging a kind of seeing. Indeed I shall argue 
that imaging is simultaneously two kinds of seeing: seeing the 
imagined and seeing the image . . . seeing something in imagination, 
or "in the mind's eye", is a way of really seeing it ... it is unin-
telligible to suppose that one could see something in imagination 
without also seeing something not in imagination ... one cannot see 
something merely intentionally without at the same time seeing some-
thing else materially ' (Mental Images - A Defence, p. 145). Imaging, 
too, is associated with aspect -perceiving, but with the difference 
that the 'Y' s' are kept in. For 
... if in picturing,hallucinating and dreaming one is 
seeing something intentionally, it would seem wholly 
inexplicable that one saw nothing materially. Without a 
'mental' analogue of the pi.ctorial property that allows 
us to see something when it is perceptually absent one 
could no more picture or imagine something to oneself 
than one could see something represented without seeing 
a representation. 'Imaging' and 'seeing things represented' 
denote analogous visual experiences, and both require a 
' material ' object. If there were no mental images there 
would be no imaging. (p. 173) 
Imaging occurs, there are mental images, and we see 
them . (p . 17 5) 
But in forcing this gross conclusion through, Hannay introduces more 
problems than he pretends to solve. And is the only way of justi-
fying the ordinary reports of imaging experience - if they need 
justifying - to assume that imaging is perceiving (or, for that matter, 
perceiving is imaging)? What is gained by such a manoeuvre ? 
V 
IMAGINATION AND THE INNER 
A potent assumption, underlying the various accounts of 
imaging and imagination so far examined, which has been en-
countered but not yet enunciated or faced up to, is that in general 
and ultimately language remains - despite some naive practices 
wholly adequate to the articulation of all imaginative exercises. 
Linked with this assumption is one more pervasive and deep-seated, 
from which the former derives its force, that what we experience, 
what we know , can always be made explicit in accurate linguistic 
terms . The dominant traditional conception of the imagination, then, 
understandably engendered a regard for imaginative exercises as 
quite fruitless endeavours . For if perception is the only procedure 
by which to acquire knowledge of reality (a knowledge which is always 
conscious and definite) , pale , impoverished copies of perception 
provide just mere reminders of what is already known and succinctly 
expressible . Moreover it was thought self-evident that mental images , 
because so impoverished, were not always reliable . indicators of 
what presents itself in perceptual experience . 
Now even though the traditional theory of experience has been 
recently attacked and rejected, the associated beliefs concerning the 
adequacy of language, the explicitness of knowledge and the poverty 
of imagination have been retained in large measure. Ryle, for instance, 
denies that imaging consists in the apprehension of copied sensation: 
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rather imaging involves the imitation of a perceptual experience -
a pretence that one is perceiving, doing or being. Part of the motiva-
tion for this change is the desire to remove certain defective and mis-
leading terms in the description of the mind, and so to find that 
language which is truly and most rigorously adequate to that des-
cription. Previously it was agreed that any image which does not 
reproduce a perception tends to the fantastic, and as such becomes 
an obstruction to clear, productive thinking. Thought is at its best 
when the ideas, consisting of images, are exact representations of 
the real world. The point where ideas become fantastic coincides with 
the boundary of coherent thought and the break-down of language. 
Acutely sensitive to linguistic features, Ryle argues that the point 
where language breaks down must be redrawn: there can be no really 
acceptable talk of i.nternal copies. Consequently the restrictions on 
the imagination become most severe. Imaging or imagining is always 
a pretending, a playing with experience, For that reason it may be 
interesting and diverting, but it cannot enter into the serious matters 
of living. To be sure, if imagining consists entirely in the utilization 
of knowledge, it is the expression of knowledge already possessed 
consciously and unproblematically, and hence static. There is no 
movement forward, no actual thinking; imagining involves the 
thought of . . . but no progress beyond that which has been assi -
milated in perception. Imagining is like marching on the spot - it 
may have its value (exercise) but it gets one nowhere. 
Sartre, the other chief respondent to the traditional conception , 
does not concentrate on the relationship between (imaginative) 
experience and linguistic description but takes it for granted that 
language contains no obstacle to the 'description' of 'transcendental · 
consciousness '. Thus it would seem reasonable to maintain that 
if language manages to completely grasp the strangely apprehended 
' essences' of consciousness, then ordinary experience itself ought 
to pose no difficulty. (But this is not to imply that every linguistic 
formulation is automatically satisfactory; absurd uses of language 
are all too apparent.) The phenomenological method should be the 
final corrective, for the 'reduction' cannot but determine true repre-
sentation in language. Sartre, too , has no doubt that the imagi-
nation cannot supersede the knowledge possessed prior to the onset 
of imaginative consciousness . The animating intention is a function 
of the transparent knowledge which defines the object aimed at . As 
the image contains no more than what one consciously puts in it, the 
imagination must be essentially impoverished in relation to inex-
haustible reality. Nonetheless , poverty in this instance becomes a 
virtue for it permits one to extract features of the world by employing 
a met hod of sublimation so as to counter miserable reality with de-
lightful and tantalizing imaginative selections . 
Both Sartre and Ryle attempt to resolve the apparent problems 
in the description of imaginative acts by fashioning imaging as an 
act whose focus is primarily (for Ryle I exclusively) outward. The 
objects of the imaginative consciousness reside outside oneself in the 
world - or perhaps could reside there. Most fmportantly, it is claimed 
that in imaging one is not attending to an internal something but 
rathe r focussing on an external (or transcendent) item . . To say otherwise , 
to accept the traditional view, is intolerable for it implies that man 
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exists on two separate planes, physical and mental, when the truth 
is that man is essentially embodied - he is one kind of physical 
object among others. And to deny man's grounding in the world is 
tantamount, it seems, to a denial of each man's responsibility to 
himself and others as physical beings. This groundedness is found 
reflected in language, for language is a social phenomenon, an 
instrument for articulating commonly experienced objects, events and 
situations. Thus to speak of private, internal objects and events is 
to abuse the purpose of language and to use words in a peculiar, 
aberrant manner. Now it is claimed that language, when so exploited, 
becomes metaphorical. And metaphor, we should recognize, harbours 
vagueness, extravagance, gross exaggeration. By ridding language 
of this undesirable sort of metaphor, we encourage an outward-looking, 
engaged attitude to life and discourage a dreamy self-indulgence. 
While the attack on 'bovarizing' (i.e. aspiring after a dream -
world) is to be surely endorsed, the concomitant restriction of 
imagining to external awareness clearly has its drawbacks. For if, 
when imagining, my attention is invariably directed upon the world 
by means of the specific knowledge acquired through experience of 
it, there may at some time be an instance where the inclination to 
sustain the outward direction of awareness would cause a distraction 
from the actual purpose of the particular imaginative act , indeed a 
kind of distraction for which imagining formerly was thought to be the 
antidote. But if it is assumed that we know fully what we are doing, 
what is on the mind, when imagining, then the world could not possibly 
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be a source of distraction: being certain of the object of one ' s atten-
tion ensures that one has a measure of control over the range of things 
that claim notice . This . element of control likely characterizes most 
imaginative acts. (We should remember here that the imagination 
can be used aimlessly, and that some images can tyrannize the mind. 
But I shall say nothing about these.) Now the question to be con-
sidered is whether this control and vividness of purpose characterizes 
(barring the few exceptions) imaginative acts , whether the content of 
the imagination is determined always by awareness of items external 
to consciousness. If on occasion we imagine because our problem 
is to become aware of what we are not aware of, or to discover what 
we have only the vaguest hunch about, then for such an exercise 
of imagination the world may well interfere with the effort to achieve 
the aim of the endeavour. 
My proposals require a change of perspective. I have intro-
duced the change in an earlier chapter by considering the question 
of language, that is, the description of the imaging experience . And 
now I can say more about that. 
I have already a rgued that we need not be forced to assume 
that , because the reports of imaging experiences involve transferred 
terms, these terms are necessarily metaphoricql . Transference 
does not entail metaphor; but on the other hand it appears impossible 
to establish conclusively that such reports are void of metaphor. So 
it would seem reasonable to conclude, tentatively, that both the 
decision to ascribe metaphor to such reports and the decision not to, 
are arbitrary, and as arbitrary, representative of biases . If, then, 
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this issue is to be in some way settled, we must investigate where 
each bias leads. A comparison should indicate the value of each 
impelling assumption. 
It is evident that Sartre and Ryle see language as unalterably 
focussed outwards: the subject matter of speech is naturally the 
material world. Accordingly, when language purports to describe 
some private, inner reality, a serious and fundamental error is com-
mitted. To maintain that language can be used with an exclusive 
inner focus is, they argue, to radically misunderstand the fixedness 
of linguistic reference. Thus to talk of an inner world is to talk non-
sense. 
The simple contrast between inward and outward focus sug-
gests that as language is based upon the latter it cannot ever legi-
timately acquire the former. But perhaps the contrast is too simple. 
Indeed I shall contend that when it is alleged that language has been 
distorted inwards, this turning inwards ought to be interpreted as 
compatible with real outward focus. What happens when experience 
moves inwards is that a hitherto subordinate element becomes mani-
fest - the self . And as the entry of this new element affects the 
character of experience, so it affects the working of language. 
We need not wonder why others have overlooked the entry of the 
self as a salient element in the imaginative act; by failing to realize 
that the self has a discernible, if provisional, content , they have 
misconceived the significance of t he inclination to imagine (at least 
in an important minority of cases) . For example, Ryle finds the self , 
beyond the human body that acts and reacts , systematically elusive; 
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Sartre thinks of the self as necessarily empty: it is but a force that 
constantly asserts its freedom by breaking out of definite categori-
zations. If the self is considered empty or non-existent, then the 
imagination itself will be viewed as providing not much more than a 
respite from, and normally a pleasant adjunct to, perceptual experience. 
In those instances of imagining where the self enters as a 
central factor we may suppose that the language used to articulate 
the experience and so to fix the content of the experience undergoes 
strain. Compare the difference in the demands made on language in 
the following two reports. 
I visualize an indifferent object and report the experience 
by, say, 'I see the house on the corner'. 
I visualize a person, the thought of whom arouses confused 
feelings of affection and resentment, and report the 
experience by, say, 'I see father just after mother's funeral'. 
If the aim of the first imaginative act is, as declared, simply to 
resuscitate a particular neutral, visual experience, then we should 
not expect that the accompanying report will be inadequate to circum-
scribe the subject matter, at least not less adequate than the report 
would be of the corresponding perceptual experience. If the aim of the 
second is to achieve more than that of the first', if the aim - but expres-
sing it in this way makes the act seem too deliberate, too calculated 
is to locate the associated thoughts and emotions in order to come 
to grips with them, then the report by itself can be singularly 
-
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misleading. For by treating the report as the proof of the experience , 
we fail to recognize the significance of that experience. Detaching 
the report from the experience leads to an abstracting of one feature 
from the complex and detailed original . That is, using the detached 
report as the means for determining the nature of the experience pro-
duces a mere shadow of the content. This much should be evident . 
Now the fact that the report itself is usually paid exclusive attention 
may help explain why many overlook the complexity of some imaginings. 
Still, a defender of the adequacy of the reports , who accepts 
how the scope of imagining has been enlarged , might raise an objec-
tion. 'The argument is unfair, for the second report is just inappro-
priate to the experience suggested. A complete report, one that arti-
culated the emotion and attitudes, would indicate the whole content 
of the experience. The difficulty is to make certain that the reports 
are not misleading.' But the objection does not succeed because, 
although the difficulty is admitted, it minimizes that which interferes 
with the attainment of full articulation. There are two factors pre-
venting the ideal of full articulation from being reached, one concern-
ing the impact of the thoughts and feelings and the other the fabric of the 
experience . 
An ambivalent state of mind, characterized by the conflict 
of intense feelings , will be disordered and fluctuating. It follows 
that a person who suffers from such inner turmoil is incapable - unless 
he possesses extraordinary powers - of describing his · state of mind 
at all coherently . He does not know what he feels because he cannot 
.- "" .. ; .-~1~y-;o 
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make sense of the conflicting feelings; he is perplexed as he cannot 
come to terms with them. In order to supply a faithful representa-
tion of his state of mind, he would have to have, at least, a firm 
grip on his thoughts and feelings. But it is precisely this which he 
lacks. For to have a firm grip means that the thoughts and feelings 
have stabilized to such an extent that they are amenable to an 
organizing inspection. 
Now when the person becomes comparatively settled, when he 
is no longer tossed and turned by his emotions, but has some degree 
of control over what things will claim his attention, will he thereby 
be better equipped to produce a satisfactory account of his thoughts 
and feelings ? The answer must often be No. To be sure, he should 
be able to describe the ambivalence in general terms and to locate 
the competing emotions and their objects (but even this is not always 
possible for the calmest) o Perhaps he could have done much of this 
while distraught, but the difference is that now he can distance 
himself somewhat from his feelings and reflect on their constitution. 
However, although he might be in a better position to analyse his state
 
of mind, the advantage does not make easier the specification of the 
thoughts and_ feelings and their objects. For the thoughts and feelings, 
which carry no mean significance, are not susceptible of declarative 
pinpointing. To understand why this is frequently the case, we need 
to examine the texture of some feelings. 
If the main object of a set of feelings is someone who has had 
not a little influence over a period of years on the direction of one's 
life , then the attitude that one has toward that person will certainly 
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depend upon the innumerable actions and reactions which make up 
the life of the relationship. (Of course a complete account of such 
feelings would have to include much more.) That the facets of the 
relationship (th~ mass of subtle details, the complexity of apparently 
simple interactions that are built upon so many others) are inexhaus-
tible means that there is far more in the make-up of the feelings than 
one could possibly hope to represent within the limits of ordinary 
speech and comprehension. We face the problem of not being able 
to articulate all that we know and all that we know has to be arti -
culated, for we realize that what we are now conscious of amounts to 
only a very small part of what we must be conscious of so as to get 
in touch with the expanse of the feelings . And, to add a complication, 
we are not certain that our present feelings will not undergo alteration 
when consciousness of them is heightened. 
Once we accept the strength of these considerations, we should 
see that the ideal of exact and complete articulation of the emotions 
is upset : emotions of some importance are not straightforwardly 
communicable. The attribution of metaphor , then, if it means in part 
that the utterances are deficient, carries some weight; but the mistake 
is to misapp_ly this truth. Now if the utterances we make in attempt -
ing to articulate a feeling are, when it really matters, hopelessly 
inadequate, why should we be so bothered about discovering the 
'correct' representation ? What value do such utterances have ? 
I suggest that these utterances act as stepping stones; they 
are used to loca_te the objects and describe the content of feeling , 
but the locating and describing is always provisional. For, providing 
the person makes efforts to understand his state of mind, each utter-
~ . -
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ance along the way will be some advance on its predecessor. To 
illustrate: we can envisage a progression from the initial 'Father's 
behaviour after mother's funeral disturbed me' to the later 'His 
perfunctory manner made me cold' and to the much later 'I under-
stand now how much he suffered and how much he so foolishly sup-
pressed his grief'. The changes in description reflect the differing 
feelings that the incident arouses. Such a development reveals an 
awareness of greater complexity and a corresponding deepening of 
response. This is not to say that the original feelings have remained 
unaltered throughout and have only become more evident. But it will 
not be easy to determine whether the development marks a clarifi-
cation of the original feelings, or whether the constant efforts of 
appraisal were instrumental in affecting the character of the feelings 
themselves. That the attempt to understand and clarify will surely 
change somewhat the feelings under inspection seems an unavoidable 
result of inducing a response, a response which, coming some time 
after the incident in question, cannot be immune to the changes in 
belief, apprehension and feeling that have come about in the meantime. 
But the change in response is not a result to be regretted because it 
alienates one's true feelings; on the contrary, a more developed 
response, a rnore mature response is a truer response . We should 
think that growth, rather than distancing us from our feelings, brings 
us closer to our real feelings; the more we become aware of, the 
more we respond to, the more integrated and sure the emotional life 
can become. To think that one's true feelings are forever lost, 
because they disappeared with the passing of the correlated situation, 
never to be recovered, is to succumb to a sentimentality. 
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Throughout the development of response to an incident which 
continues to impinge on consciousness, there is something that 
remains constant, namely, the incident itself which is returned to 
again and again. One is compelled to relive and reinvestigate it 
so as to measure the soundness of the developing response and the 
accompanying articulations. Indeed so intimately are the incident, 
response and articulations related that attention to the latter two 
demands attention to the former . For one gives meaning to the others; 
the response and articulations without consciousness of the incident 
remain empty, attention to the incident alone serves to make it unin-
teresting and insignificant. Keeping faith with an important incident 
means to never banish it, to always keep it alive, for one can never 
be certain that its significance has been exhausted, that its emo-
tional status has been frozen. Furthermore, to take the utterance that 
we are inclined to make (most often to ourselves alone) as containing 
the whole experience would have the effect of making our imaginings, 
not to say the rest of our inner lives, entirely baffling, or, if not 
baffling, recalcitrant annoyances . Someone who believes that the 
utterance is the sole criterion of the experience would tend to consider 
inner feelings and imaginings at best embarrassing and at worst things 
to be exorcised. 
The danger , then, of abstracting the report of an imaginative 
act from the act itself is that it alienates the person from his feelings , 
feelings which can be effectively reached only through imagining. 
Concentrating on the utterance by itself will not ensure awareness of 
all that underlies it. Faith in the utterance blinds one to the weight of 
the experience, and allows only a superficial comprehension of it, 
since the ordinary utterance is incapable of encapsulating more. If 
such a faith characterizes both Ryle and Sartre (despite his pheno-
menology), it explains their failure to integrate the imagination with 
one's vital concerns. For some the imagination is more than a luxury; 
rather it is that which furnishes the material upon which they thrive, 
it is that which provides the means by which to inhabit one's vital 
thoughts and feelings so as to make one's responses whole. 
Thus the utterances act as guides and supports for the matura-
tion of feeling. Why then is there a general reluctance - I do not 
think I overstate - to articulate one's deeper feelings, to make them 
known ? Could it be that the assertion of feeling couched in definite 
terms appears fina 1 and incontrovertible ? And we know , we have 
learned not once, that the declarations of a feeling change _so unex-
pectedly. Are we embarrassed by the patent inconsistencies ? We 
must be if we demand and expect - as we undoubtedly do - a 
person's character and behaviour to remain steadfast. Are we not 
suspicious of those who frequently alter their opinions ? So we 
are suspicious and uncertain of ourselves when we find that an inclina-
tion to describe a particular feeling conflicts with a previous and equally 
strong inclination. A quick way of dealing with the divergent 
utterances (and so the self-doubt) is to disown them altogether; they 
can be easily got rid of by labelling them metaphors . But not every 
one will be so labelled; we can accept and feel comfortable with 
those utterances which are tantamount to neutral descriptions. Per-
haps we have come across the motivation for rejecting all talk of 
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the experience, and allows only a superficial comprehension of it, 
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one's vital concerns. For some the imagination is more than a luxury; 
rather it is that which furnishes the material upon which they thrive, 
it is that which provides the means by which to inhabit one's vital 
thoughts and feelings so as to make one's responses whole. 
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internal images; after all to grant an effective status to internal 
images is one short step behind pondering the effect they have on 
the soul. 
It may be asked why we should consider inner thoughts and feel-
ings when examining mental imagery, for it can be doubted that inner 
thoughts and feelings are more than irrelevant accessories It may 
even be asserted that a discussion of the inner life will only steer 
us away from the aim of the inquiry; if we want to uncover the nature 
of mental images we must investigate them alone. But I wish to argue 
that just this view is responsible for retarding real understanding of 
the nature of the imagination. Certainly Sartre and Ryle endorse it, 
each in his own way. 
The view is an instance of this assumption concerning the dis -
covery of truth. It is claimed that to expose the nature of a thing, 
each of its features which can be eliminated without harm ought to 
be suppressed. Thus the more that is stripped away, the purer the 
thing becomes - and the purer object is the truer object. This 
denuding procedure clearly benefits the logician and physicist, but 
it most certainly disadvantages the moralist , aesthetician and psycho-
logist . For the latter require the richest, most powerful specimens 
in order to assess what the thing can effect; for .them the barest 
should be the most impoverished, and the least interesting. Now 
just as we come to recognize what art actually means when we respond 
deeply to the greatest works , so we encounter true humanness when we 
communicate with those whose inner life is most fully developed, for 
~ 
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they are more alive and, hence, we might say, more real. 
Similarly, when examining a feature of the mind we want to know it 
if we are to know it at all - in all its richness, complexity and power: 
what is on this account the richest, most complex and of greatest 
importance is the most deserving of attention and the most real. If 
we think and operate otherwise we are likely to end up with results 
that fail to penetrate and illuminate. Here Sartre and Ryle are good 
illustrations: they choose unquestioningly the simplest, least 
potent examples of mental imagery and imagining but yet expect that 
such examples will reveal characteristics which offer essential 
ins i'ght into the significance of the imagination. There should be no 
doubt that such examples of imaging as visualizing a friend and 
hearing a tune in the mind's ear, which are meant to display the mini-
mum of features, naturally yield only the paltriest details. The mis-
take is to presume that images which are summoned up for their 
qualities of simplicity and indifference will somehow furnish the key 
to intense imaginative experiences which grip the innermost thoughts 
and feelings. If phenomenology has a value then it ought to advise 
that the most important and far-reaching examples be faithfully 
revived and scrutinized, for they above all suggest the magnitude 
of the imagination. 
Now how does the self enter the imaginative act ? It enters 
when the questions What do I think and feel ? and What should I 
think and feel ? circumscribe the mental proce·sses undergone, even 
if these questions rarely appear in t his form - or at all. For these 
questions are normally addressed unconsciously, when awareness 
is engaged with that which strikes the senses . But , even though we 
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are not always conscious of our thoughts, feelings and problems, 
we cannot fail to be aware of the signs of mental and emotional 
activity. We know that mental and emotional stress and excitement 
manifest themselves in physical symptoms, from, say, mere tens ion 
in the solar plexus in minor cases to severe illnesses in extreme 
ones. It is possible however not to see the meaning of these physical 
signs, not to see that the physical signs are embodiments of the 
mental activity, and possible to eonsider them negligible or annoying 
effects of an activity that takes place at a much higher level. But 
to believe that as physical symptoms interfere with coherent and 
efficient resolution they ought to be suppressed and eliminated, and 
to apply this injunction ruthlessly to oneself amounts to a policy 
which is the source of a special but not uncommon psychosomatic 
condition. We readily recognize the absence of freshness and spon-
taneity, the numbed sensibility of the man who finds the physical 
aspect of his inner life a chronic nuisance. (One writer calls such 
symptoms 'liability conditions' . ) · Now, the man who attempts 
to refine, purify and make greater his thoughts and feelings by sup-
pressing the internal symptoms kills the very potential for having 
finer thoughts and feelings, for thoughts and feelings of some con-
sequence are born (and could appear in no other manner) out of stress 
and excitement expressed internally. This insight regarding the un-
foreseen effects of suppression belongs to Nietz'sche (The Gay Science, 
~ 47) ; but, while it is expressed by him in relation to the language 
and gesture of emotion , it applies as well to the suppression of internal 
symptoms . 
The reason that the questions guiding the imaginative act are 
crucial and difficult is that our response to people and situations 
is seldom so straightforward as to permit immediate and adequate 
a rticulations. Indeed as sensitivity expands and deepens each novel 
experience or later experience of a person or situation will tend to 
activate ever more thoughts and feelings, and more than can possibly 
come to awareness in a few contemplative acts. Most of the thoughts 
and feelings aroused by a particular situation will remain , if they 
ever rise to the surface, inchoate for a considerable time: we have 
the familiar experience of being disposed to some thing in a way that 
defies introspection. But although introspection fails, there may be 
another method for exposing the extent and quality of response. If 
we assume that the response, including both conscious and uncon-
scious elements, establishes itself in the form of internal sensation , 
then we may be able to measure the extent and quality of the response 
by that which manages to relieve in some instances and strengthen 
in others the internal, sensational components. To be sure, if a thing 
has even the smallest influence on sensibility, it will make a contri-
bution to the intensity and complexity of the response, and by the same 
token to the constitution of internal sensation: otherwise, supposing 
the connection to have no physical basis , our reactions to the world 
would be mysteriously detached and autonomous. That being so, it 
should be possible to mine a response by presenting to oneself various 
items in relative isolation, items which serve to probe the central 
or nearly central features of the response. The mark of a successful 
exploration will be the power that a particular item has pf arousing 
inner sensation, which forms part of the total response. When that 
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is accomplished, when the objects of the response have been 
clarified, the real work can begin, of scrutinizing, testing and 
revising the response in light of the articulations. 
I have spoken of the inner life all along; perhaps I can now make 
what is so perplexing somewhat clearer . It should be agreed that a 
man who has an inner life has to the same degree depth; a man 
possessing a rich and developed inner life reacts sensitively to many 
more features of the 'world and reacts to them with greater intensity 
than one, shallow, bereft of such inwardness . And very many of the 
features to which he is finely sensitive inhabit the undercurrents of 
experience more often than the large conspicuous areas . The depth 
of the inner is , then, a function of percipience , of the capacity to 
detect and react to the unobvious and underlying characteristics of 
what is given in experience: the greater the capacity to probe the 
outer , the deeper the inner. But to attribute acute sensitivity to a 
man , or a deep inner life, is not at the same time to imply that every-
thing he responds to can come quickly and definitely to mind , nor to 
imply that the expression of a deep response in words and actions is 
the outcome of a cons c ious appraisal of the relevant factors. For the 
assimilation and organization of a deep response occurs normally 
w ithout reflective interference; anyway in most cases such inter-
ference would not be effective or useful , even if poss ible . The 
process of coming to grips with a response is one that often appears 
to be undergone rather than initiated or directed , for it is not an un-
common exp erience to have reached some sort of s e tt led and developed 
state of thought and feeling without being aware of having gone through 
the intermediate stages. It is as though the inner forces that are 
activated by that which impinges on sensibility interact, intensify 
and diminish according to inscrutable mechanisms. At least we 
sense that our deepest thoughts and feelings lie beyond the range of 
our introspective powers; we seem lost, with no solid ground to 
stand upon, when the inner, after a dormant period, comes to life 
and fills consciousness, e.g. in some imaginative acts. We know 
too that whatever we attempt by way of exerting conscious and arti-
culate control will fail utterly to capture and contain the inner pro-
cesses; and what is more, a strong, unyielding persistence to under-
stand - prematurely - will likely retard the attaining of some stage 
at which something firm can be extracted, and will just as surely 
introduce a complicating tension to an already complex and highly 
charged condition. Such persistence to manipulate one's inner life 
may result in an induced numbness c:ind obliviousness through an 
unremitting attack on incipient feeling. 
Now when the inner forces are activated and the process of 
development begins, a need arises for a means of presenting relevant 
experience and so securing substantial progress, or in other words, 
a means of ii;icreasing and improving the data upon which thought and 
feeling can operate. The need is satisfied - as much as it can be - by 
the origination of the imaginative act. 
Although in talk of perception it is familiar to refer to the parti-
cipation of all the senses at once in the texture of experience, there 
has been a neglect of an analogous participation in the composition 
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of the imaginative act. The usual procedure in investigating the 
imagination is to isolate one kind of imaging (nearly always visualiza-
tion) and to discuss its features as though the imaginative act is 
not made more complete or more imaginative by the addition of the 
other kinds, that is, providing it makes sense to suppose that they 
can exist together. But again reduction is a mistake. An act of 
imagining can involve more than one form of imagery; the imagina-
tion may engulf consciousness as perception engulfs it, for there are 
indeed imaginative acts - of the highest order - in which a whole 
experience is created or recreated, where sights, sounds, thoughts 
and feelings are unified, if only for brief moments. If the purpose of 
an imagining is not just to picture a certain object but rather to repre-
sent in the fullest detail all that went into the composition of an 
experience, what was experienced and how it was experienced, then 
the resulting presentment should be appropriately expansive and 
variegated. I am not interested in those imaginings which are merely 
the summation of the various forms of mental imagery; rather I am 
concerned to show that the character of such imaginings .·is radically 
altered by the impulse to self-discovery and self- development . 
The function of the imaginative act , then , is not simply to re-
create an experience or invent possible ones, but to employ such pre-
sentments as data for thought, feeling and insight to operate on . Now 
a full presentment demands a high degree of application and concen-
tration ; what things supply the energy to accomplish this ? The 
imagination is engaged because there is a matter of some urgency, 
whether potentially beneficial or harmful, which normal thinking 
remains unequipped to treat. The matter will be of a kind which 
touches and brings into question the structure and meaning of one's 
life, of a kind which is so large-scale and fundamental as not to 
be amenable to easy reflection: the matter is such if it involves 
what I shall call life projects. They include deciding to marry, 
pursuing a career, cultivating certain interests, adopting ideals 
all overriding determinants of the course and content of a life . The 
body of any one project is complex and far reaching; thus its mean-
ing and influence are not susceptible of simple explication. To 
see this, consider how much a close friend has affected, for good 
or ill, every facet of one's character. The remark 'So-and-so means 
very much to me' hardly conveys how he has modified and enlarged 
some desires and interests, and extinguished others, how he has 
helped one attain, say, security of mind and feeling. Now in order 
to understand the significance of one's relationship, the imagination 
has to be called upon to furnish the material needed to bring to mind 
all that should be represented, for the only avenue to encountering 
the underlying import of experience lies in fully realized imaginative 
acts. We may be able to say 'This person has had such-and-such 
an effect on me', but find it impossible to articulate the felt quality 
of the impact. There comes a time when it is just this impact which 
we want to represent, which we want to scrutinize and assess, for if 
we are to make progress in thought and feeling we have to approach 
and to come to grips with the concrete factors from which the thoughts 
and feelings are generated. Words alone, we know, wHl never be 
adequate : we require the presentments of many imaginative acts. 
180 
The problem of self-discovery and self-development which 
brings a life project into question sustains the impulse to represent 
to oneself the fundamental parts of one's life. But the impulse by 
itself cannot be sufficient to guide the imagining, since the general 
problem of establishing the meaning of, say, a particular relationship 
is too indefinite to provide a path to the most relevant and fruitful 
imaginative renderings. Often we are at a loss to specify what we 
want to accomplish. What gives direction to the energy is a vague 
sense of something to be uncovered, the expectance or presentiment 
of a. hitherto unrecognized and unencountered aspect of one's vital 
thoughts and feelings. It is this anticipatory apprehension - itself 
inarticulate - that guides the selection of certain data to which 
imaginative reflection can best be applied. 
So far we have surveyed, very broadly , some of the issues 
bearin9 on the problem of the imaginative act, as a preliminary to 
proposing a distinctive example of the imagination . The next step is 
to apply and fill out the results obtained, and in so doing describe 
the imaginative act . 
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VI 
IMAGINATION f\.ND CREATIVITY 
It has been suggested that the imagination as a centrally 
creative force arises most potently in response to problems per-
taining to the constitution of the self . That is, the problems con-
sist in an inner conflict not immediately specifiable, where the 
feelings and attitudes involved are engendered and sustained by 
factors lying beyond the pale of ordinary consciousness - the 
consciousness that typically finds expression in the ordinary spoken 
and written word. The role of the imagination, then, is to furnish, 
frequently by means of mental imagery, the material with which the 
amorphous ~exture of experience is given to reflection. Thus the 
traditional assumption that the imagination reproduces, but badly , 
perception and no more is overturned in favour of a view of imagina-
tion which allows that attention to imagery can make apparent the 
subtle dimension of experience, the unconscious thoughts and 
feelings of which ever-changing perception makes us oblivious. That 
bringing to consciousness the full import of experience is not a simple 
matter stems partly from the extraordinariness of demanding its 
recognition. We habitually neglect its exploration if only because 
it would hardly further our most pressing interests to do so. If 
language shapes consciousness , if what we say defines how we assess 
our experience and discriminate that which gives rise to it , then , 
keeping in mind that language as a social instrument contains that 
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which is most useful to communication, it follows that conscious -
ness is trained to register particularly those things having public 
significance and utility. An unusual effort of mind is therefore 
required to heighten awareness of that which normally eludes 
attention. 
It is time to make good these general remarks and justify the 
emphasis placed on one sort of imagining. The word 'imagination', 
we all know , covers a very wide and very diverse range of pheno-
mena, from mistaken perception ('He only imagined that someone was 
at the door') to outstanding artistic achievements ('The novel dis-
plays an imaginative rendering of character'). · Indeed the pheno-
mena are so diverse that to find some significant connection between 
mistaken perception and artistic rendering appears an impossible 
task. Perhaps the coupling is due to historical accident: various 
regional speech habits became, through contact of sociai groups over 
a long period, general practices. If something like that is the case 
then there is no conceptual explanation for their association. And 
it may be assumed that 'imagination' conveniently came to fill 
certain linguistic gaps because no other term seemed quite suitable, 
or was chos.en for a vague suggestiveness. An analysis of the ima-
gination based on this assumption would take the form of allocating 
each use of the term to its rightful place in the conceptual scheme 
by finding the appropriate synonym. Thus 'imagine ' in 'Imagine being 
two feet tall' is equivalent to 'conceive'; in 'His answer showed 
imagination' the word means novelty. When complete the analysis 
will have produced a list of synonyms and alternative expressions. 
A conclusion might be that the term 'imagination' is properly applied 
only to mental imagery, to which the other phenomena bear no real 
connection. 
On the other hand there is analysis based on the more credible 
assumption that divergence in application is not gratuitous but is 
generated by a general trait . It is plausible to hold that the pheno-
mena possess a common feature, perhaps very abstract, for it would 
be very strange indeed if such an important term were just arbitrarily 
exploited. So the term does contribute something of its own. The 
task is to discover the common denominator, the nature generally 
shared . Accordingly some go on to argue that 'imagination' means 
something like going beyond the given, apprehending the absent 
as though it were present, or pretending to perceive, be or do . But 
while this latter approach remains for many the more rewarding 
philosophically, for unity is extracted from diversity, its advantages 
do not preclude limitations . 
The extraction approach is without doubt superior to the 
equivalence approach inasmuch as the concept of imagination assumes 
in its hands · sin independent existence. However , the concept 
achieves independence at the expense of undergoing a distancing 
from the phenomena it peculiarly articulates. The linking feature, 
and so the conceptual core, must inevitably be , due to the obvious 
diversity, abstracted from the particularity of each phenomenon. 
Now the equivalence approach at least tends to accommodate and to 
res pect the variety of detail and individual quality. Thus if the 
extraction approach is adopted, conceptual unity and strength is 
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off set by remoteness from the phenomena. What should be done ? 
If we wish to discover the distinctive character of the imagination 
we forfeit the more intimate investigation leading to significant 
understanding. If we decide to consider each phenomenon separately 
we are not likely to be able to perform the grand synthesis at the 
end, the synthesis that may have inspired the endeavour. To satis-
fy our aims we require a way of combining experiential closeness 
with the forging of conceptual authority. As method dictates to 
content, it is important to follow the most promising method so as 
to secure the best possible results. How then should we proceed ? 
We might begin by canvassing actual cases, which can be 
taken as uncontroversial, in a Wittgensteinian-derived look-and-see 
style. The attention and openness to complexity and detail should 
produce an appreciation for the richness of the phenomena· and the 
crudity of the intellectual apparatus that articulates it. But this 
receptiveness is unlikely to result in the formulation of definite 
and determining characteristics; the detail will be immense and 
because so complicated not amenable to sorting into coherent patterns. 
Disorder and increased perplexity will be the consequence of allowing 
the world to have too large a hand in conceptual instructions. For 
if we do not take the initiative, if we do not offer improved orderings 
of experience , we cannot expect to arrive at gi;-eater understanding of 
that experience. I suggest that we forestall being overwhelmed by the 
jumble of detail by inventing examples so as to confront actual 
phenomena with analytical patterns. If bits of reality do not reveal 
themselves in neat array we shall have to begin the arranging ourselves . 
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Rather than wait on reality for sudden illumination we shall have to 
construct a plausible ordering which may yield philosophical under-
standing. 
What I have in mind may well be charged with a two-fold 
artificiality: contrived examples tend to say more of their author 
than of the phenomena, and simple patterns unavoidably fail to 
include a great deal that is, or might turn out to be, important. Now 
both points are valid insofar as they warn of very real dangers. 
Nevertheless these pitfalls can be circumvented, at least to a degree 
that has a minimal detrimental effect. We must always guard against 
abstraction that alienates the concrete, and so we should be con-
scious of the relation between the analysis which is necessarily 
abstract and the concrete items which the analysis aims to encompass. 
It is a mark of a successful analysis that it will never allow us to 
forget - but bring more vividly and comprehensively to consciousness 
the rich character of the phenomena in question. No doubt my pro-
posals as to the way in which the phenomena should be ordered are, 
since the ordering emerges from invented examples, personal. But 
I hope that the reader will come to agree with the main points of the 
argument, and will offer qualifications to help improve the rest. 
The undeniable and ineliminable artificiality of fabricated 
examples is not unique to this investigation. We find it in the work 
of the fabler and the moralist (Hans Andersen ; Jesus of Nazareth) , 
who embody ideas and ideals in tales and parables. These stories 
hold their fascination because , even though they may be unbelievable 
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in detail, they vividly convey some deep matter of human experience, 
a matter not easily kept before the mind unaided. The stories are 
ones returned to again and again not because they may represent 
actions that must be imitated or avoided - though I do not deny 
that imitation and repulsion can play a part in their acceptance -
but rather because they encapsulate a way of concretizing a notion 
or value. The stories become touchstones of experience. The com-
parison of actual candidate actions with those fictionally described 
assists us in comprehending the nature of human behaviour and its 
value, they assist by highlighting the crucial features. Thus the 
artificiality of these stories, such as it is, remains innocuous; 
indeed the simple, naive fictions pinpoint the heart of our concerns 
so surely and strikingly as no documented incidents could. Now if 
such stories enable us to recognize the nature and merits . of some 
actions, then comparable stories, invented for a different purpose, 
should enable us to cope more effectively with the description and 
analysis of some complex mental states. I am inclined to think that 
there are a number of psychological concepts whose analysis is best 
achieved in this fashion, prominent among them is the concept of 
imagination . 
Any story invented for this purpose has to satisfy two main 
conditions. It must impress as a significant f!.nd striking example 
of the phenomena the concept articulates; otherwise the analysis will 
lack focus and direction. And it must exhibit enough salient features 
so as to suggest how the range of diverse phenomena can be coherently 
ordered; otherwise the thrust of the analysis will fall short. But we 
should not expect that every common use will b
e assimilated. We 
want to locate the distinctive character of the i
magination, and so 
its real power. Any attempt to include all witho
ut discrimination, 
as if all are on a par, serves only to weaken a 
vital concept. My 
strategy, then, is to tell a story from which wi
ll emerge a set of 
characteristics, which in turn will reveal conn
ections among asso-
ciated phenomena, and so display the scope of 
the imagination. 
From adolescence Paul has had two overriding d
esires which 
have remained constant throughout his life. Fo
r him the good life 
consists in a career, challenging and creative,
 demanding acuity 
and stamina, and in the love of a woman with w
hom he can build a 
home and share the job of raising children and with whom he c
an find 
mutual support and a balance of interests and a
ctivity. He sees the 
two, the career and the marriage, as compleme
ntary and interdepen-
dent. For unless his talents are applied to a re
warding profession, 
unless he becomes a complete man by reaching 
a level of individual 
achievement and personal strength he cannot po
ssibly love as he 
ought; and without the warmth, understanding 
and affection given 
and received, and the concern for the happiness
 of his wife and 
children, he will lack the emotional strength to
 sustain the taxing 
and frequently uncongenial work; indeed the fa
mily will make his 
efforts meaningful. Paul has such faith in hi~ 
joint ideal that it 
influences and shapes all his more particular de
sires and decisions . 
But he is realistic enough to recognize that con
stant application and 
very good luck are needed to attain some state 
answering to the ideal. 
And he realizes too that even when that state is reached, it will, 
as is to be expected, fall short of his, perhaps fanciful, ideal. 
Soon after Paul is called to the bar he marries. The marriage 
not free of problems - is close , and deepens as the family grows. 
He becomes a successful lawyer, and prospers as the quality of his 
work improves. But, although Paul is fully aware of his good fortune 
and knows that the continued happiness of his family is secure, he 
does begin to experience, as he enters middle age, the nagging 
weariness of routine at work and at home. It bothers him for a time, 
but eventually, after reflection, he comes to the conclusion that he 
has after all attained what he set out to attain; so the appropriate 
attitude for him now is relaxed satisfaction. Is not that the form 
of happiness he had in mind all along ? With a disappointment that 
puzzles , :he -·· '" resigns himself to a contented but monotonously 
stab le future . 
Later he meets an old acquaintance, now an official in a major 
political party, who suggests tba t, as the representative of their 
constituency has decided not to contest the next election, Paul, a 
well-known , highly ·qualified and respected citizen of the region, might 
think of entering his name as a candidate. The seat is a safe one, and 
if Paul acts now he is bound to generate sufficient support to win the 
party's nomination. Now the prospect of entering politics excites 
him to a degree that he no longer thought possible. The offer has 
awakened desires and aims that have lain dormant for a considerable 
time; and Paul quickly realizes that the ground of his malaise must be 
that these desires and aims have remained inoperative for so long . 
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He had somehow forgotten the emphasis he placed on challenge and 
risk, if the rewards are great, when his career began. So now he 
is presented with an opportunity to make something significant out 
of this latter phase of his working life, a chance to secure great 
achievements . De lighted , he sets to thinking and considers how best 
to employ his talents in politics. But suddenly his train of thought 
is jolted by the awareness of the effect such a decision would have 
on his wife and children. The duties of a dedicated politician neces-
sitate repeated absences from home, which will over an extended 
period damage irreparably familial well-being. 
He is caught in a dilemma. If he pursues this new career 
his wife and children and he himself will suffer the pain of estrange-
ment. If he decides to preserve the emotional cohesiveness of the 
family he will drift into boredom and become, especially as he is now 
conscious of greater possibilities, deeply frustrated. In either 
direction the disadvantages, what is suffered or missed, seem to 
counterbalance the benefits, what is achieved or retained. From 
the present standpoint there appears no way out of this intolerable 
state of affairs. And he finds himself unable to cope with the range 
and complexity of the thoughts and feelings involved. To be sure, 
if he is to begin to reconcile himself to one of the alternatives by, 
in part, extinguishing the other, or to somehow pass over the dilemma 
and to establish new bearings, he requires some grasp of these vital 
factors , some way of comprehending and holding them together so that 
any solution arrived at will not have been reached by neglecting an 
item which later might prove to be of the utmost importance to the 
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conflict . The problem he faces , as a preliminary to resolving the 
pervasive conflict, concerns the difficulty in finding a method of 
representing as completely as possible the content and meaning of 
the two life projects. At the moment he has a strong feeling of being 
inadequate to the task . 
Naturally enough Paul cannot help being totally preoccupied 
with the conflict. And he withdraws from responsible application in 
his work and from responsive family activity. But the withdrawal is 
not an outcome of deliberation, not a consequence of decision. It 
is the characteristic accompaniment of total absorption in thought. 
If the greater part of a man's intellectual and emotional energy is 
deployed in a concentrated reflection then he has little to expend 
in normal, everyday circumstances. For Paul it is as though the 
conflict possesses the mental life. He has lost command of the 
sequence and content of thoughts and feelings. Now he must at all 
times attend to the processes activated and the energies discharged 
to deal with the conflict: the competing life projects take control. 
This should not surprise, for as Paul's state of mind is extremely 
confused he is unable to frame an objective by which to conduct 
reflection. He does not know what he wants, let alone what might 
solve the problem. 
Even though his successive ponderings appear disconnected 
and incoherent overall, several themes recur, and they recur in the 
form - which all his thought seems to take - of mental imagery. If 
he is not reliving some memorable experience or a half-forgotten 
episode in the first days of marriage , he is envisaging the rewards 
of an active political life or the deterioration of a once happy 
family. Gradually he vividly encounters the kind of life he has had, 
and the kinds of life he could have. And in moments of respite 
from the turmoil he re-enters the state of harmony and contentment 
just left behind. Then he thinks that the distress is merely a 
temporary aberration. But no sooner does he frame the consoling 
thought than he recoils at the prospect of a dreary and unceasing 
equilibrium. And when he dwells on various ways that his talents 
might be fulfilled in government he usually ends with - as the 
vividness of envisagement fades - the awareness of the consequences
 
on those nearest to him. He wants the new career but having it entails
 
shirking responsibilities and severing deep attachments; whatever he 
does he cannot abandon those who have given most. But, on the other
 
hand, if he fails to revitalize himself through more challenging 
and rewarding work, how will he, in such a miserable state, con-
tribute to their happiness ? His frustration will introduce a dis-
ruptive tension and coolness. Yet might this view be unduly pessi-
mistic, a result of overestimating the influence of the new career ? 
Not a little time is spent in picturing a future that is a happy exten-
sion of life to date . 
Paul is utterly bewildered; as things stand there seems no 
solution available. But he does not sink into despair, for he is 
not unaware that there is work to be done , work that must be done 
the alternative is disintegration. His reflection consists in the 
presentments of past episodes and future contingencies , but present -
ments that amount to explorations of the significance of what he has 
192 
experienced and what he could yet experience. At such times, in 
such explorative attitudes, he sustains a concentrated responsive-
ness to the actual content and meaning that his family and career 
have for him, and what he contributes in return. It is only in the 
form of fully realized mental images - one so quickly loses hold of 
words alone - that he is able to make vivid and real to himself the 
rm tter of his life. In dwelling scrupulously on aspects of endeavours 
and relationships he comes in conscious contact with the value of 
his life proJe.ots. Thus by means of representing in images he makes 
concrete those elements that are peculiarly difficult to keep in 
focus, and so provides himself with a personal critique. This kind 
of critique has a compelling impact because there is all the difference 
between it and a self-critique formulated in accordance with rational 
judgment : the difference in effect on the soul between deliberate, 
analytical reasoning and actual or re-lived experience implying 
judgment is seldom taken account of. Now the method, the creating 
and the repeating of imaging experiences, amounts to 'assembling 
reminders for a purpose', although the purpose does not occupy a 
position in the forefront of consciousness. The purpose is realized 
at the end, when it confers sense and order on that leading to it. 
The purpose (inasmuch as we can speak of one) plays no 
actively conscious role in the critique because the aim of the acti-
vity is a change in what set the critique in motion. That is , the 
critique involves alternation or modification to the beliefs, desires 
and interests comprising the self; and so the self too .is altered 
and modified . If Paul is to resolve the inner disharmony, a solution 
.-.. '' 
' 
will not be achieved by opting for one side of the conflict and 
banishing the other: he must somehow retain both in order to pre-
vent disintegration. But a reconciliation is not a clear possibility , 
that is , not a possibility for him as things are at present. If it 
were a clear possibility he would be able to express it, and it would 
become a conscious, articulated goal. But Paul cannot state what 
he is up to , he is not equipped to comprehend a true reconciliation. 
For the reconciliation, if there is one , can be reached only after a 
dramatic change in the self has been undergone . And the self reborn 
is not a coherent and thinkable outcome of a t ransformation of the 
present self . Just as there is no coherent thought answering to the 
* description of willing or imagining oneself being another person, 
so there is slight content in the thought of wanting to become funda-
mentally different . The reconciliation necessitates an alternat ion of 
det ermining factors in Paul's psychic make -up. But if the recon-
ciliation required is so fundamental and so large - scale , then the 
articu lation of a solution covering all that the transformation implies 
would be, if indeed possible , so long and cumbersome as not to 
qualify as an animating purpose a t a ll. 
The cor1sequences of Paul's repeated explorations come 
gradually , virtually without conscious recognition . Each session of 
self-absorption has the effect of lessening the hold of present beliefs , 
desires and interest, which permits him to try out variations that 
might lead the way through the dilemma. In t he period of transition 
nothing stands fast. Slowly, little by little, the conflicting beliefs , 
* Cf . B. W i lliams, ' Imagination a nd t he Self', pp . 39 - 45 . 
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desires and interests lose their grip on the psyche; at the same time 
their replacements, tenuously held, begin to form themselves more 
definitely and begin to germinate in consciousness. Thus as the 
supplanting projects establish themselves, as Paul feels more secure 
and at home with them, the new self emerges. 
The acid test of the reformed self clearly is whether it can 
cope effectively and constructively with the problem that Paul still 
faces. Not only must he be able to make confident decisions , but 
the decisions must be of a kind which, while acknowledging the 
process of change and appreciating the former self, cause no regret, 
nor suggest that something of value in his character has been for-
feited. Rather, if the period of reflection, suspension and emergence 
has been successful then he should be prepared to recognize that, 
if anything, he has gained. He has gained in power and pose; he 
can now consider the problem with composure while before it caused 
distress. 
Without reluctance Paul decides to turn down the offer of 
candidacy. Before his mind is the picture of a more fulfilling alter-
native, more fulfilling because it incorporates where the others 
exclude. It allows him to be fully himself, although now a markedly 
different self. He sees a way of satisfying the urge to revitalize 
his work while preserving and enriching familial love and cohesive-
ness. He sets himself the task of acquiring a greater understanding 
of politics and government - after all he is still a novice in these 
matters - by study , discussion and experience in party organization 
and local affairs . By proceeding conscientiously in his political 
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education he can allow his views time to mature, time to cohere 
into a we 11-founded programme . Moreover, this painstaking method 
has the advantage of making it possible for the family to adjust to 
the expected career. They too can develop interests in these and 
related areas, and can participate with Paul in his public activities. 
In this manner they will be prepared, as he will be prepared, for 
the attempt at political office and the different pattern of life entailed 
by its success. The aim of entering politics .has been retained but it 
now inhabits a refurbished domain. It is now enmeshed in a different 
set of aims where it does not occupy the most powerful position. 
Since it formerly ruled above and alone whenever acknowledged, 
its character has been drastically altered . Similarly, his wish for 
a stable and happy family has not been abandoned; it has become sub-
ordinated to the desire to enhance family life by giving more of him-
self and so binding the family more closely. If Paul has not removed 
all the problems , he has nonetheless fashioned, after experiencing a 
cul-de-sac , new projects which have emerged from his own energies 
and which express the critical features of his personality . 
The structure of the story is this: 
(1) After achieving a state of contentment, after satisfying his 
ideal, he experiences a vague feeling of incompleteness. But , 
thinking that such misgivings are idle, he tries not to trouble 
himself. 
(2) The unanticipated prospect of improving his situation by 
changing careers casts away the doldrums, and upsets , what seemed 
to be, a strong mental and emotional balance. He is thrown into 
deep confusion . 
(3) If the turmoil incapacitates and prevents judgment and deli-
beration , it does not eliminate every resource. He is too enfeebled 
to direct his ponderings . But he does register a host of imaging ex-
periences. The succession of affecting images serves to induce a 
dissociation from the desires and aims, held so firmly, which are 
the source of the conflict. A city under siege becomes less attached 
to its treasures as it struggles for survival . 
(4) What has given life meaning is explored with disinterestedness, 
as he is bereft of unquestioned aims and desires . And the estab-
lishment of meaning leads to an experimenting with suitable aims and 
desires, an experimenting which is conducted through mental images. 
Candidate replacements are tentatively assimilated, until some 
reconciliation appears , until some revised psychic structure begins 
to take hold . 
(5) As the revised self congeals so he regains the conscious and 
considered command over his mental and emotional life. He recovers 
the strength and energy to enact the dictates of the self. He succeeds 
in resolving the conflict by removing its causes ; the transformation 
justifies itself and the old self is hardly missed . In fact he is 
inclined to assert that nothing has been lost, all is growth . 
Whether this story exemplifies the imagination shall not be 
argued, it shall be assumed . And if it does not immediately impress 
it may do so when the yield is inspected. 
1. Materials . The story presents a succession of states: 
relative harmony, irresolvable conflict, disordered imaging, trans-
formation and resolution. The imagination is indispensable to the 
attainment of the end. But need the imagining always be conducted 
through mental imagery ? Imagery is an important ingredient of the 
transformation, but is it always required to introduce the imagi-
nation ? 
It is common to maintain that some artists of stature display 
in their works qualities of imagination to the highest degree. And 
this cannot be denied . But this truism, however, may prove vacuous 
if what is meant by the attribution of imaginative excellence comes 
only to the praising of artistic talent. For then the only power the 
term 'imagination' possesses is that of abbreviating a set of charac-
teristics - it contributes nothing of its own. And if that is so then 
the imagination is not distinctive, hence of no particular interest . 
But, even if the reduction of the imagination to artistic talent is 
avoided and application of the term is reserved for those exhibiting 
specific skills - not just any work of art deserves to be called 
imaginative , but there are some which plainly do, and it is with them 
that the anal~sis should beg in - it appears that a mistake has been 
made in claiming certain very special and very rare skills as a pre -
requisite for the imagination . For surely mature artistic talent con-
sists in exceptional skills of expression , articulation and execution , 
in word , p igme nt or clay . But why s hould the total absence of s uch 
artis tic skills , or a mere average endowment , debar a man from having 
a fully developed imagination ? That the imagination properly accom-
panie s great artists seems an inordinately stringe nt condition . And , 
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anyway, to make the imagination the exclusive property of artistic 
genius may lead back to a view of the imagination that adds nothing 
of moment to what we already ascribe to genius. 
But from the denial that the imagination is exclusive to artistic 
creation it does not follow that it is exclusive to that consisting in 
internal images. Rather it seems reasonable to suppose that as 
artistic expression derives from and extends ordinary expression 
so the distinctively imaginative elements in art depend upon more 
widely based and easily accessible ones: imagination in art is 
founded on an imagination requiring no extraordinary powers of ex-
pression. Now if the imagination as a creative force is to exist 
generally, unaided by exceptional gifts, then it must naturally 
express itself in mental imagery. For the framing of mental images 
requires no training or special talent: the ability to image is a 
consequence of the ability to perceive. Thus, inasmuch as we can 
summon up internal images we share a basic feature of the imagina-
tion. If we do not have the benefit of artistic skill at least we have 
within ourselves the means to participate in the kind of thing 
achieved by the gifted few. So the imagination, while its greatest 
exemplifications occur in the greatest artists , is grounded generally 
in the ability to image. 
The material of the imagination varies : writing novels, com-
posing music, painting pictures as well as framing internal images 
all manifest the workings of the imagination. It is characteristic of 
such activities that their completion culminates the laborious pursual 
of an end . Since t he end is not one that could be achieved immediately, 
the imagination must needs be called upon. And for that reason 
a material is employed to provide something to generate and sustain 
the process and to register each error and correction and the stages 
of development. It is difficult to conceive how , without such 
material , a result could be worked out . But now why should the 
goal be reached by a working out ? 
For example , consider a man , totally lacking in a rti stic 
talent and not inclined to dwell on internal images, who , after 
being presented with a seemingly intractable problem and brooding 
for a time, suddenly produces a solution. Not only did no images 
enter his mind during the period of brooding , but no thoughts of the 
problem either. Still he was preoccupied with the problem through-
out. He had the feeling of being oppressed by it and of making 
efforts to solve it (a feeling he could not articulate) but he followed 
no method , took no steps. And then quite spontaneously an idea of 
the solution formed from elements that seemed to come into exis -
t ence as soon as they came together. 
This story is certainly plausible. But its plausibility qepend s 
upon assumptions as to the nature of the problem and solution. 
That is, as tne problem and solution approach in depth and quality 
that of Paul's, the story becomes le ss believable . It is easy to con-
ceive of this man finding, say, an ingenious technique for assessing 
a chemical substance, or a procedure for answering a mathematical 
poser, but immensely hard to think that he could arrive at a regenerated 
self in a similar way. But surely , an objection runs, it can happen that 
a brilliant solution to an engineering problem , say, entails a major 
alteration to the inventor's beliefs , etc ., an alteration which amounts 
to a real change in him. Thus there is not a significant difference 
between the two sets of problems and solutions, and by the same 
token no reason to separate them with respect to the imagination. 
A reply to this objection is registered in the distinction between what 
happens to one and what changes one. Certainly each change in a 
man's beliefs, desires and plans is a change in how he sees, and 
conducts himself in, the world. And so it can be said, trivially, 
that each change in a man's beliefs, etc. amounts to a change in him; 
he is to that extent different . But it has to be recognized that there 
is a great difference between a revision to an inconsequential belief 
and the abandonment of a belief that lies near the centre of his basic 
concerns. Admittedly the extremes differ in degree; but with the 
former there is warrant for maintaining that he undergoes no change, 
that the self alters so slightly as to remain intact, while with the 
latter: it must be acknowledged that the change is so radical that a 
new self has been born, he has been transformed. Change in the 
basic constituents of the self involves alteration and modification 
on a large scale, just because that which occupies the central loca-
tion generates or colours all of the rest. 
If , then, this picture of change in the self is right it remains 
very difficult to understand how a radical revision to beliefs, desires 
and interests could be brought about by the imagination while in a 
state of psychic equilibrium. For such an imaginative transformation 
must in fact manifest itself in doubt , confusion and insecurity , which 
cannot but be suffered. The change involves, directly or indirectly , 
every concern so it requires the application of him whose condition 
it is. Stability is recovered by promoting and guiding as best he 
can the process leading to reconstitution. Otherwise, without this 
attentive coming to grips with the problem, there is every like-
lihood of going under . 
Attentiveness is important for another reason . We find the 
story of a man emerging from a period of blankness with a solution 
to a problem about his deepest projects as a result of imagination 
hard to understand for the strong reason that in order for the man 
to accept the new self as truly and imaginatively his, he should be 
able to trace the development as one involving the progressive re-
alignment of his inmost beliefs, desires and interests. Unless 
he is able to recognize the continuity of the new self with the old , 
he need not be committed to accepting responsibility for effecting 
the later condition. He may not accept responsibility because he 
has not taken an active part in encouraging the development of some 
aspects and the quashing of others, and so has not experienced 
the new self emerging from the old. Dramatic transformations of 
the self can take place without active working out , as for instance 
in the Damascus road conversion. But it is in just such cases that 
we are not tempted to attribute the change to the workings of the 
imagination . We are not tempted because the ·transformation is in-
stantaneous and due wholly to the interference of an external force . 
Now this interference contrasts with the aid provided by someone who, 
appreciating the problem, contributes to the subject ' s imagination 
with more or less detailed suggestions . In cases of such contribution , 
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where not all the work is done internally, the imagination so acti-
vated is credited with a diminished participation. The less the 
person's imagination takes part in the process, the less responsi-
bility he has for bringing about the result. 
2. Consciousness. In arguing that a working out with the material 
is required for the imagination to deal with certain deep problems, 
particularly those concerning the basic aspects of the self, we have 
come to argue for the view that as a consequence the imaginative 
process must involve conscious awareness. The difficulty is to 
describe what this awareness means . 
The case of the man who produces a solution to a not uncom-
plicated problem after a period of mental blankness shows that the 
imagination may be evidenced when no conscious attentiveness 
obtains. But blankness is no more than an accidental feature. 
There seems nothing to prevent him or another from following a step-
by-step procedure which will lead to the right result. Indeed it may 
be more efficient in some instances to set a concrete stimulus for the 
imagination by carefully traversing the ground up to and around the 
problem, be reviewing, say, all the data so as to circumscribe the 
problem. With the problem clearly in focus adjustments to the atten-
dant items can be tested in a trial-and-error fashion until everything 
falls into place. 
Thus there are , calling upon the imagination, problems that a re 
susceptible of more or less full articulation and consequently problems 
whose solutions can be prefigured. It is often possible to picture, 
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however sketchily, the kind of condition that would satisfy the 
problem, while lacking the means of achieving a particular reali-
zation of the solution. The role of the imagination here becomes, 
after the solution is framed, one of keeping the end-product vividly 
present so as to act as a guiding influence on the efforts mustered 
to attain it. We can conclude that some imaginative processes 
involve prefigurement and others do not; and that where prefigure-
ment obtains so does conscious attentiveness. But the converse does 
not hold. Not every imaginative process involving conscious 
attentiveness includes prefigurement of the solution, for in some 
important instances (such as Paul's case above) prefigurement can 
even be an impediment to reaching the solution. 
We have to consider those cases in which, for one, the problem 
is not clearly apprehended and, for another, there is no hint of 
what the solution might be. Because the matters in question over-
whelm in range and depth, neither the problem nor the solution is 
amenable to articulation. Still the individual may express his 
dejection and upset and complain of great troubles; but each ex-
pression will fall far short of adequate articulation . For in order to 
grasp completely the nature of his problem he would have to have 
already attained the solution. And, although for that reason he is 
incapable of prefiguring the solution, he can (and must) envisage 
as an important part of the imaginative process the likely extensions 
of certain aspects of his present state. 
When the problem is the problem of overcoming that which 
gives rise to it then the solution is not one that can be a possible 
204 
extension of that which requires it. And if the problem fails to be 
comprehended because as a problem of the self it lies outside the 
self then the solution also falls outside the pale of conscious 
awareness. 
The limits of consciousness are not , we might say, the limits 
of the imagination, for the imagination outstrips them. It outstrips 
them because it can deal with matters that exceed the grasp of 
ordinary discursive reasoning. What a man can represent to himself 
is shaped by his experience, by his beliefs, interests and desires . 
On the other hand he can make vivid a life altered in certain respects 
by suspending some of his beliefs, etc . and adopting improving re-
placements. But there are firm limits to such suspension and experi-
mentation. Such limits exist for two reasons. First, the process 
of suspending less and less superficial beliefs, desires and interests 
becomes increasingly difficult because, as deeper items · support 
ever more subordinate ones, an attempt to dissociate oneself from 
a relatively deep item demands exceptional powers of concentration . 
The point where the inability to simultaneously hold in abeyance the 
wealth of establishing mental features engenders the inability to 
maintain a grip on the new persona is all too quickly reached in the 
course of methodical dissociation. In the suspension of deep items 
what mus t be attended to far exceeds what consciousness can 
effectively handle; as the task becomes greater the chances of 
success diminish . Second, there is a question about the subject 
of such a suspension of deep items, providing we assume for the 
moment that no restrictions hold on what can be brought under conscious 
controL Even if the most important and most basic of one's beliefs, 
etc. may be truly suspended, one might yet doubt whether a value 
attaches to the performance of that operation, whether in fact any-
one could have an interest in the outcome of divesting himself of 
his mental and emotional constituents. He might find no attraction 
in that operation since, he is certain that with each dissociation he 
himself must suffer a reduction, until, in the extreme case, he (the 
person who set out) has vanished altogether. He cannot think that 
if he were to suspend the adherence to a life prnject (cons is ting of 
beliefs, desires and interests) it would be he himself contemplating 
the replacement. For he is not merely a subject of awareness, a 
contentles s point of apprehension, and no force of willing could 
reduce him to it. After all, even if such a state were entered, what 
impact could the adopted persona have ? If his actual life design 
is set aside then how might the unusual experience stimulate a 
critical scrutiny of the self ? Thus any attempt to deny that, or a part 
of that , which defines the self as a means of contending with certain 
deep problems must be idle. 
As the defining components of the self cannot be abandoned 
or entertained at will, a problem about the tenability of such com-
ponents is precluded from a consciously directed inquiry. The 
calamity that befalls the one who ignores these conditions attests 
to their truth. Consider a man who , victim of a deep conflict (e.g., 
career versus marriage} and efficient to the core, is impatient to 
have the solution without de lay. Rather than submit to the slow, 
unmanageable and unpredictable psychic forces and endure the upset 
and confusion that are bound to result, he decides to expedite 
matters by weighing alternatives and plumping for that displaying 
the more beneficial prospects in the long run. The conflicting 
projects are irreconcilable; but he is not prepared to give up either 
if that means giving up both. And if one has to go it will be the less 
advantageous . He cannot afford , he thinks , to run the risk of 
forfeiting all of what he now holds dear by submitting to an unknown 
process. So by dint of will he tries to at once banish the less de-
sirable project and, till a replacement presents itself, increase the 
power of the survivor in order to close the gap. He pictures a future 
bereft of the offending project, and suppresses each manifestation 
of it. But if indeed the project is a defining component of the self 
then failure to rid himself of it is certain. Deep beliefs, desires 
and interests neither fall away through disregard nor disappear of 
their own accord. This does not mean, however, that a man may not 
induce a state in which he remains oblivious of factors he refuses 
to acknowledge. All that he can accomplish by bullying a project 
out of consciousness is simply that: he no longer acts under its 
influence and does not have thoughts associated with it. But it 
stays, choked beneath a complicated layer of mental tangles. Think-
ing it out of existence does not make it so; for projects respond to 
a subtle approach, an approach respecting their position in the psyche. 
Now it is clear that the artificial reform leaves the self enfeebled and 
vulnerable , for each occasion that would formerly have activated a 
certain response having deep connections threatens the tenuous equi-
librium . Consequently he is less able to deal adequately and sin-
cerely with crucial elements in his (and anyone's) life. All this 
results because he demanded a conscious control, because he 
refused to allow the imagination to run a natural, disciplined course. 
A misused imagination brings about a disintegrated self. 
3. Problems. While it is possible to scrutinize the most banal 
of items with utmost meticulousness and to glance cursorily at the 
most demanding of works of art, while it is possible to feel extremely 
touched by the simplest of gestures and to be left cold by tµe noblest 
of human acts, it is not possible to extract from the imagination 
in excess of the demands made on it, or to satisfy it with less. 
Unlike perception and emotion, the imagination yields, when it 
does succeed , in proportion to that which exercises it. If the 
appearance of a problem is, as has been argued , a distinctive 
feature of the imaginative process then for the process to ·be con-
summated a solution corresponding to the problem in complexity must 
be reached. The solution, a genuine solution, must encompass or 
revise the elements comprising the problem; but it cannot transcend 
that which requires it, for the simple reason that no solution would 
thereby be secured - a solution should be assimilable . This is why 
the imagination has bounds and, as solutions generate further 
problems, a history. 
The problem in its way defines what the· imagination can accom-
plish : the greater the problem the greater imaginativeness needed . 
Without problems the imagination remains still and empty . This es-
tablishes the view that aimless picturing exemplifies only the mos t 
----~ 
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attenuated form of imagination. But more of this subsequently. 
Not all problems activating the imagination are of the same 
kind. We can roughly distinguish between those about the self 
and those about the world, and in addition between those about 
the individual self and those, we might say, about the collective 
self. The former pair can be distinguished by contrasting deep 
problems of the person with fundamental problems of nature in 
terms of prefigurement. Whereas a reconciliation of a deep conflict 
is not susceptible of prefigurement (to the subject), fundamental 
scientific, economic and sociological problems are often solvable 
with the invention of a satisfactory model. To fashion a model or 
pattern is to discover the solution for (we assume) whatever holds 
true of the macrocosm does analogously hold true of the microcosm. 
Indeed the structure of a.thing must generally be represented in 
manageable form if it is to be understood. And the test of an alleged 
discovery is whether .the model or pattern can be coherently arti-
culated and justified: a state of the world is often compre-
hensible only if the relevant model is. Now this search for com-
prehension characteristic of problems of nature and society is not 
• 
found in problems of deep personal conflict , problems which require, 
not understanding of a fixed state, but revision of a self no longer 
able to adequately cope . But as the distinction lies in the dif-
ference between understanding and growth , between fabrication and 
generation, it should be clear that some problems of the self do 
amount to the problem of comprehending the elements of a personality; 
and such problems might be solved by formulating a suitable model 
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or pattern. How are these two sorts of problem and solution 
related ? 
The problem of the self, of which models and patterns play 
no part in the solution, is the problem stemming, not from a need 
for more and better information, but from a need for an improved 
programme of action so as to make a life more congenial, satisfying 
or challenging. Although there is a great difference between a prob-
lem whose solution requires a model and a problem whose solution 
involves regeneration, they have this much in common. Each kind 
of problem derives from a deficiency in unity and cohesiveness; the 
solution to one promises greater coherence and comprehensiveness, 
to the other renewed strength of purpose. Thus both problems arise 
from a need for integration, of data or of projects; but in light of 
their differences we speak of one aiming at truth and the other 
health. 
We have distinguished between the problems whose solutions 
are and are not susceptible of prefigurement, and have aligned them 
with the fabricative and the generative. Now, to be sure, after the 
growth has been effected in the case of man who has overcome a con-
flict of definin~ projects , it should be possible, provided the growth 
is attributable to the imagination, for the individual to follow the 
development, a procedure which might involve the invention of a 
pattern. And the pattern formed would be made up of or embodied 
in personal representations . So , although a man in the throes of a 
deep conflict is incapable of prefiguring successful emergence, he 
should be able to represent (if only to himself), when the end-point 
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has been reached, the state achieved and the process leading to it. 
He should be able to comprehend the continuity of the later and 
earlier selves as a condition of endorsing the change as imagina-
tively his . 
.. 
So far attention has been restricted to an individual and his 
personal projects. Certainly there are defining projects common to 
many , the projects of a society or a culture. And there is no reason 
to suppose that common projects are immune to conflict and free of 
inadequacy, nor indeed that a society never has need of regeneration. 
Now problems of this sort are of such a magnitude that, as expected, 
only the man who possesses extraordinary sensitivity and intelli-
gence can even begin to consider them at all. The man must be 
exceptional because in representing the problems of common projects 
he cannot rely solely on his own experiences as an individual deal-
ing with a personal issue may. In order to achieve an expression of 
a social matter at once immediate and widely accessible he must 
articulate that presentment which derives from a genuinely individual 
experience but which remains impersonal in character. The pitfalls 
are two: becoming subjective , where the commentator offers his 
idiosyncracies as though they were ours; and becoming detached, 
where the material is so commonplace as to deny that shared pro-
jects are after all shared by individuals to whom, if they do matter, 
such things matter at a profound level and matter with corresponding 
feeling. 
If the preceding adumbrates the truth then there ought to be 
illustrations of those, deeply responsive to the collective self, those 
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artists who promote human growth and portray growth already 
achieved. 
A most impressive example of a work that articulates a sub-
stantial change in a people is King Lear. Once, the king, ordained 
by God, enjoyed absolute authority. But as the belief in divine 
association weakened so the supreme ruler sustained a reduction in 
the foundation of his power. The drama centres on the fact that 
Lear is the victim of a radical transformation that takes place too 
late in him. We find him at the outset, oblivious of the erosion of 
faith in divinely supported power, demanding a public demonstra-
tion of honour and affection warranted only by the formerly exalted 
office and preparing to divest himself of all that which constitutes 
his present authority. We follow him through the suffering of re-
jection and contempt to the 'madness' of trauma, which has as its 
climax the repudiation of majesty: 
..• unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, 
forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings 
Come, unbutton here. (III, iv) 
The attempt to remove the trappings of office indicates that awareness 
has come albeit belatedly. 
The tragedy of Lear depicts the drastic change that occurred 
in the conception of political power. The drama carries such impact 
because Lear himself undergoes the transformation in a convulsive 
suddenness. In him is dramatized both the nature of the change and 
the ruins of it. Lear as fallen king and Lear as the end of an idea are 
images drawn together in the final lines of the play spoken by 
Edgar: 
The oldest hath borne most; we that are young 
Shall never see so much, nor live so long. 
The old man Lear has suffered all; the tradition of power that he 
represents invested the ruler with greatness; subsequent leadership 
will never have comparable authority and durability. 
It surprises no-one that a great play by a great artist records 
a fundamental change in belief and social organization. Shakespeare 
has enabled us to appreciate the seismic force of the change by 
enacting it in an intensely moving drama of pain and death, which, 
by its closeness and convincingness of action, brings the larger 
scheme strikingly near. Now if one great artist can represent a 
change of such dimension that has occurred then another can inaugurate 
a development that needs to occur. 
In Women in Love the reader meets an intense and incisive 
diagnosis of human relationship, but he may feel when the book 
closes that nothing positive has been gained. The mechanically 
willed and possessive love between Gerald and Gudrun fails and 
Gerald dies in the snow , but the question of what should replace 
it seems left finally unanswered. The novel ends with stark incon-
clusiveness : 
'Did you need Gerald ? ' she asked one evening. 
'Yes ,' he said. 
'Aren ' t I enough for you ? ' she asked. 
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'No,' he said. 'You are enough for me, as far as a woman 
is concerned. You are all women to me. But I wanted a man 
friend, as eternal as you and I are eternal.' 
'Why aren't I enough ? ' she said. 'You are enough for 
me. I don't want anybody else but you. Why isn't it the same 
with you ?' 
'Having you, I can live all my life without anybody else, 
any other sheer intimacy. But to make it complete, really 
happy, I wanted eternal union with a man too : another kind 
of love,' he said. 
'I don't believe it,' she said. 'It's an obstinacy, a theory, 
a perversity.' 
'Well - ' he said. 
'You can't have two kinds of love. Why should you ~' 
'It seems as if I can't ,' he said. 'Yet I wanted it.' 
'You can't have it, because it's false, impossible,' she said. 
'I don't believe that ,' he answered. 
Birk in' s acknowledged dissatisfaction and the puzzlement it causes 
Ursula might be thought enough to establish the overall failure of 
the novel. Lawrence gives Birk in a lot to say about fulfilment and 
the reform of human relationship , but he does not substantiate thos e 
words, for to do so would consist in presenting their realization. At 
best there is only a sketch of a programme. However, this view mis -
interprets the absence of an embodiment of the le?-ding pronounce-
ments as it misses the subtlety of Birkin's (and so in this instance 
Lawrence' s) predicament. 
Birkin envisages schematically how human relationship could 
be, how for instance men and women could improve their union by 
reorganizing it under the idea of balanced polarity of the sexes. He 
makes exiguous advances in the realization of his penetrating and 
far-reaching thoughts because the accomplishment of his proposals 
implies a quite major transformation in human living, which, needless 
to say, cannot happen overnight, not even in Birk in. The nature of 
an individual life depends on other individual lives. Fundamental 
human growth therefore cannot occur isolated; individual growth of 
this kind must form part of a development in the collective spirit. 
This explains why Birk in encounters incomprehension and opposition , 
and why he seems to get no nearer his goal. Birkin grows only if 
some attuned to his spirit and direction grow with him. Because 
no-one responds sympathetically and Birkin is incapable of initiating 
the process alone, his own growth remains inhibited. But that does 
not., as it should not , shake his confidence in the kind of growth 
required. That he does not, and cannot, supply a fully detailed 
account of what his proposals come to, either for the skeptical or 
for himself , provides no reason for doubting their promise. For the 
inability to give a complete spelling out is a condition of the deep 
and pervasive regeneration desired. To attempt such an account 
would be to betray the imagination: any prefigurement would neces -
sarily be bound by the present state of things , and as such would 
distortedly influence development. In the face of the severest 
incredulity Birkin rightly stands his ground. Thus to fault the 
novel for not delivering what it holds up as the promise, to be dis-
appointed when the disconcertion it effects only increases at the 
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close, is to misunderstand this artistic imagination. 
This contrast of Shakespeare's imaginative rendering with 
Lawrence' s serves to illuminate another contrast. There is a 
marked difference in our approach to each artist and his works . For, 
while it matters little to the appreciation of his work that there is 
only scanty information about Shakespeare the man, Lawrence's 
letters, essays and travel books, as well as the memoirs written 
by others, are an invaluable asset in the understanding and appre-
ciation of his work. Indeed the reader who intends to come to grips 
with the novels feels almost driven to explore the man himself. Full 
biographical description is important for the appreciation of one oeuvre 
and not for another on account of the differences in the problems that 
exercise the imagination. If one work enacts a human development 
already complete, and another sows the seeds of regeneratfon, a 
regeneration that cannot be at all adequately depicted, then our 
interest in the author of the latter must certainly be greater . Pro-
viding the works are borne of integrity, the life of the artist who 
expresses the need for regeneration should be the natural complement 
of the art , for the life will, to a degree, concretely illustrate the 
meaning of the art, and thereby instruct on the merits and defects , 
the difficulties and achievements of the promptings . The life is a 
test of the work , for if the work sincerely urges .a fundamental devel -
opment then the life itself contains the source, and manifests the 
beginnings, of regeneration . 
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4. Connections. The convincingness of the account depends upon 
how well it provides an ordering of the diverse phenomena collected 
as imagination. If there are reasons for the phenomena to be asso-
ciated then the account of the most distinctive features should 
suggest what the reasons might be. 
We began with the imagination as exhibited in the problem of 
regeneration of the self. The discussion yielded a distinction 
between problems whose solutions can be prefigured or fabricated 
and those whose solutions cannot, and so a difference in how the 
imagination is activated. Thus a connection was established between 
the imagination of the self and the scientific imagination, that is, 
between the human and the non-human. But, acknowledging that 
not every problem of the self is a problem of regeneration, for there 
are problems of comprehension, we found that there can be imaginative 
presentment of individual growth already attained. And, as each 
individual self has its collective side, these problems of the self 
were seen to have a collective dimension , a dimension which the 
artist especially explores. The artist possesses the skill of moving 
from the personal to the impersonal imagination, a move involving 
the articulation of publicly accessible material . 
To return to our story . The imaginative process went through 
these two stages: the register ing of a host of imaging experiences 
and the emerging of the reborn self, first kaleidoscopic confusion 
and then understanding. Such a proc ess does not occur unless ori-
ginat ed by a problem of consequence. So far we have investigated 
the imagination as a response to deep problems . But let ' s set prob -
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lems aside to see what remains . 
The capacity to frame images may be exploited, of course, when 
no problem impinges. But as the matter of the problem diminishes, 
or the problem disappears altogether, so the images produced become 
interesting more for their phenomenal properties. The desideratum 
is that they should have the effect of pleasing, exciting or confounding . 
Thus we speak df the imagination being manifested in images (internal, 
or of words, sounds and pigments) which please, excite or confound 
ii1 a fresh manner. Novelty is important for with each repetition of 
an image the sensuous impact lessens. The familiar te.nds to dull, 
and eventually bore, sensibility. What quickens it is the surprising 
and ingenious. Sensibility craves the new delight or horror because 
the frisson once subsided can be recovered only in the stimulus of 
the yet to be experienced. As the stimulus is used up it is discarded. 
But compare this extreme with another, with the imaginative rendering 
that never completely satisfies because it has too much to give. 
Those works we return to again and again overwhelm, for they over-
flow sensibility. What sustains their hold on consciousness is a 
deeper grip. If the works are deep then they are about growth , and 
growth needs cultivation. Works about growth have to be grown into. 
If the work has- to be grown into then it is the work itself - and much 
besides - that nourishes, ever more with each ingestion . 
Eliminating materials and problems of a deep character leaves 
the imagination as the spring of insight and ideas . The perspicacious 
man , the man who understands others, understands their c ircumstance 
and point of view, exhibits , we say , imagination; so too the man 
who invents ways of making life more comfortable, safer and more 
efficient. Now one might be led to think, when reflecting on the 
general necessity for such imagination and its widespread effects, 
that the significance of the imagination lies there. But this would 
be to confuse the greater in number with the greater in nature . 
As the subtlest imagination touches the deepest reaches it pervades 
all consciousness. And as the soundless is invisible it is easy to 
overlook. 
I I 
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